Automatic Verification of Correspondences for Security Protocols by Blanchet, Bruno
ar
X
iv
:0
80
2.
34
44
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
3 F
eb
 20
08
Automatic Verification of Correspondences
for Security Protocols∗
Bruno Blanchet
CNRS, ´Ecole Normale Supe´rieure, INRIA†
Bruno.Blanchet@ens.fr
February 23, 2008
Abstract
We present a new technique for verifying correspondences in security proto-
cols. In particular, correspondences can be used to formalize authentication. Our
technique is fully automatic, it can handle an unbounded number of sessions of the
protocol, and it is efficient in practice. It significantly extends a previous technique
for the verification of secrecy. The protocol is represented in an extension of the
pi calculus with fairly arbitrary cryptographic primitives. This protocol represen-
tation includes the specification of the correspondence to be verified, but no other
annotation. This representation is then translated into an abstract representation by
Horn clauses, which is used to prove the desired correspondence. Our technique
has been proved correct and implemented. We have tested it on various proto-
cols from the literature. The experimental results show that these protocols can be
verified by our technique in less than 1 s.
1 Introduction
The verification of security protocols has already been the subject of numerous re-
search works. It is particularly important since the design of protocols is error-prone,
and errors cannot be detected by testing, since they appear only in the presence of a
malicious adversary. An important trend in this area aims to verify protocols in the
so-called Dolev-Yao model [39], with an unbounded number of sessions, while relying
as little as possible on human intervention. While protocol insecurity is NP-complete
for a bounded number of sessions [65], it is undecidable for an unbounded number
of sessions [41]. Hence, automatic verification for an unbounded number of sessions
cannot be achieved for all protocols. It is typically achieved using language-based tech-
niques such as typing or abstract interpretation, which can handle infinite-state systems
thanks to safe approximations. These techniques are not complete (a correct protocol
∗This paper is an updated and extended version of [13] and [14].
†This research has been done within the INRIA ABSTRACTION project-team (common with the CNRS
and the ´ENS).
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can fail to typecheck, or false attacks can be found by abstract interpretation tools), but
they are sound (when they do not find attacks, the protocol is guaranteed to satisfy the
considered property). This is important for the certification of protocols.
Our goal in this paper is to extend previous work in this line of research by pro-
viding a fully automatic technique for verifying correspondences in security protocols,
without bounding the number of sessions of the protocol. Correspondences are prop-
erties of the form: if the protocol executes some event, then it must have executed
some other events before1. We consider a rich language of correspondences, in which
the events that must have been executed can be described by a logical formula con-
taining conjunctions and disjunctions. Furthermore, we consider both non-injective
correspondences (if the protocol executes some event, then it must have executed some
other events at least once) and injective correspondences (if the protocol executes some
event n times, then it must have executed some other events at least n times). Corre-
spondences, initially named correspondence assertions [71], and the similar notion of
agreement [54] were first introduced to model authentication. Intuitively, a protocol
authenticates A to B if, when B thinks he talks to A, then he actually talks to A.
When B thinks he has run the protocol with A, he executes an event e(A,B). When
A thinks she runs the protocol with B, she executes another event e′(A,B). Authen-
tication is satisfied when, if B executes his event e(A,B), then A has executed her
event e′(A,B). Several variants along this scheme appear in the literature and, as we
show below, our technique can handle most of them. Our correspondences can also
encode secrecy, as follows. A protocol preserves the secrecy of some value M when
the adversary cannot obtain M . We associate an “event” attacker(M) to the fact that
the adversary obtains M , and represent the secrecy of M as “attacker(M) cannot be
executed”, that is, “if attacker(M) has been executed, then false.” More complex
properties can also be specified by our correspondences, for example that all messages
of the protocol have been sent in order; this feature was used in [3].
Our technique is based on a substantial extension of a previous verification tech-
nique for secrecy [1, 13, 69]. More precisely, the protocol is represented in the process
calculus introduced in [1], which is an extension of the pi calculus with fairly arbi-
trary cryptographic primitives. This process calculus is extended with events, used in
the statement of correspondences. These events are the only required annotation of
the protocol; no annotation is needed to help the tool proving correspondences. The
protocol is then automatically translated into a set of Horn clauses. This translation
requires significant extensions with respect to the translation for secrecy given in [1],
and can be seen as an implementation of a type system, as in [1]. Some of these ex-
tensions improve the precision of the analysis, in particular to avoid merging different
nonces. Other extensions define the translation of events. Finally, this set of Horn
clauses is passed to a resolution-based solver, similar to that of [13, 20, 69]. Some mi-
nor extensions of this solver are required to prove correspondences. This solver does
not always terminate, but we show in Section 8.1 that it terminates for a large class of
well-designed protocols, named tagged protocols. Our experiments also demonstrate
that, in practice, it terminates on many examples of protocols.
The main advantages of our method can be summarized as follows. It is fully auto-
1In the CSP terminology, our events correspond to CSP signal events.
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matic; the user only has to code the protocol and the correspondences to prove. It puts
no bounds on the number of sessions of the protocol or the size of terms that the adver-
sary can manipulate. It can handle fairly general cryptographic primitives, including
shared-key encryption, public-key encryption, signatures, one-way hash functions, and
Diffie-Hellman key agreements. It relies on a precise semantic foundation. One limi-
tation of the technique is that, in rare cases, the solving algorithm does not terminate.
The technique is also not complete: the translation into Horn clauses introduces an ab-
straction, which forgets the number of repetitions of each action [17]. This abstraction
is key to the treatment of an unbounded number of sessions. Due to this abstraction, the
tool provides sufficient conditions for proving correspondences, but can fail on correct
protocols. Basically, it fails to prove protocols that first need to keep some value secret
and later reveal it (see Section 5.2.2). In practice, the tool is still very precise and, in
our experiments, it always succeeded in proving protocols that were correct.
Our technique is implemented in the protocol verifier ProVerif, available at http:
//www.proverif.ens.fr/.
Comparison with Other Papers on ProVerif As mentioned above, this paper ex-
tends previous work on the verification of secrecy [1] in order to prove correspon-
dences. Secrecy (defined as the impossibility for the adversary to compute the secret)
and correspondences are trace properties. Other papers deal with the proof of certain
classes of observational equivalences, i.e., that the adversary cannot distinguish certain
processes: [15, 16] deal with the proof of strong secrecy, i.e., that the adversary can-
not see when the value of a secret changes; [18] deals with the proof of equivalences
between processes that differ only by the terms that they contain. Moreover, [18] also
explains how to handle cryptographic primitives defined by equational theories (instead
of rewrite rules) and how to deal with guessing attacks against weak secrets.
As shown in [20], the resolution algorithm terminates for tagged protocols. The
present paper extends this result in Section 8.1, by providing a characterization of
tagged protocols at the level of processes instead of at the level of Horn clauses.
ProVerif can also reconstruct an attack using a derivation from the Horn clauses,
when the proof of a secrecy property fails [6]. Although the present paper does not de-
tail this point, this work has also been extended to the reconstruction of attacks against
non-injective correspondences.
Finally, [2], [3], and [19] present three case studies done at least partly using
ProVerif: [2] studies a certified email protocol, [3] studies the Just Fast Keying pro-
tocol, and [19] studies the Plutus secure file system. These case studies rely partly on
the results presented in this paper.
Related Work We mainly focus on the works that automatically verify correspon-
dences and authentication for security protocols, without bounding the number of ses-
sions.
The NRL protocol analyzer [42, 57], based on narrowing in rewriting systems, can
verify correspondences defined in a rich language of logical formulae [68]. It is sound
and complete, but does not always terminate. Our Horn clause representation is more
abstract than the representation of NRL, which should enable us to terminate more
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often and be more efficient, while remaining precise enough to prove most desired
properties.
Gordon and Jeffrey designed a system named Cryptic for verifying authentication
by typing in security protocols [45–47]. They handle shared-key and public-key cryp-
tography. Our system allows more general cryptographic primitives (including hash
functions and Diffie-Hellman key agreements). Moreover, in our system, no annota-
tion is needed, whereas, in Cryptic, explicit type casts and checks have to be manu-
ally added. However, Cryptic has the advantage that type checking always terminates,
whereas, in some rare cases, our analyzer does not.
Bugliesi et al. [25] define another type system for proving authentication in security
protocols. The main advantage of their system is that it is compositional: it allows
one to prove independently the correctness of the code of each role of the protocol.
However, the form of messages is restricted to certain tagged terms. This approach is
compared with Cryptic in [24].
Backes et al. [10] prove secrecy and authentication for security protocols, using
an abstract-interpretation-based analysis. This analysis builds a causal graph, which
captures the causality among program events; the security properties are proved by
traversing this graph. This analysis can handle an unbounded number of sessions of
the protocol; it always terminates, at the cost of additional abstractions, which may
cause false attacks. It handles shared-key and public-key cryptography, but not Diffie-
Hellman key agreements. It assumes that the messages are typed, so that names can be
distinguished from other terms.
Bodei et al. [21] show message authentication via a control flow analysis on a
process calculus named Lysa. Like [10], they handle shared-key and public-key cryp-
tography, and their analysis always terminates, at the cost of additional abstractions.
The notion of authentication they prove is different from ours: they show message
authentication rather than entity authentication.
Debbabi et al. [36] also verify authentication thanks to a representation of protocols
by inference rules, very similar to our Horn clauses. However, they verify a weaker
notion of authentication (corresponding to aliveness: if B terminates the protocol, then
A must have been alive at some point before), and handle only shared-key encryption.
A few other methods require little human effort, while supporting an unbounded
number of runs: the verifier of [51], based on rank functions, can prove the correctness
of or find attacks against protocols with atomic symmetric or asymmetric keys. Theo-
rem proving [63] often requires manual intervention of the user. An exception to this
is [32], but it deals only with secrecy. The theorem prover TAPS [30] often succeeds
without or with little human intervention.
Model checking [53, 59] in general implies a limit on the number of sessions of
the protocol. This problem has been tackled by [22, 23, 64]. They recycle nonces, to
use only a finite number of them in an infinite number of runs. The technique was
first used for sequential runs, then generalized to parallel runs in [23], but with the
additional restriction that the agents must be “factorisable”. (Basically, a single run of
the agent has to be split into several runs such that each run contains only one fresh
value.)
Strand spaces [44] are a formalism for reasoning about security protocols. They
have been used for elegant manual proofs of authentication [49]. The automatic tool
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Athena [66] combines model checking and theorem proving, and uses strand spaces to
reduce the state space. Scyther [33] uses an extension of Athena’s method with trace
patterns to analyze simultaneously a group of traces. These tools still sometimes limit
the number of sessions to guarantee termination.
Amadio and Prasad [7] note that authentication can be translated into secrecy, by
using a judge process. The translation is limited in that only one message can be
registered by the judge, so the verified authentication property is not exactly the same
as ours.
Outline Section 2 introduces our process calculus. Section 3 defines the correspon-
dences that we verify, including secrecy and various notions of authentication. Sec-
tion 4 outlines the main ideas behind our technique for verifying correspondences.
Section 5 explains the construction of Horn clauses and shows its correctness, Sec-
tion 6 describes our solving algorithm and shows its correctness, and Section 7 applies
these results to the proof of correspondences. Section 8 discusses the termination of
our algorithm: it shows termination for tagged protocols and how to obtain termination
more often in the general case. Section 9 presents some extensions to our framework.
Section 10 gives our experimental results on a selection of security protocols of the
literature, and Section 11 concludes. The proofs of our results are grouped in the ap-
pendices.
2 The Process Calculus
In this section, we present the process calculus that we use to represent security proto-
cols: we give its syntax, semantics, and illustrate it on an example protocol.
2.1 Syntax and Informal Semantics
Figure 1 gives the syntax of terms (data) and processes (programs) of our calculus.
The identifiers a, b, c, k, and similar ones range over names, and x, y, and z range over
variables. The syntax also assumes a set of symbols for constructors and destructors;
we often use f for a constructor and g for a destructor.
Constructors are used to build terms. Therefore, the terms are variables, names,
and constructor applications of the form f(M1, . . . ,Mn); the terms are untyped. On
the other hand, destructors do not appear in terms, but only manipulate terms in pro-
cesses. They are partial functions on terms that processes can apply. The process
let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q tries to evaluate g(M1, . . . ,Mn); if this suc-
ceeds, then x is bound to the result and P is executed, else Q is executed. More
precisely, the semantics of a destructor g of arity n is given by a set def(g) of rewrite
rules of the form g(M1, . . . ,Mn) → M where M1, . . . ,Mn,M are terms without
names, and the variables of M also occur in M1, . . . ,Mn. We extend these rules by
g(M ′1, . . . ,M
′
n) → M
′ if and only if there exist a substitution σ and a rewrite rule
g(M1, . . . ,Mn) → M in def(g) such that M ′i = σMi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
M ′ = σM . We assume that the set def(g) is finite. (It usually contains one or two
rules in examples.) We define destructors by rewrite rules instead of the equalities
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M,N ::= terms
x, y, z variable
a, b, c, k name
f(M1, . . . ,Mn) constructor application
P,Q ::= processes
M〈N〉.P output
M(x).P input
0 nil
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
(νa)P restriction
let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q destructor application
if M = N then P else Q conditional
event(M).P event
Figure 1: Syntax of the process calculus
used in [1]. This definition allows destructors to yield several different results non-
deterministically. (Non-deterministic rewrite rules are used in our modeling of Diffie-
Hellman key agreements; see Section 9.1). Using constructors and destructors, we
can represent data structures and cryptographic operations as summarized in Figure 2.
(We present only probabilistic public-key encryption because, in the computational
model, a secure public-key encryption algorithm must be probabilistic. We have cho-
sen to present deterministic signatures; we could easily model probabilistic signatures
by adding a third argument r containing the random coins, as for encryption. The coins
should be chosen using a restriction (νa) which creates a fresh name a, representing a
fresh random number.)
Constructors and destructors can be public or private. The public ones can be used
by the adversary, which is the case when not stated otherwise. The private ones can
be used only by honest participants. They are useful in practice to model tables of
keys stored in a server, for instance. A public constructor host computes a host name
from a long-term secret key, and a private destructor getkey returns the key from the
host name, and simulates a lookup in a table of pairs (host name, key). Using a public
constructor host allows the adversary to create and register any number of host names
and keys. However, since getkey is private, the adversary cannot compute a key from
the host name, which would break all protocols: host names are public while keys of
honest participants are secret.
The process calculus provides additional instructions for executing events, which
will be used for specifying correspondences. The process event(M).P executes the
event event(M), then executes P .
The other constructs in the syntax of Figure 1 are standard; most of them come
from the pi calculus. The input process M(x).P inputs a message on channel M , and
executes P with x bound to the input message. The output process M〈N〉.P outputs
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Tuples:
Constructor: tuple ntuple(x1, . . . , xn)
Destructors: projections ithn(ntuple(x1, . . . , xn)) → xi
Shared-key encryption:
Constructor: encryption of x under the key y, sencrypt(x, y)
Destructor: decryption sdecrypt(sencrypt(x, y), y) → x
Probabilistic shared-key encryption:
Constructor: encryption of x under the key y with random coins r, sencryptp(x, y, r)
Destructor: decryption sdecryptp(sencryptp(x, y, r), y) → x
Probabilistic public-key encryption:
Constructors: encryption of x under the key y with random coins r, pencryptp(x, y, r)
public key generation from a secret key y, pk(y)
Destructor: decryption pdecryptp(pencryptp(x, pk (y), r), y) → x
Signatures:
Constructors: signature of x with the secret key y, sign(x, y)
public key generation from a secret key y, pk(y)
Destructors: signature verification checksignature(sign(x, y), pk (y)) → x
message without signature getmessage(sign(x, y)) → x
Non-message-revealing signatures:
Constructors: signature of x with the secret key y, nmrsign(x, y)
public key generation from a secret key y, pk(y)
constant true
Destructor: verification nmrchecksign(nmrsign(x, y), pk (y), x) → true
One-way hash functions:
Constructor: hash function h(x)
Table of host names and keys
Constructor: host name from key host(x)
Private destructor: key from host name getkey(host(x)) → x
Figure 2: Constructors and destructors
the message N on the channel M and then executes P . We allow communication
on channels that can be arbitrary terms. (We could adapt our work to the case in
which channels are only names.) Our calculus is monadic (in that the messages are
terms rather than tuples of terms), but a polyadic calculus can be simulated since tuples
are terms. It is also synchronous (in that a process P is executed after the output
of a message). The nil process 0 does nothing. The process P | Q is the parallel
composition ofP andQ. The replication !P represents an unbounded number of copies
of P in parallel. The restriction (νa)P creates a new name a and then executes P . The
conditional if M = N then P else Q executes P if M and N reduce to the same term
at runtime; otherwise, it executes Q. We define let x = M in P as syntactic sugar for
P{M/x}. As usual, we may omit an else clause when it consists of 0.
The name a is bound in the process (νa)P . The variable x is bound in P in the
processes M(x).P and let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q. We write fn(P ) and
fv(P ) for the sets of names and variables free in P , respectively. A process is closed if
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E,P ∪ { 0 } → E,P (Red Nil)
E,P ∪ { !P } → E,P ∪ {P, !P } (Red Repl)
E,P ∪ {P | Q } → E,P ∪ {P,Q } (Red Par)
E,P ∪ { (νa)P } → E ∪ {a′},P ∪ {P{a′/a} } (Red Res)
where a′ /∈ E.
E,P ∪ {N〈M〉.Q,N(x).P } → E,P ∪ {Q,P{M/x} } (Red I/O)
E,P ∪ { let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q } → E,P ∪ {P{M
′/x} }
if g(M1, . . . ,Mn) →M ′ (Red Destr 1)
E,P ∪ { let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q } → E,P ∪ {Q } (Red Destr 2)
if there exists no M ′ such that g(M1, . . . ,Mn) →M ′
E,P ∪ { if M = M then P else Q } → E,P ∪ {P } (Red Cond 1)
E,P ∪ { if M = N then P else Q } → E,P ∪ {Q } (Red Cond 2)
if M 6= N
E,P ∪ { event(M).P } → E,P ∪ {P } (Red Event)
Figure 3: Operational semantics
it has no free variables; it may have free names. We identify processes up to renaming
of bound names and variables. We write {M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn} for the substitution
that replaces x1, . . . , xn with M1, . . . , Mn, respectively.
2.2 Operational Semantics
A semantic configuration is a pair E,P where the environment E is a finite set of
names and P is a finite multiset of closed processes. The environment E must contain
at least all free names of processes in P . The configuration {a1, . . . , an}, {P1, . . . ,
Pn} corresponds intuitively to the process (νa1) . . . (νan)(P1 | . . . | Pn). The seman-
tics of the calculus is defined by a reduction relation → on semantic configurations,
shown in Figure 3. The rule (Red Res) is the only one that uses renaming. This is
important so that the parameters of events are not renamed after the execution of the
event, to be able to compare them with the parameters of events executed later. This
semantics is superficially different from those of [1, 14], which were defined using a
structural congruence relation and a reduction relation on processes. The new seman-
tics (in particular the renaming point mentioned above) provides simplifications in the
definitions of correspondences (Definitions 2, 3, 6, 7, and 9) and in the proofs that
correspondences hold.
8
2.3 Example
As a running example, we consider a simplified version of the Needham-Schroeder
public-key protocol [60], with the correction by Lowe [53], in which host names are
replaced by public keys, which makes interaction with a server useless. (The version
tested in the benchmarks is the full version. Obviously, our tool can verify much more
complex protocols; we use this simple example for illustrative purposes.) The protocol
contains the following messages:
Message 1. A→ B : {a, pkA}pkB
Message 2. B → A : {a, b, pkB}pkA
Message 3. A→ B : {b}pkB
A first sends to B a nonce (fresh name) a encrypted under the public key of B. B
decrypts this message using his secret key skB and replies with the nonce a, a fresh
nonce he chooses b, and its own public key pkB , all encrypted under pkA. When A
receives this message, she decrypts it. When A sees the nonce a, she is convinced
that B answered since only B can decrypt the first message and obtain a. Then A
replies with the nonce b encrypted under pkB . B decrypts this message. When B sees
the nonce b, he is convinced that A replied, since only A could decrypt the second
message and obtain b. The presence of pkA in the first message and pkB in the second
message makes explicit that these messages are for sessions between A and B, and so
avoids man-in-the-middle attacks, such as the well-known attack found by Lowe [53].
This protocol can be represented in our calculus by the process P , explained below:
PA(skA, pkA, pkB) = !c(x pkB).(νa)event(e1(pkA, x pkB, a)).
(νr1)c〈pencryptp((a, pkA), x pkB, r1)〉.
c(m).let (= a, x b,= x pkB) = pdecryptp(m, skA) in
event(e3(pkA, x pkB, a, x b)).(νr3)c〈pencryptp(x b, x pkB, r3)〉
if x pkB = pkB then
event(eA(pkA, x pkB, a, x b)).c〈sencrypt(sAa, a)〉.c〈sencrypt(sAb, x b)〉
PB(skB, pkB, pkA) = !c(m
′).let (x a, x pkA) = pdecryptp(m
′, skB) in (νb)
event(e2(x pkA, pkB, x a, b)).(νr2)c〈pencryptp((x a, b, pkB), x pkA, r2)〉.
c(m′′).let (= b) = pdecryptp(m
′′, skB) in
if x pkA = pkA then
event(eB(x pkA, pkB, x a, b)).c〈sencrypt(sBa, x a)〉.c〈sencrypt(sBb, b)〉
P = (νskA)(νskB)let pkA = pk(skA) in let pkB = pk (skB) in
c〈pkA〉c〈pkB〉.(PA(skA, pkA, pkB) | PB(skB, pkB, pkA))
The channel c is public: the adversary can send and listen on it. We use a single public
channel and not two or more channels because the adversary could take a message from
one channel and relay it on another channel, thus removing any difference between the
channels. The process P begins with the creation of the secret and public keys of A
and B. The public keys are output on channel c to model that the adversary has them
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in its initial knowledge. Then the protocol itself starts: PA representsA, PB represents
B. Both principals can run an unbounded number of sessions, so PA and PB start with
replications.
We consider that A and B are both willing to talk to any principal. So, to de-
termine to whom A will talk, we consider that A first inputs a message containing
the public key x pkB of its interlocutor. (This interlocutor is therefore chosen by
the adversary.) Then A starts a protocol run by choosing a nonce a, and executing
the event e1(pkA, x pkB, a). Intuitively, this event records that A sent Message 1
of the protocol, for a run with the participant of public key x pkB , using the nonce
a. Event e1 is placed before the actual output of Message 1; this is necessary for
the desired correspondences to hold: if event e1 followed the output of Message 1,
one would not be able to prove that event e1 must have been executed, even though
Message 1 must have been sent, because Message 1 could be sent without execut-
ing event e1. The situation is similar for events e2 and e3 below. Then A sends
the first message of the protocol pencryptp((a, pkA), x pkB, r1), where r1 are fresh
coins, used to model that public-key encryption is probabilistic. A waits for the
second message and decrypts it using her secret key skA. If decryption succeeds,
A checks that the message has the right form using the pattern-matching construct
let (= a, xb,= x pkB) = pdecryptp(m, skA) in . . . This construct is syntactic sugar
for let y = pdecryptp(m, skA) in let x1 = 1th3(y) in let xb = 2th3(y) in let x3 =
3th3(y) in if x1 = a then if x3 = x pkB then . . . Then A executes the event
e3(pkA, x pkB , a, x b), to record that she has received Message 2 and sent Message 3
of the protocol, in a session with the participant of public key x pkB , and nonces a and
x b. Finally, she sends the last message of the protocol pencryptp(x b, x pkB, r3).
After sending this message, A executes some actions needed only for specifying prop-
erties of the protocol. When x pkB = pkB , that is, when the session is between A and
B, A executes the event eA(pkA, x pkB, a, x b), to record that A ended a session of
the protocol, with the participant of public key x pkB and nonces a and x b. A also
outputs the secret name sAa encrypted under the nonce a and the secret name sAb
encrypted under the nonce x b. These outputs are helpful in order to formalize the se-
crecy of the nonces. Our tool can prove the secrecy of free names, but not the secrecy
of bound names (such as a) or of variables (such as x b). In order to overcome this
limitation, we publish the encryption of a free name sAa under a; then sAa is secret if
and only if the nonce a chosen by A is secret. Similarly, sAb is secret if and only if the
nonce x b received by A is secret.
The process PB proceeds similarly: it executes the protocol, with the additional
event e2(x pkA, pkB, x a, b) to record that Message 1 has been received and Mes-
sage 2 has been sent by B, in a session with the participant of public key x pkA and
nonces x a and b. After finishing the protocol itself, when x pkA = pkA, that is,
when the session is between A and B, PB executes the event eB(x pkA, pkB, x a, b),
to record that B finished the protocol, and outputs sBa encrypted under x a and sBb
encrypted under b, to model the secrecy of x a and b respectively.
The events will be used in order to formalize authentication. For example, we
formalize that, if A ends a session of the protocol, then B has started a session of
the protocol with the same nonces by requiring that, if eA(x1, x2, x3, x4) has been
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executed, then e2(x1, x2, x3, x4) has been executed.2
3 Definition of Correspondences
In this section, we formally define the correspondences that we verify. We prove cor-
respondences of the form “if an event e has been executed, then events e11, . . . , e1l1
have been executed, or . . . , or em1, . . . , emlm have been executed”. These events may
include arguments, which allows one to relate the values of variables at the various
events. Furthermore, we can replace the event e with the fact that the adversary knows
some term (which allows us to prove secrecy properties), or that a certain message has
been sent on a certain channel. We can prove that each execution of e corresponds
to a distinct execution of some events ejk (injective correspondences, defined in Sec-
tion 3.2), and we can prove that the events ejk have been executed in a certain order
(general correspondences, defined in Section 3.3).
We assume that the protocol is executed in the presence of an adversary that can
listen to all messages, compute, and send all messages it has, following the so-called
Dolev-Yao model [39]. Thus, an adversary can be represented by any process that has
a set of public names Init in its initial knowledge and that does not contain events.
(Although the initial knowledge of the adversary contains only names in Init , one can
give any terms to the adversary by sending them on a channel in Init .)
Definition 1 Let Init be a finite set of names. The closed process Q is an Init-
adversary if and only if fn(Q) ⊆ Init and Q does not contain events.
3.1 Non-injective Correspondences
Next, we define when a trace satisfies an atom α, generated by the following grammar:
α ::= atom
attacker(M) attacker knowledge
message(M,M ′) message on a channel
event(M) event
Intuitively, a trace satisfies attacker(M) when the attacker has M , or equivalently,
when M has been sent on a public channel in Init . It satisfies message(M,M ′) when
the message M ′ has been sent on channel M . Finally, it satisfies event(M) when the
event event(M) has been executed.
Definition 2 We say that a trace T = E0,P0 →∗ E′,P ′ satisfies attacker(M) if and
only if T contains a reduction E,P ∪ { c〈M〉.Q, c(x).P } → E,P ∪ {Q,P{M/x} }
for some E, P , x, P , Q, and c ∈ Init .
We say that a trace T = E0,P0 →∗ E′,P ′ satisfies message(M,M ′) if and only
if T contains a reduction E,P ∪ {M〈M ′〉.Q,M(x).P } → E,P ∪ {Q,P{M ′/x} }
for some E, P , x, P , Q.
2For this purpose, the event eA must not be executed when A thinks she talks to the adversary. Indeed,
in this case, it is correct that no event has been executed by the interlocutor of A, since the adversary never
executes events.
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We say that a trace T = E0,P0 →∗ E′,P ′ satisfies event(M) if and only if T
contains a reduction E,P ∪ { event(M).P } → E,P ∪ {P } for some E, P , P .
The correspondence α ⇒
∨m
j=1
(
αj  
∧lj
k=1 event(Mjk)
)
, formally defined
below, means intuitively that, if an instance of α is satisfied, then for some j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, the considered instance of α is an instance of αj and a corresponding
instance of the each of the events event(Mj1), . . . , event(Mjlj ) has been executed.3
Definition 3 The closed process P0 satisfies the correspondence
α⇒
m∨
j=1

αj  
lj∧
k=1
event(Mjk)


against Init -adversaries if and only if, for any Init -adversaryQ, for any E0 containing
fn(P0)∪Init∪fn(α)∪
⋃
j fn(αj)∪
⋃
j,k fn(Mjk), for any substitution σ, for any trace
T = E0, {P0, Q} →∗ E′,P ′, if T satisfies σα, then there exist σ′ and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
such that σ′αj = σα and, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , lj}, T satisfies event(σ′Mjk) as well.
This definition is very general; we detail some interesting particular cases below.
When m = 0, the disjunction∨mj=1 . . . is denoted by false. When α = αj for all j, we
abbreviate the correspondence by α 
∨m
j=1
∧lj
k=1 event(Mjk). This correspondence
means that, if an instance of α is satisfied, then for some j ≤ m, a corresponding
instance of event(Mj1), . . . , event(Mjlj ) has been executed. The variables in α
are universally quantified (because, in Definition 3, σ is universally quantified). The
variables in Mjk that do not occur in α are existentially quantified (because σ′ is exis-
tentially quantified).
Example 1 In the process of Section 2.3, the correspondence event(eB(x1, x2, x3,
x4)) event(e1(x1, x2, x3))∧ event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4))∧ event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4))
means that, if the event eB(x1, x2, x3, x4) has been executed, then the events e1(x1,
x2, x3), e2(x1, x2, x3, x4), and e3(x1, x2, x3, x4) have been executed, with the same
value of the arguments x1, x2, x3, x4.
The correspondence
event(R received(msg(x, z))) ⇒
(event(R received(msg(x, (z′,Auth)))) 
event(S has(k,msg(x, (z′,Auth))))∧
event(TTP send(sign((sencrypt(msg(x, (z′,Auth)), k), x), skTTP))))
∨ (event(R received(msg(x, (z′,NoAuth)))) 
event(S has(k,msg(x, (z′,NoAuth))))∧
event(TTP send(sign(sencrypt(msg(x, (z′,NoAuth)), k), skTTP))))
3The implementation in ProVerif uses a slightly different notation: αj is omitted, but additionnally equal-
ity tests are allowed on the right-hand side of , so that one can check that α is actually an instance of αj .
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means that, if the event R received(msg(x, z)) has been executed, then two cases can
happen: either z = (z′,Auth) or z = (z′,NoAuth) for some z′. In both cases,
the events TTP send(certificate) and S has(k,msg(x, z)) have been executed for
some k, but with a different value of certificate: certificate = sign((S2TTP , x),
skTTP) when z = (z′,Auth), and certificate = sign(S2TTP , skTTP) when z =
(z′,NoAuth), with S2TTP = sencrypt(msg(x, z), k). A similar correspondence was
used in our study of a certified email protocol, in collaboration with Martı´n Abadi [2,
Section 5, Proposition 4]. We refer to that paper for additional details.
The following definitions are particular cases of Definition 3.
Definition 4 The closed process P preserves the secrecy of all instances of M from
Init if and only if it satisfies the correspondence attacker(M)  false against Init-
adversaries.
When M is a free name, this definition is equivalent to that of [1].
Example 2 The process P of Section 2.3 preserves the secrecy of sAa when the cor-
respondence attacker(sAa)  false is satisfied. In this case, intuitively, P preserves
the secrecy of the nonce a that A chooses. The situation is similar for sAb, sBa , and
sBb.
Definition 5 Non-injective agreement is a correspondence of the form event(e(x1,
. . . , xn)) event(e
′(x1, . . . , xn)).
Intuitively, the correspondence event(e(x1, . . . , xn)) event(e′(x1, . . . , xn)) means
that, if an event e(M1, . . . ,Mn) is executed, then the event e′(M1, . . . ,Mn) has also
been executed. This definition can be used to represent Lowe’s notion of non-injective
agreement [54].
Example 3 In the example of Section 2.3, the correspondence event(eA(x1, x2, x3,
x4))  event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4)) means that, if A executes an event eA(x1, x2, x3,
x4), then B has executed the event e2(x1, x2, x3, x4). So, if A terminates the protocol
thinking she talks to B, then B is actually involved in the protocol. Moreover, the
agreement on the parameter of the events, pkA = x pkA, x pkB = pkB , a = x a,
and x b = b implies that B actually thinks he talks to A, and that A and B agree on the
values of the nonces.
The correspondence event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))  event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4)) is
similar, after swapping the roles of A and B.
3.2 Injective Correspondences
Definition 6 We say that the event event(M) is executed at step τ in a trace
T = E0,P0 →∗ E′,P ′ if and only if the τ -th reduction of T is of the form
E,P ∪ { event(M).P } → E,P ∪ {P } for some E, P , P .
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Intuitively, an injective correspondence event(M)  inj event(M ′) requires
that each event event(σM) is enabled by distinct events event(σM ′), while a non-
injective correspondence event(M)  event(M ′) allows several events event(σM)
to be enabled by the same event event(σM ′). We denote by [inj] an optional inj
marker: it can be either inj or nothing. When [inj] = inj, an injective correspondence
is required. When [inj] is nothing, the correspondence does not need to be injective.
Definition 7 The closed process P0 satisfies the correspondence
event(M) ⇒
m∨
j=1

event(Nj) 
lj∧
k=1
[inj]jkevent(Mjk)


against Init -adversaries if and only if, for any Init -adversaryQ, for any E0 containing
fn(P0)∪Init∪fn(M)∪
⋃
j fn(Nj)∪
⋃
j,k fn(Mjk), for any trace T = E0, {P0, Q} →∗
E′,P ′, there exist functions φjk from a subset of steps in T to steps in T such that
• For all τ , if the event event(σM) is executed at step τ in T for some σ, then
there exist σ′ and j such that σ′Nj = σM and, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , lj}, φjk(τ) is
defined and event(σ′Mjk) is executed at step φjk(τ) in T .
• If [inj]jk = inj, then φjk is injective.
The functions φjk map execution steps of events event(σM) to the execution steps of
the events event(σ′Mjk) that enable event(σM). When [inj]jk = inj, the injectivity
of φjk guarantees that distinct executions of event(σM) correspond to distinct execu-
tions of event(σ′Mjk). When M = Nj for all j, we abbreviate the correspondence
by event(M) 
∨m
j=1
∧lj
k=1[inj]jkevent(Mjk), as in the non-injective case.
Woo and Lam’s correspondence assertions [71] are a particular case of this defi-
nition. Indeed, they consider properties of the form: if γ1 or . . . or γk have been exe-
cuted, then µ1 or . . . or µm must have been executed, denoted by γ1 | . . . | γk →֒ µ1 |
. . . | µm. Such a correspondence assertion is formalized in our setting by for all i ∈
{1, . . . , k}, the process satisfies the correspondence event(γi) 
∨m
j=1 inj event(µj).
Remark 1 Correspondences α ⇒
∨m
j=1
(
αj  
∧lj
k=1[inj]jkevent(Mjk)
)
with α =
attacker(M) and at least one inj marker would always be wrong: the adversary can
always repeat the output of M on one of his channels any number of times. With
α = message(M,M ′) and at least one inj marker, the correspondence may be true
only when the adversary cannot execute the corresponding output. For simplicity, we
focus on the case α = event(M) only.
Definition 8 Injective agreement is a correspondence of the form event(e(x1, . . . ,
xn)) inj event(e
′(x1, . . . , xn)).
Injective agreement requires that the number of executions of event(e(M1, . . . ,Mn))
is smaller than the number of executions of event(e′(M1, . . . ,Mn)): each execution
of event(e(M1, . . . ,Mn)) corresponds to a distinct execution of event(e′(M1, . . . ,
Mn)). This corresponds to Lowe’s agreement specification [54].
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Example 4 In the example of Section 2.3, the correspondence event(eA(x1, x2, x3,
x4))  inj event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4)) means that each execution of event(eA(x1, x2,
x3, x4)) corresponds to a distinct execution of event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4)). So each com-
pleted session of A talking to B corresponds to a distinct session of B talking to A,
and A and B agree on the values of the nonces.
The correspondence event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))  inj event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4)) is
similar, after swapping the roles of A and B.
3.3 General Correspondences
Correspondences also give information on the order in which events are executed. In-
deed, if we have the correspondence
event(M) ⇒
m∨
j=1

event(Nj) 
lj∧
k=1
[inj]jkevent(Mjk)


then the events event(Mjk) for k ≤ lj have been executed before event(Nj). For-
mally, in the definition of injective correspondences, we can define φjk such that
φjk(τ) ≤ τ when φjk is defined. (The inequality τ ′ ≤ τ means that τ ′ occurs be-
fore τ in the trace.) Indeed, otherwise, by considering the prefix of the trace that stops
just after τ , we would contradict the correspondence. In this section, we exploit this
point to define more general properties involving the ordering of events.
Let us first consider some examples. Using the process of Section 2.3, we will
denote by
event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4)) (inj event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4)) 
(inj event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4)) inj event(e1(x1, x2, x3))))
(1)
the correspondence that means that each execution of the event eB(x1, x2, x3, x4) cor-
responds to distinct executions of the events e1(x1, x2, x3), e2(x1, x2, x3, x4), and
e3(x1, x2, x3, x4) in this order: each execution of eB(x1, x2, x3, x4) is preceded by a
distinct execution of e3(x1, x2, x3, x4), which is itself preceded by a distinct execution
of e2(x1, x2, x3, x4), which is itself preceded by a distinct execution of e1(x1, x2, x3).
This correspondence shows that, when B terminates the protocol talking with A, A and
B have exchanged all messages of the protocol in the expected order. This correspon-
dence is not equivalent to the conjunction of the correspondences event(eB(x1, x2, x3,
x4))  inj event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4)), event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4))  inj event(e2(x1,
x2, x3, x4)), and event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4))  inj event(e1(x1, x2, x3)), because (1)
may be true even when, in order to prove that e2 is executed, we need to know that
eB has been executed, and not only that e3 has been executed and, similarly, in or-
der to prove that e1 has been executed, we need to know that eB has been executed,
and not only that e2 has been executed. Using general correspondences such as (1) is
therefore strictly more expressive than using injective correspondences. A correspon-
dence similar to (1) has been used in our study of the Just Fast Keying protocol, one of
the proposed replacements for IKE in IPSec, in collaboration with Martı´n Abadi and
Ce´dric Fournet [3, Appendix B.5].
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As a more generic example, the correspondence event(M) ⇒
∨m
j=1
(
event(Mj)
 
∧lj
k=1
(
[inj]jkevent(Mjk) 
∨mjk
j′=1
∧ljkj′
k′=1[inj]jkj′k′event(Mjkj′k′)
))
means that,
if an instance of event(M) has been executed, then there exists j such that this in-
stance of event(M) is an instance of event(Mj) and for all k, a corresponding in-
stance of event(Mjk) has been executed before event(Mj), and there exists j′k such
that for all k′ a corresponding instance of event(Mjkj′
k
k′) has been executed before
event(Mjk).
Let us now consider the general definition. We denote by k a sequence of indices k.
The empty sequence is denoted ǫ. When j = j1 . . . jn and k = k1 . . . kn are sequences
of the same length, we denote by jk the sequence obtained by taking alternatively
one index in each sequence j and k: jk = j1k1 . . . jnkn. We sometimes use jk as
an identifier that denotes a sequence obtained in this way; for instance, “for all jk,
φjk is injective” abbreviates “for all j and k of the same length, φjk is injective”.
We only consider sequences jk that occur in the correspondence. For instance, for
the correspondence event(M) ⇒
∨m
j=1
(
event(Mj) 
∧lj
k=1
(
[inj]jkevent(Mjk) ∨mjk
j′=1
∧ljkj′
k′=1[inj]jkj′k′event(Mjkj′k′)
))
, we consider the sequences jk = ǫ, jk = jk,
and jk = jkj′k′ where 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ k ≤ lj , 1 ≤ j′ ≤ mjk, and 1 ≤ k′ ≤ ljkj′ .
Given a family of indices J = (jk)k indexed by sequences of indices k, we define
makejk(k, J) by makejk(ǫ, J) = ǫ and makejk(kk, J) = makejk(k, J)jkk. Less
formally, if k = k1k2k3 . . ., we have makejk(k, J) = jǫk1jk1k2jk1k2k3 . . . Intuitively,
the correspondence contains disjunctions over indices j and conjunctions over indices
k, so we would like to express quantifications of the form ∃jǫ∀k1∃jk1∀k2∃jk1k2∀k3 . . .
on the sequence jǫk1jk1k2jk1k2k3 . . .. The notation makejk(k, J) allows us to replace
such a quantification with the quantification ∃J∀k on the sequence makejk(k, J).
Definition 9 The closed process P0 satisfies the correspondence
event(M) ⇒
m∨
j=1

event(Mj) 
lj∧
k=1
[inj]jkqjk


where
qjk = event(Mjk) 
mjk∨
j=1
ljkj∧
k=1
[inj]jkjkqjkjk
against Init -adversaries if and only if, for any Init -adversaryQ, for any E0 containing
fn(P0)∪Init∪fn(M)∪
⋃
j fn(Mj)∪
⋃
jk fn(Mjk), for any trace T = E0, {P0, Q} →∗
E′,P ′, there exists a function φjk for each non-empty jk, such that for all non-empty
jk, φjk maps a subset of steps of T to steps of T and
• For all τ , if the event event(σM) is executed at step τ in T for some σ, then
there exist σ′ and J = (jk)k such that σ′Mjǫ = σM and, for all non-empty
k, φmakejk(k,J)(τ) is defined and event(σ′Mmakejk(k,J)) is executed at step
φmakejk(k,J)(τ) in T .
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• For all non-empty jk, if [inj]jk = inj, then φjk is injective.
• For all non-empty jk, for all j and k, if φjkjk(τ) is defined, then φjk(τ) is
defined and φjkjk(τ) ≤ φjk(τ). For all j and k, if φjk(τ) is defined, then
φjk(τ) ≤ τ .
We abbreviate by qjk = event(Mjk) the correspondence qjk = event(Mjk)  ∨mjk
j=1
∧ljkj
k=1[inj]jkjkqjkjk when mjk = 1 and ljk1 = 0, that is, the disjunction∨mjk
j=1
∧ljkj
k=1[inj]jkjkqjkjk is true. Injective correspondences are then a particular case
of general correspondences.
The function φjk maps the execution steps of instances of event(M) to the execu-
tion steps of the corresponding instances of event(Mjk). The first item of Definition 9
guarantees that the required events have been executed. The second item means that,
when the inj marker is present, the correspondence is injective. Finally, the third item
guarantees that the events have been executed in the expected order.
Example 5 Let us consider again the correspondence (1). Using the notations of
Definition 9, this correspondence is written event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))  inj q11
(or event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4)) ⇒ event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))  inj q11), where
q11 = event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4))  inj q1111, q1111 = event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4))  
inj q111111, and q111111 = event(e1(x1, x2, x3)). By Definition 9, this correspondence
means that there exist functions φ11, φ1111, and φ111111 such that:
• For all τ , if the event event(σeB(x1, x2, x3, x4)) is executed at step τ for some
σ, then φ11(τ), φ1111(τ), and φ111111(τ) are defined, and event(σe3(x1, x2, x3,
x4)) is executed at step φ11(τ), event(σe2(x1, x2, x3, x4)) is executed at step
φ1111(τ), and event(σe1(x1, x2, x3)) is executed at step φ111111(τ). (Here,
σ′ = σ since all variables of the correspondence occur in event(eB(x1, x2, x3,
x4)). Moreover, jk = 1 for all k and the non-empty sequences k are 1, 11,
and 111, since all conjunctions and disjunctions have a single element. The
sequences makejk(k, J) are then 11, 1111, and 111111.)
• The functions φ11, φ1111, and φ111111 are injective, so distinct executions of
eB(x1, x2, x3, x4) correspond to distinct executions of e1(x1, x2, x3), e2(x1, x2,
x3, x4), and e3(x1, x2, x3, x4).
• When φ111111(τ) is defined, φ111111(τ) ≤ φ1111(τ) ≤ φ11(τ) ≤ τ , so the
events e1(x1, x2, x3), e2(x1, x2, x3, x4), and e3(x1, x2, x3, x4) are executed in
this order, before eB(x1, x2, x3, x4).
Similarly, general correspondences allow us to express that, if a protocol participant
successfully terminates with honest interlocutors, then the expected messages of the
protocol have been exchanged between the protocol participants, in the expected order.
This notion is the formal counterpart of the notion of matching conversations initially
introduced in the computational model by Bellare and Rogaway [11]. This notion of
authentication is also used in [34].
We first focus on non-injective correspondences, and postpone the treatment of
general correspondences to Section 7.2.
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4 Automatic Verification: from Secrecy to Correspon-
dences
Let us first summarize our analysis for secrecy. The clauses use two predicates:
attacker and message, where attacker(M) means that the attacker may have the
message M and message(M,M ′) means that the message M ′ may be sent on chan-
nel M . The clauses relate atoms that use these predicates as follows. A clause
message(M1,M
′
1)∧ . . .∧message(Mn,M
′
n) ⇒ message(M,M
′) is generated when
the process outputs M ′ on channel M after receiving M ′1, . . . , M ′n on channels M1,
. . . , Mn respectively. A clause attacker(M1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(Mn) ⇒ attacker(M)
is generated when the attacker can compute M from M1, . . . , Mn. The clause
message(x, y) ∧ attacker(x) ⇒ attacker(y) means that the attacker can listen on
channel x when he has x, and the clause attacker(x) ∧ attacker(y) ⇒ message(x, y)
means that the attacker can send any message y he has on any channel x he has. When
attacker(M) is derivable from the clauses the attacker may have M , that is, when
attacker(M) is not derivable from the clauses, we are sure that the attacker cannot
have M , but the converse is not true, because the Horn clauses can be applied any
number of times, which is not true in general for all actions of the process. Similarly,
when message(M,M ′) is derivable from the clauses, the message M ′ may be sent on
channel M . Hence our analysis overapproximates the execution of actions.
Let us now consider that we want to prove a correspondence, for instance
event(e1(x))  event(e2(x)). In order to prove this correspondence, we can
overapproximate the executions of event e1: if we prove the correspondence with
this overapproximation, it will also hold in the exact semantics. So we can eas-
ily extend our analysis for secrecy with an additional predicate event, such that
event(M) means that event(M) may have been executed. We generate clauses
message(M1,M
′
1) ∧ . . . ∧ message(Mn,M
′
n) ⇒ event(M) when the process exe-
cutes event(M) after receiving M ′1, . . . , M ′n on channels M1, . . . , Mn respectively.
However, such an overapproximation cannot be done for the event e2: if we prove
the correspondence after overapproximating the execution of e2, we are not really sure
that e2 will be executed, so the correspondence may be wrong in the exact semantics.
Therefore, we have to use a different method for treating e2.
We use the following idea: we fix the exact set E of allowed events e2(M) and,
in order to prove event(e1(x))  event(e2(x)), we check that only events e1(M)
for M such that e2(M) ∈ E can be executed. If we prove this property for any
value of E , we have proved the desired correspondence. So we introduce a predi-
cate m-event, such that m-event(e2(M)) is true if and only if e2(M) ∈ E . We gen-
erate clauses message(M1,M ′1) ∧ . . . ∧ message(Mn,M ′n) ∧ m-event(e2(M0)) ⇒
message(M,M ′) when the process outputsM ′ on channelM after executing the event
e2(M0) and receiving M ′1, . . . , M ′n on channels M1, . . . , Mn respectively. In other
words, the output of M ′ on channel M can be executed only when m-event(e2(M0))
is true, that is, e2(M0) ∈ E . (When the output of M ′ on channel M is under sev-
eral events, the clause contains several m-event atoms in its hypothesis. We also have
similar clauses with event(e1(M)) instead of message(M,M ′) when the event e1 is
executed after executing e2 and receiving M ′1, . . . , M ′n on channels M1, . . . , Mn re-
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spectively.)
For instance, if the events e2(M1) and e2(M2) are executed in a certain trace
of the protocol, we define E = {e2(M1), e2(M2)}, so that m-event(e2(M1)) and
m-event(e2(M2)) are true and all other m-event facts are false. Then we show that
the only events e1 that may be executed are e1(M1) and e1(M2). We prove a similar
result for all values of E , which proves the desired correspondence.
In order to determine whether an atom is derivable from the clauses, we use a
resolution-based algorithm. The resolution is performed for an unknown value of E .
So, basically, we keep m-event atoms without trying to evaluate them (which we can-
not do since E is unknown). In the vocabulary of resolution, we never select m-event
atoms. (We detail this point in Section 6.1.) Thus the obtained result holds for any value
of E , which allows us to prove correspondences. In order to prove the correspondence
event(e1(x))  event(e2(x)), we show that event(e1(M)) is derivable only when
m-event(e2(M)) holds. We transform the initial set of clauses into a set of clauses
that derives the same atoms. If, in the obtained set of clauses, all clauses that conclude
event(e1(M)) contain m-event(e2(M)) in their hypotheses, then event(e1(M)) is
derivable only when m-event(e2(M)) holds, so the desired correspondence holds.
We still have to solve one problem. For simplicity, we have considered that terms,
which represent messages, are directly used in clauses. However, in order to repre-
sent nonces in our analysis for secrecy, we use a special encoding of names: a name a
created by a restriction (νa) is represented by a function a[M1, . . . ,Mn] of the mes-
sages M1, . . . ,Mn received above the restriction, so that names created after receiving
different messages are distinguished in the analysis (which is important for the preci-
sion of the analysis). However, this encoding still merges names created by the same
restriction after receiving the same messages. For example, in the process !c(x)(νa),
the names created by (νa) are represented by a[x], so several names created for the
same value of x are merged. This merging is not acceptable for the verification of cor-
respondences, because when we prove event(e1(x))  event(e2(x)), we must make
sure that x contains exactly the same names in e1(x) and in e2(x). In order to solve
this problem, we label each replication with a session identifier i, which is an integer
that takes a different value for each copy of the process generated by the replication.
We add session identifiers as arguments to our encoding of names, which becomes
a[M1, . . . ,Mn, i1, . . . , in′ ] where i1, . . . , in′ are the session identifiers of the replica-
tions above the restriction (νa). For example, in the process !c(x)(νa), the names
created by (νa) are represented by a[x, i]. Each execution of the restriction is then
associated with a distinct value of the session identifiers i1, . . . , in′ , so each name has
a distinct encoding. We detail and formalize this encoding in Section 5.1.
5 From Processes to Horn Clauses
In this section, we first explain the instrumentation of processes with session identifiers.
Next, we explain the translation of processes into Horn clauses.
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5.1 Instrumented Processes
We consider a closed process P0 representing the protocol we wish to check. We
assume that the bound names of P0 have been renamed so that they are pairwise distinct
and distinct from names in Init ∪ fn(P0) and in the correspondence to prove. We
denote by Q a particular adversary; below, we prove the correspondence properties
for any Q. Furthermore, we assume that, in the initial configuration E0, {P0, Q}, the
names of E0 not in Init ∪ fn(P0) or in the correspondence to prove have been renamed
to fresh names, and the bound names of Q have been renamed so that they are pairwise
distinct and fresh. (These renamings do not change the satisfied correspondences, since
(νa)P and the renamed process (νa′)P{a′/a} reduce to the same configuration by
(Red Res).) After encoding names, the terms are represented by patterns p (or “terms”,
but we prefer the word “patterns” in order to avoid confusion), which are generated by
the following grammar:
p ::= patterns
x, y, z, i variable
a[p1, . . . , pn, i1, . . . , in′ ] name
f(p1, . . . , pn) constructor application
For each name a in P0 we have a corresponding pattern construct a[p1, . . . , pn, i1,
. . . , in′ ]. We treat a as a function symbol, and write a[p1, . . . , pn, i1, . . . , in′ ] rather
than a(p1, . . . , pn, i1, . . . , in′) only to distinguish names from constructors. The sym-
bol a in a[. . .] is called a name function symbol. If a is a free name, then its encoding
is simply a[ ]. If a is bound by a restriction (νa)P in P0, then its encoding a[. . .] takes
as argument session identifiers i1, . . . , in′ , which can be constant session identifiers λ
or variables i (taken in a set Vs disjoint from the set Vo of ordinary variables). There
is one session identifier for each replication above the restriction (νa). The pattern
a[. . .] may also take as argument patterns p1, . . . , pn containing the messages received
by inputs above the restriction (νa)P in the abstract syntax tree of P0 and the result
of destructor applications above the restriction (νa)P . (The precise definition is given
below.)
In order to define formally the patterns associated with a name, we use a notion of
instrumented processes. The syntax of instrumented processes is defined as follows:
• The replication !P is labeled with a variable i in Vs: !iP . The process !iP
represents copies of P for a countable number of values of i. The variable i
is a session identifier. It indicates which copy of P , that is, which session, is
executed.
• The restriction (νa)P is labeled with a restriction label ℓ: (νa : ℓ)P , where ℓ is
either a[M1, . . . ,Mn, i1, . . . , in′ ] for restrictions in honest processes or b0[a[i1,
. . . , in′ ]] for restrictions in the adversary. The symbol b0 is a special name func-
tion symbol, distinct from all other such symbols. Using a specific instrumenta-
tion for the adversary is helpful so that all names generated by the adversary are
encoded by instances of b0[x]. They are therefore easy to generate. This labeling
of restrictions is similar to a Church-style typing: ℓ can be considered as the type
of a. (This type is polymorphic since it can contain variables.)
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The instrumented processes are then generated by the following grammar:
P,Q ::= instrumented processes
!iP replication
(νa : ℓ)P restriction
. . . (as in the standard calculus)
For instrumented processes, a semantic configuration S,E,P consists of a set S of ses-
sion identifiers that have not yet been used by P , an environment E that is a mapping
from names to closed patterns of the form a[. . .], and a finite multiset of instrumented
processes P . The first semantic configuration uses any countable set of session identi-
fiers S0. The domain of E must always contain all free names of processes in P , and
the initial environment maps all names a to the pattern a[ ]. The semantic rules (Red
Repl) and (Red Res) become:
S,E,P ∪ { !iP } → S \ {λ}, E,P ∪ {P{λ/i}, !iP } where λ ∈ S (Red Repl)
S,E,P ∪ { (νa : ℓ)P }
→ S,E[a′ 7→ E(ℓ) ],P ∪ {P{a′/a} } if a′ /∈ dom(E)
(Red Res)
where the mapping E is extended to all terms as a substitution by E(f(M1,
. . . ,Mn)) = f(E(M1), . . . , E(Mn)) and to restriction labels byE(a[M1, . . . ,Mn, i1,
. . . , in′ ]) = a[E(M1), . . . , E(Mn), i1, . . . , in′ ] and E(b0[a[i1, . . . , in′ ]]) = b0[a[i1,
. . . , in′ ]], so that it maps terms and restriction labels to patterns. The rule (Red Repl)
takes an unused constant session identifier λ in S, and creates a copy of P with session
identifier λ. The rule (Red Res) creates a fresh name a′, substitutes it for a in P , and
adds to the environment E the mapping of a′ to its encoding E(ℓ). Other semantic
rules E,P → E,P ′ simply become S,E,P → S,E,P ′.
The instrumented process P ′0 = instr(P0) associated with the process P0 is built
from P0 as follows:
• We label each replication !P of P0 with a distinct, fresh session identifier i, so
that it becomes !iP .
• We label each restriction (νa) of P0 with a[t, s], so that it becomes (νa : a[t, s]),
where s is the sequence of session identifiers that label replications above (νa) in
the abstract syntax tree of P ′0, in the order from top to bottom; t is the sequence
of variables x that store received messages in inputs M(x) above (νa) in P0 and
results of non-deterministic destructor applications let x = g(. . .) in P else Q
above (νa) in P0. (A destructor is said to be non-deterministic when it may
return several different results for the same arguments. Adding the result
of destructor applications to t is useful to improve precision, only for non-
deterministic destructors. For deterministic destructors, the result of the destruc-
tor can be uniquely determined from the other elements of t, so the addition is
useless. If we add the result of non-deterministic destructors to t, we can show
that the relative completeness result of [1] still holds in the presence of non-
deterministic destructors. This result shows that, for secrecy, the Horn clause
approach is at least as precise as a large class of type systems.)
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Hence names are represented by functions a[t, s] of the inputs and results of
destructor applications in t and the session identifiers in s. In each trace of the
process, at most one name corresponds to a given a[t, s], since different copies
of the restriction have different values of session identifiers in s. Therefore,
different names are not merged by the verifier.
For the adversary, we use a slightly different instrumentation. We build the instru-
mented process Q′ = instrAdv(Q) as follows:
• We label each replication !P of Q with a distinct, fresh session identifier i, so
that it becomes !iP .
• We label each restriction (νa) ofQwith b0[a[s]], so that it becomes (νa:b0[a[s]]),
where s is the sequence of session identifiers that label replications above (νa)
in Q′. (Including the session identifiers as arguments of nonces is necessary
for soundness, as discussed in Section 4. Including the messages previously re-
ceived as arguments of nonces is important for precision in the case of honest
processes, in order to relate the nonces to these messages. It is however useless
for the adversary: since we consider any Init -adversary Q, we have no defi-
nite information on the relation between nonces generated by the adversary and
messages previously received by the adversary.)
Remark 2 By moving restrictions downwards in the syntax tree of the process (until
the point at which the fresh name is used), one can add more arguments to the pattern
that represents the fresh name, when the restriction is moved under an input, replica-
tion, or destructor application. Therefore, this transformation can make our analysis
more precise. The tool can perform this transformation automatically.
Example 6 The instrumentation of the process of Section 2.3 yields:
P ′A(skA, pkA, pkB) = !
iAc(x pkB).(νa : a[x pkB, iA]) . . . (νr1 : r1[x pkB, iA]) . . .
c(m) . . . (νr3 : r3[x pkB,m, iA]])
P ′B(skB, pkB, pkA) = !
iB c(m′) . . . (νb : b[m′, iB]) . . . (νr2 : r2[m
′, iB]) . . .
P ′ = (νskA : skA[ ])(νskB : skB[ ]) . . . (P
′
A(skA, pkA, pkB) | P
′
B(skB, pkB, pkA))
The names created by the restriction (νa) will be represented by the pattern a[x pkB,
iA], so we have a different pattern for each copy of the process, indexed by iA, and
the pattern also records the public key x pkB of the interlocutor of A. Similarly, the
names created by the restriction (νb) will be represented by the pattern b[m′, iB].
The semantics of instrumented processes allows exactly the same communications
and events as the one of standard processes. More precisely, let P be a multiset of in-
strumented processes. We define unInstr(P) as the multiset of processes of P without
the instrumentation. Thus we have:
Proposition 1 If E0, {P0, Q} →∗ E1,P1, then there exist E′1 and P ′1 such that for any
S, countable set of session identifiers, there exists S′ such that S, {a 7→ a[ ] | a ∈ E0},
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{instr(P0), instrAdv(Q)} →∗ S′, E′1,P
′
1, dom(E
′
1) = E1, unInstr(P
′
1) = P1, and
both traces execute the same events at the same steps and satisfy the same atoms.
Conversely, if S, {a 7→ a[ ] | a ∈ E0}, {instr(P0), instrAdv(Q)} →∗ S′, E′1,P ′1,
thenE0, {P0, Q} →∗ dom(E′1), unInstr(P ′1), and both traces execute the same events
at the same steps and satisfy the same atoms.
Proof This is an easy proof by induction on the length of the traces. The reduction
rules applied in both traces are rules with the same name. 2
We can define correspondences for instrumented processes. These correspondences
and the clauses use facts defined by the following grammar:
F ::= facts
attacker(p) attacker knowledge
message(p, p′) message on a channel
m-event(p) must-event
event(p) may-event
The fact attacker(p) means that the attacker may have p, and the fact message(p, p′)
means that the message p′ may appear on channel p. The fact m-event(p) means
that event(M) must have been executed with M corresponding to p, and event(p)
that event(M) may have been executed with M corresponding to p. We use the word
“fact” to distinguish them from atoms attacker(M), message(M,M ′), and event(M).
The correspondences do not use the fact m-event(p), but the clauses use it.
The mapping E of a semantic configuration is extended to atoms by
E(attacker(M)) = attacker(E(M)), E(message(M,M ′)) = message(E(M),
E(M ′)), and E(event(M)) = event(E(M)), so that it maps atoms to facts. We de-
fine that an instrumented trace T satisfies an atom α by naturally adapting Definition 2.
When F is not m-event(p), we say that an instrumented trace T = S0, E0,P0 →∗
S′, E′,P ′ satisfies a fact F when there exists an atom α such that T satisfies α and
E′(α) = F . We also define that event(M) is executed at step τ in the instrumented
trace T by naturally adapting Definition 6. We say that event(p) is executed at step τ
in the instrumented trace T = S0, E0,P0 →∗ S′, E′,P ′ when there exists a term M
such that event(M) is executed at step τ in T and E′(M) = p.
Definition 10 Let P0 be a closed process and P ′0 = instr(P0). The instrumented
process P ′0 satisfies the correspondence
F ⇒
m∨
j=1

Fj  
lj∧
k=1
event(pjk)


against Init -adversaries if and only if, for any Init-adversary Q, for any trace T =
S0, E0, {P ′0, Q
′} →∗ S′, E′,P ′, with Q′ = instrAdv(Q), E0(a) = a[ ] for all a ∈
dom(E0), and fn(P ′0) ∪ Init ⊆ dom(E0), if T satisfies σF for some substitution
σ, then there exist σ′ and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that σ′Fj = σF and for all k ∈
{1, . . . , lj}, T satisfies event(σ′pjk).
23
A correspondence for instrumented processes implies a correspondence for stan-
dard processes, as shown by the following lemma, proved in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 Let P0 be a closed process and P ′0 = instr(P0). Let Mjk (j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
k ∈ {1, . . . , lj}) be terms; let α and αj (j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) be atoms. Let pjk, F, Fj be
the patterns and facts obtained by replacing names a with patterns a[ ] in the terms and
atoms Mjk, α, αj respectively. If P ′0 satisfies the correspondence
F ⇒
m∨
j=1

Fj  
lj∧
k=1
event(pjk)


against Init -adversaries then P0 satisfies the correspondence
α⇒
m∨
j=1

αj  
lj∧
k=1
event(Mjk)


against Init -adversaries.
For instrumented processes, we can specify properties referring to bound names of
the process, which are represented by patterns. Such a specification is impossible in
standard processes, because bound names can be renamed, so they cannot be referenced
in terms in correspondences.
5.2 Generation of Horn Clauses
Given a closed processP0 and a set of names Init , the protocol verifier first instruments
P0 to obtain P ′0 = instr(P0), then it builds a set of Horn clauses, representing the
protocol in parallel with any Init -adversary. The clauses are of the formF1∧. . .∧Fn ⇒
F , where F1, . . . , Fn, F are facts. They comprise clauses for the attacker and clauses
for the protocol, defined below. These clauses form the set RP ′
0
,Init . The predicate
m-event is defined by a set of closed facts Fme, such that m-event(p) is true if and
only if m-event(p) ∈ Fme. The facts in Fme do not belong toRP ′
0
,Init . The set Fme is
the set of facts that corresponds to the set of allowed events E , mentioned in Section 4.
5.2.1 Clauses for the Attacker
The clauses describing the attacker are almost the same as for the verification of secrecy
in [1]. The only difference is that, here, the attacker is given an infinite set of fresh
names b0[x], instead of only one fresh name b0[ ]. Indeed, we cannot merge all fresh
names created by the attacker, since we have to make sure that different terms are
represented by different patterns for the verification of correspondences to be correctly
implemented, as seen in Section 4. The abilities of the attacker are then represented by
the following clauses:
For each a ∈ Init , attacker(a[ ]) (Init)
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attacker(b0[x]) (Rn)
For each public constructor f of arity n,
attacker(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(xn) ⇒ attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn))
(Rf)
For each public destructor g,
for each rewrite rule g(M1, . . . ,Mn) →M in def(g),
attacker(M1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(Mn) ⇒ attacker(M)
(Rg)
message(x, y) ∧ attacker(x) ⇒ attacker(y) (Rl)
attacker(x) ∧ attacker(y) ⇒ message(x, y) (Rs)
The clause (Init) represents the initial knowledge of the attacker. The clause (Rn) means
that the attacker can generate an unbounded number of new names. The clauses (Rf)
and (Rg) mean that the attacker can apply all operations to all terms it has, (Rf) for
constructors, (Rg) for destructors. For (Rg), notice that the rewrite rules in def(g) do
not contain names and that terms without names are also patterns, so the clauses have
the required format. Clause (Rl) means that the attacker can listen on all channels it
has, and (Rs) that it can send all messages it has on all channels it has.
If c ∈ Init , we can replace all occurrences of message(c[ ],M) with attacker(M)
in the clauses. Indeed, these facts are equivalent by the clauses (Rl) and (Rs).
5.2.2 Clauses for the Protocol
When a function ρ associates a pattern with each name and variable, and f is a construc-
tor, we extend ρ as a substitution by ρ(f(M1, . . . ,Mn)) = f(ρ(M1), . . . , ρ(Mn)).
The translation [[P ]]ρH of a process P is a set of clauses, where ρ is a function that
associates a pattern with each name and variable, and H is a sequence of facts of the
form message(p, p′) or m-event(p). The environment ρ maps each variable and name
to its associated pattern representation. The sequenceH keeps track of events that have
been executed and of messages received by the process, since these may trigger other
messages. The empty sequence is denoted by ∅; the concatenation of a fact F to the
sequence H is denoted by H ∧F . The pattern ρi is always a session identifier variable
of Vs.
[[0]]ρH = ∅
[[P | Q]]ρH = [[P ]]ρH ∪ [[Q]]ρH
[[!iP ]]ρH = [[P ]](ρ[i 7→ i])H
[[(νa : a[M1, . . . ,Mn, i1, . . . , in′ ])P ]]ρH =
[[P ]](ρ[a 7→ a[ρ(M1), . . . , ρ(Mn), ρ(i1), . . . , ρ(in′)] ])H
[[M(x).P ]]ρH = [[P ]](ρ[x 7→ x])(H ∧message(ρ(M), x))
[[M〈N〉.P ]]ρH = [[P ]]ρH ∪ {H ⇒ message(ρ(M), ρ(N))}
[[let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q]]ρH =
⋃
{[[P ]]((σρ)[x 7→ σ′p′])(σH)
| g(p′1, . . . , p
′
n) → p
′ is in def(g) and (σ, σ′) is a most general pair of
substitutions such that σρ(M1) = σ′p′1, . . . , σρ(Mn) = σ′p′n} ∪ [[Q]]ρH
25
[[if M = N then P else Q]]ρH = [[P ]](σρ)(σH) ∪ [[Q]]ρH
where σ is the most general unifier of ρ(M) and ρ(N)
[[event(M).P ]]ρH = [[P ]]ρ(H ∧m-event(ρ(M))) ∪ {H ⇒ event(ρ(M))}
The translation of a process is a set of Horn clauses that express that it may send
certain messages or execute certain events. The clauses are similar to those of [1],
except in the cases of replication, restriction, and the addition of events.
• The nil process does nothing, so its translation is empty.
• The clauses for the parallel composition of processes P and Q are the union of
clauses for P and Q.
• The replication only inserts the new session identifier i in the environment ρ. It
is otherwise ignored, because all Horn clauses are applicable arbitrarily many
times.
• For the restriction, we replace the restricted name a in question with the pattern
a[ρ(M1), . . . , ρ(Mn), ρ(i1), . . . , ρ(in′)]. By definition of the instrumentation,
this pattern contains the previous inputs, results of non-deterministic destructor
applications, and session identifiers.
• The sequence H is extended in the translation of an input, with the input in
question.
• The translation of an output adds a clause, meaning that the output is triggered
when all conditions in H are true.
• The translation of a destructor application is the union of the clauses for the cases
where the destructor succeeds (with an appropriate substitution) and where the
destructor fails. For simplicity, we assume that the else branch of destructors
may always be executed; this is sufficient in most cases, since the else branch is
often empty or just sends an error message. We outline a more precise treatment
in Section 9.2.
• The conditional if M = N then P else Q is in fact equivalent to
let x = equal(M,N) in P else Q, where the destructor equal is defined by
equal(x, x) → x, so the translation of the conditional is a particular case of the
destructor application. We give it explicitly since it is particularly simple.
• The translation of an event adds the hypothesis m-event(ρ(M)) to H , meaning
that P can be executed only if the event has been executed first. Furthermore, it
adds a clause, meaning that the event is triggered when all conditions in H are
true.
Remark 3 Depending on the form of the correspondences we want to prove, we can
sometimes simplify the clauses generated for events. Suppose that all arguments of
events in the process and in correspondences are of the form f(M1, . . . ,Mn) for some
function symbol f .
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If, for a certain function symbol f , events event(f(. . .)) occur only before in
the desired correspondences, then it is easy to see in the following theorems that hy-
potheses of the form m-event(f(. . .)) in clauses can be removed without changing the
result, so the clauses generated by the event event(M) when M is of the form f(. . .)
can be simplified into:
[[event(M).P ]]ρH = [[P ]]ρH ∪ {H ⇒ event(ρ(M))}
(Intuitively, since the events event(f(. . .)) occur only before in the desired corre-
spondences, we never prove that an event event(f(. . .)) has been executed, so the
facts m-event(f(. . .)) are useless.)
Similarly, if event(f(. . .)) occurs only after  in the desired correspondences,
then clauses that conclude a fact of the form event(f(. . .)) can be removed without
changing the result, so the clauses generated by the event event(M) when M is of the
form f(. . .) can be simplified into:
[[event(M).P ]]ρH = [[P ]]ρ(H ∧m-event(ρ(M)))
(Intuitively, since the events event(f(. . .)) occur only after in the desired correspon-
dences, we never prove properties of the form “if event(f(. . .)) has been executed,
then . . . ”, so clauses that conclude event(f(. . .)) are useless.)
This translation of the protocol into Horn clauses introduces approximations. The
actions are considered as implicitly replicated, since the clauses can be applied any
number of times. This approximation implies that the tool fails to prove protocols
that first need to keep some value secret and later reveal it. For instance, consider the
process (νd)(d〈s〉.c〈d〉 | d(x)). This process preserves the secrecy of s, because s is
output on the private channel d and received by the input on d, before the adversary
gets to know d by the output of d on the public channel c. However, the Horn clause
method cannot prove this property, because it treats this process like a variant with
additional replications (νd)(!d〈s〉.c〈d〉 | !d(x)), which does not preserve the secrecy
s. Similarly, the process (νd)(d〈M〉 | d(x).d(x).event(e1)) never executes the event
e1, but the Horn clause method cannot prove this property because it treats this process
like (νd)(!d〈M〉 | d(x).d(x).event(e1)), which may execute e1. The only exception
to this implicit replication of processes is the creation of new names: since session
identifiers appear in patterns, the created name is precisely related to the session that
creates it, so name creation cannot be unduly repeated inside the same session. Due to
these approximations, our tool is not complete (it may produce false attacks) but, as we
show below, it is sound (the security properties that it proves are always true).
5.2.3 Summary and Correctness
Let ρ = {a 7→ a[ ] | a ∈ fn(P ′0)}. We define the clauses corresponding to the
instrumented process P ′0 as:
RP ′
0
,Init = [[P
′
0]]ρ∅ ∪ {attacker(a[ ]) | a ∈ Init} ∪ {(Rn), (Rf), (Rg), (Rl), (Rs)}
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Example 7 The clauses for the process P of Section 2.3 are the clauses for the adver-
sary, plus:
attacker(pk (skA[ ])) (2)
attacker(pk (skB[ ])) (3)
H1 ⇒ attacker(pencryptp((a[x pkB, iA], pk(skA[ ])), x pkB, r1[x pkB, iA])) (4)
H2 ⇒ attacker(pencryptp(x b, x pkB, r3[x pkB , p2, iA])) (5)
H3 ⇒ event(eA(pk(skA[ ]), pk (skB[ ]), a[pk (skB[ ]), iA], x b)) (6)
H3 ⇒ attacker(sencrypt(sAa[ ], a[pk (skB[ ]), iA])) (7)
H3 ⇒ attacker(sencrypt(sAb[ ], x b)) (8)
where p2 = pencryptp((a[x pkB, iA], x b, x pkB), pk (skA[ ]), x r2)
H1 = attacker(x pkB) ∧m-event(e1(pk (skA[ ]), x pkB, a[x pkB, iA]))
H2 = H1 ∧ attacker(p2) ∧m-event(e3(pk (skA[ ]), x pkB, a[x pkB, iA], x b))
H3 = H2{pk(skB[ ])/x pkB}
attacker(p1) ∧m-event(e2(x pkA, pk (skB[ ]), x a, b[p1, iB]))
⇒ attacker(pencryptp((xa, b[p1, iB], pk(skB[ ])), x pkA, r2[p1, iB]))
(9)
where p1 = pencryptp((x a, x pkA), pk (skB[ ]), x r1)
H4 ⇒ event(eB(pk(skA[ ]), pk (skB[ ]), x a, b[p
′
1, iB])) (10)
H4 ⇒ attacker(sencrypt(sBa[ ], x a)) (11)
H4 ⇒ attacker(sencrypt(sBb[ ], b[p
′
1, iB])) (12)
where p′1 = pencryptp((x a, pk(skA[ ])), pk (skB[ ]), x r1)
H4 = attacker(p
′
1) ∧m-event(e2(pk (skA[ ]), pk (skB[ ]), x a, b[p
′
1, iB])) ∧
attacker(pencryptp(b[p
′
1, iB], pk(skB [ ]), x r3))
Clauses (2) and (3) correspond to the outputs in P ; they mean that the adversary has
the public keys of the participants. Clauses (4) and (5) correspond to the first two
outputs in PA. For example, (5) means that, if the attacker has x pkB and the sec-
ond message of the protocol p2 and the events e1(pk (skA[ ]), x pkB, a[x pkB, iA])
and e3(pk(skA[ ]), x pkB, a[x pkB, iA], x b) are allowed, then the attacker can get
pencryptp(x b, x pkB, r3[x pkB, p2, iA]), because PA sends this message after re-
ceiving x pkB and p2 and executing the events e1 and e3. When furthermore x pkB =
pk(skB[ ]), PA executes event eA and outputs the encryption of sAa[ ] under a[x pkB,
iA] and the encryption of sBb[ ] under x b. These event and outputs are taken into
account by Clauses (6), (7), and (8) respectively. Similarly, Clauses (9), (11), and (12)
correspond to the outputs in PB and (10) to the event eB . These clauses have been
simplified using Remark 3, taking into account that e1, e2, and e3 appear only on the
right-hand side of , and eA and eB only on the left-hand side of in the queries of
Examples 1, 2, and 3.
Theorem 1 (Correctness of the clauses) Let P0 be a closed process and Q be an
Init-adversary. Let P ′0 = instr(P0) and Q′ = instrAdv(Q). Consider a trace T =
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S0, E0, {P ′0, Q
′} →∗ S′, E′,P ′, with fn(P ′0) ∪ Init ⊆ dom(E0) and E0(a) = a[ ]
for all a ∈ dom(E0). Assume that, if T satisfies event(p), then m-event(p) ∈ Fme.
Finally, assume that T satisfies F . Then F is derivable from RP ′
0
,Init ∪ Fme.
This result shows that, if the only executed events are those allowed in Fme and a
fact F is satisfied, then F is derivable from the clauses. It is proved in Appendix B.
Using a technique similar to that of [1], its proof relies on a type system to express
the soundness of the clauses on P ′0, and on the subject reduction of this type system to
show that soundness of the clauses is preserved during all executions of the process.
6 Solving Algorithm
We first describe a basic solving algorithm without optimizations. Next, we list the
optimizations that we use in our implementation, and we prove the correctness of the
algorithm. The termination of the algorithm is discussed in Section 8.
6.1 The Basic Algorithm
To apply the previous results, we have to determine whether a fact is derivable from
RP ′
0
,Init ∪ Fme. This may be undecidable, but in practice there exist algorithms that
terminate on numerous examples of protocols. In particular, we can use variants of res-
olution algorithms, such as the algorithms described in [13, 14, 20, 69]. The algorithm
that we describe here is the one of [14], extended with a second phase to determine
derivability of any query. It also corresponds to the extension to m-event facts of the
algorithm of [20].
We first define resolution: when the conclusion of a clause R unifies with an hy-
pothesis F0 of a clause R′, we can infer a new clause R ◦F0 R′, that corresponds to
applying R and R′ one after the other. Formally, this is defined as follows:
Definition 11 Let R = H ⇒ C and R′ = H ′ ⇒ C′ be two clauses. Assume that
there exists F0 ∈ H ′ such that C and F0 are unifiable, and σ is the most general unifier
of C and F0. In this case, we define R ◦F0 R′ = σ(H ∪ (H ′ \ {F0})) ⇒ σC′.
An important idea to obtain an efficient solving algorithm is to specify conditions that
limit the application of resolution, while keeping completeness. The conditions that we
use correspond to resolution with free selection [9, 35, 55]: a selection function chooses
selected facts in each clause, and resolution is performed only on selected facts, that is,
the clause R ◦F0 R′ is generated only when the conclusion is selected in R and F0 is
selected in R′.
Definition 12 We denote by sel a selection function, that is, a function from clauses to
sets of facts, such that sel(H ⇒ C) ⊆ H . If F ∈ sel(R), we say that F is selected in
R. If sel(R) = ∅, we say that no hypothesis is selected in R, or that the conclusion of
the clause is selected.
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The choice of the selection function can change dramatically the speed of the algorithm.
Since the algorithm combines clauses by resolution only when the facts unified in the
resolution are selected, we will choose the selection function to reduce the number
of possible unifications between selected facts. Having several selected facts slows
down the algorithm, because it has more choices of resolutions to perform, therefore
we will select at most one fact in each clause. In the case of protocols, facts of the form
attacker(x), with x variable, can be unified will all facts of the form attacker(p).
Therefore we should avoid selecting them. The m-event facts must never be selected
since they are not defined by known clauses.
Definition 13 We say that a fact F is unselectable when F = attacker(x) for some
variable x or F = m-event(p) for some pattern p. Otherwise, we say that F is se-
lectable.
We require that the selection function never selects unselectable hypotheses and
that sel(H ⇒ attacker(x)) 6= ∅ when H contains a selectable fact.
A basic selection function for security protocols is then
sel0(H ⇒ C) =
{
∅ if ∀F ∈ H , F is unselectable
{F0} where F0 ∈ H and F0 is selectable, otherwise
In the implementation, the hypotheses are represented by a list, and the selected fact is
the first selectable element of the list of hypotheses.
The solving algorithm works in two phases, summarized in Figure 4. The first
phase, saturate, transforms the set of clauses into an equivalent but simpler one. The
second phase, derivable, uses a depth-first search to determine whether a fact can be
inferred or not from the clauses.
The first phase contains 3 steps.
• The first step inserts in R the initial clauses representing the protocol and the
attacker (clauses that are in R0), after simplification by simplify (defined below
in Section 6.2) and elimination of subsumed clauses by elim . We say that H1 ⇒
C1 subsumes H2 ⇒ C2, and we write (H1 ⇒ C1) ⊒ (H2 ⇒ C2), when there
exists a substitution σ such that σC1 = C2 and σH1 ⊆ H2. (H1 and H2 are
multisets, and we use here multiset inclusion.) If R′ subsumes R, and R and R′
are in R, then R is removed by elim(R).
• The second step is a fixpoint iteration that adds clauses created by resolution.
The composition of clauses R and R′ is added only if no hypothesis is selected
in R, and the hypothesis F0 of R′ that we unify is selected. When a clause
is created by resolution, it is added to the set of clauses R after simplification.
Subsumed clauses are eliminated from R.
• At last, the third step returns the set of clauses of R with no selected hypothesis.
Basically, saturate preserves derivability: F is derivable from R0 ∪Fme if and only if
it is derivable from saturate(R0) ∪ Fme. A formal statement of this result is given in
Lemma 2 below.
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First phase: saturation
saturate(R0) =
1. R← ∅.
For each R ∈ R0, R← elim(simplify(R) ∪R).
2. Repeat until a fixpoint is reached
for each R ∈ R such that sel(R) = ∅,
for each R′ ∈ R, for each F0 ∈ sel(R′) such that R ◦F0 R′ is defined,
R← elim(simplify(R ◦F0 R
′) ∪R).
3. Return {R ∈ R | sel(R) = ∅}.
Second phase: backwards depth-first search
deriv(R,R,R1) =


∅ if ∃R′ ∈ R, R′ ⊒ R
{R} otherwise, if sel(R) = ∅⋃
{deriv(simplify ′(R′ ◦F0 R), {R} ∪ R,R1) | R
′ ∈ R1,
F0 ∈ sel(R) such that R′ ◦F0 R is defined } otherwise
derivable(F,R1) = deriv(F ⇒ F, ∅,R1)
Figure 4: Solving algorithm
The second phase searches the facts that can be inferred fromR1 = saturate(R0).
This is simply a backward depth-first search. The call derivable(F,R1) returns a set of
clauses R = H ⇒ C with empty selection, such that R can be obtained by resolution
from R1, C is an instance of F , and all instances of F derivable from R1 can be
derived by using as last clause a clause of derivable(F,R1). (Formally, if F ′ is an
instance of F derivable from R1, then there are a clause H ⇒ C ∈ derivable(F,R1)
and a substitution σ such that F ′ = σC and σH is derivable from R1.)
The search itself is performed by deriv(R,R,R1). The function deriv starts with
R = F ⇒ F and transforms the hypothesis of R by using a clause R′ of R1 to
derive an element F0 of the hypothesis of R. So R is replaced with R′ ◦F0 R (third
case of the definition of deriv). The fact F0 is chosen using the selection function sel.
The obtained clause R′ ◦F0 R is then simplified by the function simplify ′ defined in
Section 6.2. (Hence deriv derives the hypothesis of R using a backward depth-first
search. At each step, the clause R can be obtained by resolution from clauses of R1,
and R concludes an instance of F .) The setR is the set of clauses that we have already
seen during the search. Initially,R is empty, and the clause R is added toR in the third
case of the definition of deriv.
The transformation of R described above is repeated until one of the following two
conditions is satisfied:
• R is subsumed by a clause in R: we are in a cycle; we are looking for instances
of facts that we have already looked for (first case of the definition of deriv);
• sel(R) is empty: we have obtained a suitable clause R and we return it (second
case of the definition of deriv).
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6.2 Simplification Steps
Before adding a clause to the clause base, it is first simplified using the following
functions. Some of them are standard, such as the elimination of tautologies and of
duplicate hypotheses; others are specific to protocols. The simplification functions
take as input a clause or a set of clauses and return a set of clauses.
Decomposition of Data Constructors A data constructor is a constructor f of arity
n that comes with associated destructors gi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} defined by gi(f(x1,
. . . , xn)) → xi. Data constructors are typically used for representing data structures.
Tuples are examples of data constructors. For each data constructor f , the following
clauses are generated:
attacker(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(xn) ⇒ attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) (Rf)
attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) ⇒ attacker(xi) (Rg)
Therefore, attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)) is derivable if and only if ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
attacker(pi) is derivable. So the function decomp transforms clauses as follows. When
a fact of the form attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)) is met, it is replaced with attacker(p1) ∧
. . . ∧ attacker(pn). If this replacement is done in the conclusion of a clause
H ⇒ attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)), n clauses are created: H ⇒ attacker(pi) for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This replacement is of course done recursively: if pi itself is a data
constructor application, it is replaced again. The function decomphyp performs this de-
composition only in the hypothesis of clauses. The functions decomp and decomphyp
leave the clauses (Rf) and (Rg) for data constructors unchanged. (When attacker(x)
cannot be selected, the clauses (Rf) and (Rg) for data constructors are in fact not
necessary, because they generate only tautologies during resolution. However, when
attacker(x) can be selected, which cannot be excluded in extensions such as the one
presented in Section 9.3, these clauses may become necessary for soundness.)
Elimination of Tautologies The function elimtaut removes clauses whose conclu-
sion is already in the hypotheses, since such clauses do not generate new facts.
Elimination of Duplicate Hypotheses The function elimdup eliminates duplicate
hypotheses of clauses.
Elimination of Useless attacker(x) Hypotheses If a clause H ⇒ C contains in its
hypotheses attacker(x), where x is a variable that does not appear elsewhere in the
clause, the hypothesis attacker(x) is removed by the function elimattx . Indeed, the
attacker always has at least one message, so attacker(x) is always satisfied.
Secrecy Assumptions When the user knows that a fact F will not be derivable, he
can tell it to the verifier. (When this fact is of the form attacker(p), the user tells that
p remains secret; that is why we use the name “secrecy assumptions”.) Let Fnot be a
set of facts, for which the user claims that no instance of these facts is derivable. The
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solveP ′
0
,Init (F ) =
1. Let R1 = saturate(RP ′
0
,Init ).
2. For each F ′ ∈ Fnot, if derivable(F ′,R1) 6= ∅, then terminate with error.
3. Return derivable(F,R1).
Figure 5: Summary of the solving algorithm
function elimnot removes all clauses that have an instance of a fact in Fnot in their
hypotheses. As shown in Figure 5, at the end of the saturation, the solving algorithm
checks that the facts in Fnot are indeed underivable from the obtained clauses. If
this condition is satisfied, solveP ′
0
,Init (F ) returns clauses that conclude instances of F .
Otherwise, the user has given erroneous information, so an error message is displayed.
Even when the user gives erroneous secrecy assumptions, the verifier never wrongly
claims that a protocol is secure.
Mentioning such underivable facts prunes the search space, by removing useless
clauses. This speeds up the search process. In most cases, the secret keys of the
principals cannot be known by the attacker, so examples of underivable facts are
attacker(skA[ ]) and attacker(skB [ ]).
Elimination of Redundant Hypotheses When a clause is of the form H ∧H ′ ⇒ C,
and there exists σ such that σH ⊆ H ′ and σ does not change the variables of H ′ and
C, then the clause is replaced with H ′ ⇒ C by the function elimredundanthyp . These
clauses are semantically equivalent: obviously, H ′ ⇒ C subsumes H ∧ H ′ ⇒ C;
conversely, if a fact can be derived by an instance σ′H ′ ⇒ σ′C of H ′ ⇒ C, then it
can also be derived by the instance σ′σH ∧ σ′H ′ ⇒ σ′C of H ∧H ′ ⇒ C, since the
elements of σ′σH can be derived because they are in σ′H ′.
This replacement is especially useful when H contains m-event facts. Otherwise,
the elements of H could be selected and transformed by resolution, until they are of
the form attacker(x), in which case they are removed by elimattx if σx 6= x (because
x does not occur in H ′ and C since σ does not change the variables of H ′ and C)
or by elimdup if σx = x (because attacker(x) = σattacker(x) ∈ σH ⊆ H ′). In
contrast, m-event facts remain forever, because they are unselectable. Depending on
user settings, this replacement can be applied for all H , applied only when H contains
a m-event fact, or switched off, since testing this property takes time and slows down
small examples. On the other hand, on big examples, such as some of those gener-
ated by TulaFale [12] for verifying Web services, this technique can yield important
speedups.
Putting All Simplifications Together The function simplify groups all these simpli-
fications. We define simplify = elimattx ◦ elimtaut ◦ elimnot ◦ elimredundanthyp ◦
elimdup ◦decomp. In this definition, the simplifications are ordered in such a way that
simplify ◦ simplify = simplify , so it is not necessary to repeat the simplification.
Similarly, simplify ′ = elimattx ◦ elimnot ◦ elimredundanthyp ◦ elimdup ◦
decomphyp . In simplify ′, we use decomphyp instead of decomp, because the conclu-
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sion of the considered clause is the fact we want to derive, so it must not be modified.
6.3 Soundness
The following lemmas show the correctness of saturate and derivable (Figure 4).
Proofs can be found in Appendix C. Intuitively, the correctness of saturate expresses
that saturation preserves derivability, provided the secrecy assumptions are satisfied.
Lemma 2 (Correctness of saturate) Let F be a closed fact. If, for all F ′ ∈ Fnot,
no instance of F ′ is derivable from saturate(R0) ∪ Fme, then F is derivable from
R0 ∪ Fme if and only if F is derivable from saturate(R0) ∪ Fme.
This result is proved by transforming a derivation of F fromR0∪Fme into a derivation
of F (or a fact in Fnot) from saturate(R0) ∪ Fme. Basically, when the derivation
contains a clause R′ with sel(R′) 6= ∅, we replace in this derivation two clauses R,
with sel(R) = ∅, and R′ that have been combined by resolution during the execution
of saturate with a single clause R ◦F0 R′. This replacement decreases the number
of clauses in the derivation, so it terminates, and, upon termination, all clauses of the
obtained derivation satisfy sel(R′) = ∅ so they are in saturate(R0) ∪ Fme.
Intuitively, the correctness of derivable expresses that if F ′, instance of F , is deriv-
able, then F ′ is derivable from R1 by a derivation in which the clause that concludes
F ′ is in derivable(F,R1), provided the secrecy assumptions are satisfied.
Lemma 3 (Correctness of derivable) Let F ′ be a closed instance of F . If, for all
F ′′ ∈ Fnot, derivable(F ′′,R1) = ∅, then F ′ is derivable from R1 ∪ Fme if and only
if there exist a clause H ⇒ C in derivable(F,R1) and a substitution σ such that
σC = F ′ and all elements of σH are derivable from R1 ∪ Fme.
Basically, this result is proved by transforming a derivation of F ′ from R1 ∪ Fme into
a derivation of F ′ (or a fact in Fnot) whose last clause (the one that concludes F ′) is
H ⇒ C and whose other clauses are still in R1 ∪ Fme. The transformation relies on
the replacement of clauses combined by resolution during the execution of derivable.
It is important to apply saturate before derivable, so that all clauses in R1 have no
selected hypothesis. Then the conclusion of these clauses is in general not attacker(x)
(with the simplifications of Section 6.2 and the selection function sel0, it is never
attacker(x)), so that we avoid unifying with attacker(x).
Finally, the following theorem shows the correctness of solveP ′
0
,Init (Figure 5).
Below, when we require that solveP ′
0
,Init (F ) has a certain value, we also implicitly
require that solveP ′
0
,Init (F ) does not terminate with error. Intuitively, if an instance
F ′ of F is satisfied by a trace T , then F ′ is derivable from RP ′
0
,Init ∪ Fme, so, by the
soundness of the solving algorithm, it is derivable by a derivation whose last clause is in
solveP ′
0
,Init (F ). Then there must exist a clause H ⇒ C ∈ solveP ′
0
,Init (F ) that can be
used to deriveF ′, so F ′ = σC and the hypothesisσH is derivable fromRP ′
0
,Init∪Fme.
In particular, the events in σH are satisfied, that is, are in Fme, so these events have
been executed in the trace T . Theorem 2 below states this result formally. It is proved
by combining Lemmas 2 and 3, and Theorem 1.
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Theorem 2 (Main theorem) Let P0 be a closed process and P ′0 = instr(P0). Let Q
be an Init-adversary and Q′ = instrAdv(Q).
Consider a trace T = S0, E0, {P ′0, Q′} →∗ S′, E′, P ′, with fn(P ′0) ∪ Init ⊆
dom(E0) and E0(a) = a[ ] for all a ∈ dom(E0).
If T satisfies an instance F ′ of F , then there exist a clause H ⇒ C ∈
solveP ′
0
,Init (F ) and a substitution σ such that F ′ = σC and, for all m-event(p) in
σH , T satisfies event(p).
Proof Since for all F ′′ ∈ Fnot, derivable(F ′′,R1) = ∅, by Lemma 3, no instance of
F ′′ is derivable from R1 ∪ Fme = saturate(RP ′
0
,Init ) ∪ Fme. This allows us to apply
Lemma 2.
Let Fme = {m-event(p′) | T satisfies event(p′)}. By Theorem 1, since T sat-
isfies F ′, F ′ is derivable from RP ′
0
,Init ∪ Fme. By Lemma 2, F ′ is derivable from
saturate(RP ′
0
,Init )∪Fme = R1∪Fme. By Lemma 3, there exist a clauseR = H ⇒ C
in solveP ′
0
,Init (F ) = derivable(F,R1) and a substitution σ such that σC = F ′ and all
elements of σH are derivable from R1 ∪Fme. For all m-event(p) in σH , m-event(p)
is derivable from R1 ∪ Fme. Since no clause in R1 has a conclusion of the form
m-event(p′), m-event(p) ∈ Fme. Given the choice of Fme, this means that T satisfies
event(p). 2
Theorem 2 is our main correctness result: it allows one to show that some events
must have been executed. The correctness of the analysis for correspondences follows
from this theorem.
Example 8 For the process P of Section 2.3, Init = {c}, and P ′ = instr(P ), our tool
shows that
solveP ′,Init (event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))) = {m-event(e1(pkA, pkB, pa)) ∧
m-event(e2(pkA, pkB, pa, pb)) ∧
m-event(e3(pkA, pkB, pa, pb))
⇒ event(eB(pkA, pkB, pa, pb))}
where pkA = pk(skA[ ]), pkB = pk(skB[ ]), pa = a[pkB, iA]
pb = b[pencryptp((pa, pkA), pkB, r1[pkB, iA]), iB]
By Theorem 2, if T satisfies event(eB(p1, p2, p3, p4)), this event is an instance of
event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4)), so, given the value of solveP ′,Init (event(eB(x1, x2, x3,
x4))), there exists σ such that event(eB(p1, p2, p3, p4)) = σevent(eB(pkA, pkB, pa,
pb)) and T satisfies
event(σe1(pkA, pkB, pa)) = event(e1(p1, p2, p3))
event(σe2(pkA, pkB, pa, pb)) = event(e2(p1, p2, p3, p4))
event(σe3(pkA, pkB, pa, pb)) = event(e3(p1, p2, p3, p4))
Therefore, if event(eB(M1,M2,M3,M4)) has been executed, then event(e1(M1,
M2,M3)), event(e2(M1,M2,M3,M4)), and event(e3(M1,M2,M3,M4)) have
been executed.
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7 Application to Correspondences
7.1 Non-injective Correspondences
Correspondences for instrumented processes can be checked as shown by the following
theorem:
Theorem 3 Let P0 be a closed process and P ′0 = instr(P0). Let pjk (j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
k ∈ {1, . . . , lj}) be patterns; let F and Fj (j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) be facts. Assume that
for all R ∈ solveP ′
0
,Init (F ), there exist j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, σ′, and H such that R =
H ∧m-event(σ′pj1) ∧ . . . ∧m-event(σ
′pjlj ) ⇒ σ
′Fj .
Then P ′0 satisfies the correspondence F ⇒
∨m
j=1
(
Fj  
∧lj
k=1 event(pjk)
)
against Init -adversaries.
Proof Let Q be an Init -adversary and Q′ = instrAdv(Q). Consider a trace T =
S0, E0, {P ′0, Q
′} →∗ S′, E′,P ′, with fn(P ′0) ∪ Init ⊆ dom(E0) and E0(a) = a[ ]
for all a ∈ dom(E0). Assume that T satisfies σF . By Theorem 2, there exist R =
H ′ ⇒ C′ ∈ solveP ′
0
,Init (F ) and σ′′ such that σF = σ′′C′ and for all m-event(p)
in σ′′H ′, T satisfies event(p). All clauses R in solveP ′
0
,Init (F ) are of the form H ∧
m-event(σ′pj1) ∧ . . . ∧m-event(σ′pjlj ) ⇒ σ
′Fj for some j and σ′. So, there exist j
and σ′ such that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , lj}, m-event(σ′pjk) ∈ H ′ and C′ = σ′Fj . Hence
σF = σ′′C′ = σ′′σ′Fj and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , lj}, m-event(σ′′σ′pjk) ∈ σ′′H ′, so T
satisfies event(σ′′σ′pjk), so we have the result. 2
From this theorem and Lemma 1, we obtain correspondences for standard pro-
cesses.
Theorem 4 Let P0 be a closed process and P ′0 = instr(P0). Let Mjk (j ∈ {1, . . . ,
m}, k ∈ {1, . . . , lj}) be terms; let α and αj (j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) be atoms. Let pjk, F, Fj
be the patterns and facts obtained by replacing names a with patterns a[ ] in the terms
and atoms Mjk, α, αj respectively. Assume that, for all clauses R in solveP ′
0
,Init (F ),
there exist j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, σ′, and H such that R = H ∧ m-event(σ′pj1) ∧ . . . ∧
m-event(σ′pjlj ) ⇒ σ
′Fj .
Then P0 satisfies the correspondence α ⇒
∨m
j=1
(
αj  
∧lj
k=1 event(Mjk)
)
against Init -adversaries.
Example 9 For the process P of Section 2.3, Init = {c}, and P ′ = instr(P ),
the value of solveP ′,Init (event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))) given in Example 8 shows that
P satisfies the correspondence event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))  event(e1(x1, x2, x3)) ∧
event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4)) ∧ event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4)) against Init -adversaries.
As particular cases of correspondences, we can show secrecy and non-injective
agreement:
Corollary 1 (Secrecy) Let P0 be a closed process and P ′0 = instr(P0). Let N be a
term. Let p be the pattern obtained by replacing names a with patterns a[ ] in the term
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N . Assume that solveP ′
0
,Init (attacker(p)) = ∅. Then P0 preserves the secrecy of all
instances of N from Init .
Intuitively, if no instance of attacker(p) is derivable from the clauses representing the
protocol, then the adversary cannot have an instance of the term N corresponding to p.
Example 10 For the process P of Section 2.3, Init = {c}, and P ′ = instr(P ), our
tool shows that solveP ′,Init (attacker(sAa[ ])) = ∅. So P preserves the secrecy of sAa
from Init . The situation is similar for sAb, sBa , and sBb.
Corollary 2 (Non-injective agreement) Let P0 be a closed process and P ′0 =
instr(P0). Assume that, for each R ∈ solveP ′
0
,Init (event(e(x1, . . . , xn))) such that
R = H ⇒ event(e(p1, . . . , pn)), we have m-event(e′(p1, . . . , pn)) ∈ H . Then P0
satisfies the correspondence event(e(x1, . . . , xn))  event(e′(x1, . . . , xn)) against
Init-adversaries.
Intuitively, the condition means that, if event(e(p1, . . . , pn)) can be derived,
m-event(e′(p1, . . . , pn)) occurs in the hypotheses. Then the theorem says that, if
event(e(M1, . . . ,Mn)) has been executed, then event(e′(M1, . . . ,Mn)) has been
executed.
Example 11 For the process P of Section 2.3, Init = {c}, and P ′ = instr(P ), the
value of solveP ′,Init (event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))) given in Example 8 also shows that
P satisfies the correspondence event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4)) event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4))
against Init -adversaries. The tool shows in a similar way that P satisfies the cor-
respondence event(eA(x1, x2, x3, x4))  event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4)) against Init-
adversaries.
7.2 General Correspondences
In this section, we explain how to prove general correspondences. Moreover, we also
show that, when our verifier proves injectivity, it proves recentness as well. For exam-
ple, when it proves a correspondence event(M) inj event(M ′), it shows that, when
the event event(M) has been executed, not only the event event(M ′) has been exe-
cuted, but also this event has been executed recently. As explained by Lowe [54], the
precise meaning of “recent” depends on the circumstances: it can be that event(M)
is executed within the duration of the part of the process after event(M ′), or it can be
within a certain number of time units. Here, we define recentness as follows: the run-
time of the session that executes event(M) overlaps with the runtime of the session
that executes the corresponding event(M ′) event.
We can formally define recent correspondences for instrumented processes as fol-
lows. We assume that, in P0, the events are under at least one replication. We define
an instrumented process P ′0 = instr′(P0), where instr′(P0) is defined like instr(P0),
except that the events event(M) in P0 are replaced with event(M, i), where i is the
session identifier that labels the down-most replication above event(M) in P0. The
session identifier i indicates the session in which the considered event is executed.
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When k = k1 . . . kn is a non-empty sequence of indices, we denote by k⌈ the
sequence obtained by removing the last index from k: k⌈= k1 . . . kn−1.
Definition 14 LetP0 be a closed process andP ′0 = instr′(P0). We say thatP ′0 satisfies
the recent correspondence
event(p) ⇒
m∨
j=1

event(p′j) 
lj∧
k=1
[inj]jkqjk


where
qjk = event(pjk) 
mjk∨
j=1
ljkj∧
k=1
[inj]jkjkqjkjk
against Init-adversaries if and only if for any Init -adversary Q, for any trace T =
S0, E0, {P ′0, Q
′} →∗ S′, E′,P ′, with Q′ = instrAdv(Q), E0(a) = a[ ] for all a ∈
dom(E0), and fn(P ′0) ∪ Init ⊆ dom(E0), there exists a function φjk for each non-
empty jk, such that for all non-empty jk, φjk maps a subset of steps of T to steps of
T and
• For all τ , if the event event(σp, λǫ) is executed at step τ in T for some σ and
λǫ, then there exist σ′ and J = (jk)k such that σ′p′jǫ = σp and, for all non-
empty k, φmakejk(k,J)(τ) is defined, event(σ′pmakejk(k,J), λk) is executed at
step φmakejk(k,J)(τ) in T , and if [inj]makejk(k,J) = inj, then the runtimes of
session(λk⌈) and session(λk) overlap (recentness).
The runtime of session(λ) begins when the rule S,E,P ∪ { !iP } → S \ {λ},
E,P ∪ {P{λ/i}, !iP } is applied and ends when P{λ/i} has disappeared.
• For all non-empty jk, if [inj]jk = inj, then φjk is injective.
• For all non-empty jk, for all j and k, if φjkjk(τ) is defined, then φjk(τ) is
defined and φjkjk(τ) ≤ φjk(τ). For all j and k, if φjk(τ) is defined, then
φjk(τ) ≤ τ .
We do not define recentness for standard processes, since it is difficult to track formally
the runtime of a session in these processes. Instrumented processes make that very easy
thanks to session identifiers. It is easy to infer correspondences for standard processes
from recent correspondences for instrumented processes, with a proof similar to that of
Lemma 1.
Lemma 4 Let P0 be a closed process and P ′0 = instr′(P0). Let Mjk, M , and M ′j be
terms. Let pjk, p, p
′
j be the patterns obtained by replacing names a with patterns a[ ]
in the terms Mjk,M,M ′j respectively. If P ′0 satisfies the recent correspondence
event(p) ⇒
m∨
j=1

event(p′j) 
lj∧
k=1
[inj]jkqjk


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where
qjk = event(pjk) 
mjk∨
j=1
ljkj∧
k=1
[inj]jkjkqjkjk
against Init -adversaries then P0 satisfies the correspondence
event(M) ⇒
m∨
j=1

event(M ′j) 
lj∧
k=1
[inj]jkq
′
jk


where
q′
jk
= event(Mjk) 
mjk∨
j=1
ljkj∧
k=1
[inj]jkjkq
′
jkjk
against Init -adversaries.
Let P0 be a closed process andP ′0 = instr′(P0). We adapt the generation of clauses
as follows: the set of clauses R′P ′
0
,Init is defined as RP ′0,Init except that
[[M〈N〉.P ]]ρH = [[P ]]ρH ∪ {H{ρ|Vo∪Vs/} ⇒ message(ρ(M), ρ(N))}
[[!iP ]]ρH = [[P ]](ρ[i 7→ i])(H{ρ|Vo∪Vs/})
[[event(M, i).P ]]ρH = [[P ]]ρ(H ∧m-event(ρ(M),)) ∪ {H ⇒ event(ρ(M), i)}
where  is a special variable. The predicate event has as additional argument the ses-
sion identifier in which the event is executed. The predicate m-event has as additional
argument an environment ρ that gives values that variables will contain at the first out-
put or replication that follows the event;  is a placeholder for this environment. We
define solve′P ′
0
,Init as solveP ′0,Init except that it applies to R
′
P ′
0
,Init instead of RP ′0,Init .
Let us first consider the particular case of injective correspondences. We consider
general correspondences in Theorem 5 below.
Proposition 2 (Injective correspondences) Let P0 be a closed process and P ′0 =
instr′(P0). We assume that, in P0, all events are of the form event(f(M1, . . . ,Mn))
and that different occurrences of event have different root function symbols.
We also assume that the patterns p, p′j, pjk satisfy the following conditions: p and
p′j for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} are of the form f(. . .) for some function symbol f and for all j,
k such that [inj]jk = inj, pjk = fjk(. . .) for some function symbol fjk.
Let solve′P ′
0
,Init (event(p, i)) = {Rjr | j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, r ∈ {1, . . . , nj}}. Assume
that there exist xjk , ijr, and ρjrk (j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, r ∈ {1, . . . , nj}, k ∈ {1, . . . , lj})
such that
• For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all r ∈ {1, . . . , nj}, there exist H and σ such that
Rjr = H ∧m-event(σpj1, ρjr1) ∧ . . . ∧ m-event(σpjlj , ρjrlj ) ⇒ event(σp
′
j ,
ijr).
• For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all r and r′ in {1, . . . , nj}, for all k ∈
{1, . . . , lj} such that [inj]jk = inj, ρjrk(xjk){λ/ijr} does not unify with
ρjr′k(xjk){λ′/ijr′} when λ 6= λ′.
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Then P ′0 satisfies the recent correspondence
event(p) ⇒
m∨
j=1

event(p′j) 
lj∧
k=1
[inj]jkevent(pjk)


against Init -adversaries.
This proposition is a particular case of Theorem 5 below. It is proved in Appendix E.
By Theorem 3, after deleting session identifiers and environments, the first item shows
that P ′0 satisfies the correspondence
event(p) ⇒
∨
j=1..m,r

event(p′j) 
lj∧
k=1
event(pjk)

 (13)
The environments and session identifiers as well as the second item serve in prov-
ing injectivity. Suppose that [inj]jk = inj, and denote by an unknown term.
If two instances of event(p, i) are executed in P ′0 for the branch j of the corre-
spondence, by the first item, they are instances of event(σjrp′j, ijr) for some r,
so they are event(σ′1σjr1p′j , σ′1ijr1) and event(σ′2σjr2p′j , σ′2ijr2) for some σ′1 and
σ′2. Furthermore, there is only one occurrence of event(f(. . .), i) in P ′0, so the
event event(f(. . .), i) can be executed at most once for each value of the session
identifier i, so σ′1ijr1 6= σ′2ijr2 . Then, by the first item, corresponding events
event(σ′1σjr1pjk, ) and event(σ′2σjr2pjk, ) have been executed, with associated en-
vironments σ′1ρjr1k and σ′2ρjr2k. By the second item, ρjr1k(xjk){λ1/ijr1} does not
unify with ρjr2k(xjk){λ2/ijr2} for different values λ1 = σ′1ijr1 and λ2 = σ′2ijr2 of
the session identifier. (In this condition, r1 can be equal to r2, and when r1 = r2 = r,
the condition simply means that ijr occurs in ρjrk.) So σ′1ρjr1k(xjk) 6= σ′2ρjr2k(xjk),
so the events event(σ′1σjr1pjk), ) and event(σ′2σjr2pjk), ) are distinct, which
shows injectivity. This point is very similar to the fact that injective agreement is
implied by non-injective agreement when the parameters of events contain nonces gen-
erated by the agent to whom authentication is being made, because the event can be
executed at most once for each value of the nonce. (The session identifier ijr in our
theorem plays the role of the nonce.) [Andrew Gordon, personal communication].
Corollary 3 (Recent injective agreement) Let P0 be a closed process and P ′0 =
instr′(P0). We assume that, in P0, all events are of the form event(f(M1, . . . ,Mk))
and that different occurrences of event have different root function symbols. Let
{R1, . . . , Rn} = solve
′
P ′
0
,Init (event(e(x1, . . . , xm), i)). Assume that there exist x,
ir, and ρr (r ∈ {1, . . . , n}) such that
• For all r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Rr = H ∧m-event(e′(p1, . . . , pm), ρr) ⇒ event(e(p1,
. . . , pm), ir) for some p1, . . . , pm, and H .
• For all r and r′ in {1, . . . , n}, ρr(x){λ/ir} does not unify with ρr′(x){λ′/ir′}
when λ 6= λ′.
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Then P ′0 satisfies the recent correspondence event(e(x1, . . . , xm)) inj event(e′(x1,
. . . , xm)) against Init-adversaries.
Proof This result is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2. 2
Example 12 For the process P of Section 2.3, P ′ = instr′(P ), and Init = {c}, we
have
solve
′
P ′,Init (event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4), i)) =
{H ∧m-event(e3(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]), ρ)
⇒ event(eB(pkA, pkB , a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]), iB0)}
where pkA = pk (skA[ ]), pkB = pk(skB[ ])
p1 = pencryptp((a[pkB, iA0], pkA), pkB, r1[pkB , iA0])
p2 = pencryptp((a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0], pkB), pkA, r2[p1, iB0])
ρ = {iA 7→ iA0, x pkB 7→ pkB,m 7→ p2}
Intuitively, this result shows that each event eB(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]),
executed in the session of index iB = iB0 is preceded by an event e3(pkA, pkB,
a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]) executed in the session of index iA = iA0 with x pkB = pkB
and m = p2. Since iB0 occurs in this event (or in its environment4), different ex-
ecutions of eB , which have different values of iB0, cannot correspond to the same
execution of e3, so we have injectivity. More formally, the second hypothesis of Corol-
lary 3 is satisfied because ρ(m){λ/iB0} does not unify with ρ(m){λ′/iB0} when
λ 6= λ′, since iB0 occurs in ρ(m) = p2. Then, P ′ satisfies the recent correspondence
event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4)) inj event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4)) against Init -adversaries.
The tool shows in a similar way that P ′ satisfies the recent correspondence
event(eA(x1, x2, x3, x4)) inj event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4)) against Init -adversaries.
Let us now consider the case of general correspondences. The basic idea is
to decompose the general correspondence to prove into several correspondences.
For instance, the correspondence event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))  (event(e3(x1, x2, x3,
x4))  event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4))) is implied by the conjunction of the correspon-
dences event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))  event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4)) and event(e3(x1, x2,
x3, x4))  event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4)). However, as noted in Section 3.3, this proof
technique would often fail because, in order to prove that e2(x1, x2, x3, x4) has been
executed, we may need to know that eB(x1, x2, x3, x4) has been executed, and not
only that e3(x1, x2, x3, x4) has been executed. To solve this problem, we use the fol-
lowing idea: when we know that eB(x1, x2, x3, x4) has been executed, we may be
able to show that certain particular instances of e3(x1, x2, x3, x4) have been executed,
and we can exploit this information in order to prove that e2(x1, x2, x3, x4) has been
executed. In other words, we rather prove the correspondences event(eB(x1, x2, x3,
x4)) ⇒
∨m
r=1 σrevent(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))  σrevent(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4)) and for all
4In general, the environment may contain more variables than the event itself, so looking for the session
identifiers in the environment instead of the event is more powerful.
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r ≤ m, σrevent(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4))  σrevent(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4)). When the con-
sidered general correspondence has several nesting levels, we perform such a decom-
position recursively. The next theorem generalizes and formalizes these ideas.
Below, the notation (Env jk)jk represents a family Env jk of sets of pairs (ρ, i)
where ρ is an environment and i is a session identifier, one for each non-empty jk.
The notation (Env jkjk)jk represents a subfamily of (Env jk)jk in which the first two
indices are jk, and this family is reindexed by omitting the fixed indices jk.
Theorem 5 Let P0 be a closed process and P ′0 = instr′(P0). We assume that, in P0,
all events are of the form event(f(M1, . . . ,Mn)) and that different occurrences of
event have different root function symbols.
Let us define verify(q′, (Env jk)jk), where jk is non-empty, by:
V1. If q′ = event(p) for some p, then verify(q′, (Env jk)jk) is true.
V2. If q′ = event(p) ⇒ ∨mj=1 (event(p′j) ∧ljk=1[inj]jkq′jk) and q′jk =
event(pjk)  . . . for some p, p′j , and pjk, where m 6= 1, lj 6= 0, or p 6= p′1,
then verify(q′, (Env jk)jk) is true if and only if there exists (σjr)jr such that thefollowing three conditions hold:
V2.1. We have solve′P ′
0
,Init (event(p, i)) ⊆ {H∧
∧lj
k=1 m-event(σjrpjk, ρjrk) ⇒
event(σjrp
′
j, ijr) for some H , j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, r, and (ρjrk, ijr) ∈ Env jk
for all k}.
V2.2. For all j, r, k0, the common variables between σjrq′jk0 on the one hand and
σjrp
′
j and σjrq′jk for all k 6= k0 on the other hand occur in σjrpjk0 .
V2.3. For all j, r, k, verify(σjrq′jk, (Env jkjk)jk) is true.
Consider the following recent correspondence:
q = event(p) ⇒
m∨
j=1

event(p′j) 
lj∧
k=1
[inj]jkqjk


where
qjk = event(pjk) 
mjk∨
j=1
ljkj∧
k=1
[inj]jkjkqjkjk
We assume that the patterns in the correspondence satisfy the following conditions: p
and p′j for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} are of the form f(. . .) for some function symbol f and, for
all non-empty jk such that [inj]jk = inj, pjk = fjk(. . .) for some function symbol fjk.
We also assume that if inj occurs in qjk , then [inj]jk = inj.
Assume that there exist (Env jk)jk and (xjk)jk , where jk is non-empty, such that
H1. verify(q, (Env jk)jk) is true.
H2. For all non-empty jk, if [inj]jk = inj, then for all (ρ, i), (ρ′, i′) ∈ Env jk,
ρ(xjk){λ/i} does not unify with ρ′(xjk){λ′/i′} when λ 6= λ′.
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Then P ′0 satisfies the recent correspondence q against Init -adversaries.
This theorem is rather complex, so we give some intuition here. Its proof can be found
in Appendix E.
Point V2.1 allows us to infer correspondences by Theorem 3: after deleting session
identifiers and environments, P ′0 satisfies the correspondences:
event(p) ⇒
∨
j=1..m,r

event(σjrp′j) 
lj∧
k=1
event(σjrpjk)

 (14)
and, using the recursive calls of Point V2.3,
event(σ′
jrk⌈
pjk) ⇒
∨
j=1..mjk,r

event(σ′
jrkjr
pjk) 
ljkj∧
k=1
event(σ′
jrkjr
pjkjk)


(15)
against Init -adversaries, where σ′
jrkjr
= σjrkjrσjrk⌈ . . . σjr and we denote by σjrkjr
the substitution σjr obtained in recursive calls to verify indexed by jrk. In order to
infer the desired correspondence, we need to show injectivity properties and to combine
the correspondences (14) and (15) into a single correspondence. Injectivity comes from
Hypothesis H2: this hypothesis generalizes the second item of Proposition 2 to the case
of general correspondences.
The correspondences (14) and (15) are combined into a single correspondence us-
ing Point V2.2. We illustrate this point on the simple example of the correspondence
event(p) ⇒ (event(p′1) (event(p11) event(p1111))). By V2.1 and the recursive
call of V2.3, we have correspondences of the form:
event(p) ⇒
∨
r
(event(σ1rp
′
1) event(σ1rp11)) (16)
event(σ1rp11) ⇒
∨
r′
(event(σ1r11r′σ1rp11) event(σ1r11r′σ1rp1111)) (17)
for some σ1r and σ1r11r′ . The correspondence (17) implies the simpler correspondence
event(σ1rp11) event(σ1rp1111). (18)
Furthermore, if an instance of event(p) is executed, e1 = event(σp), then by (16),
for some r and σ′1 such that σp = σ′1σ1rp′1, the event e2 = event(σ′1σ1rp11) has
been executed before e1. By (18), for some σ′2 such that σ′1σ1rp11 = σ′2σ1rp11,
the event e3 = event(σ′2σ1rp1111) has been executed before e2. We now need to
reconcile the substitutions σ′1 and σ′2; this can be done thanks to V2.2. Let us de-
fine σ′′ such that σ′′x = σ′1x for x ∈ fv (σ1rp11) ∪ fv (σ1rp′1) and σ′′x = σ′2x
for x ∈ fv(σ1rp1111) ∪ fv(σ1rp11). Such a substitution σ′′ exists because the com-
mon variables between fv (σ1rp11) ∪ fv(σ1rp′1) and fv(σ1rp1111) ∪ fv(σ1rp11) oc-
cur in σ1rp11 by V2.2, and for the variables x ∈ fv (σ1rp11), σ′1x = σ′2x since
σ′1σ1rp11 = σ
′
2σ1rp11. So, for some r and σ′′ such that σp = σ′′σ1rp′1, the event
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e2 = event(σ
′′σ1rp11) has been executed before e1 and e3 = event(σ′′σ1rp1111) has
been executed before e2. This result proves the desired correspondence event(p) ⇒
(event(p′1) (event(p11) event(p1111)). Point V2.2 generalizes this technique to
any correspondence.
In the implementation, the hypotheses of this theorem are checked as follows. In
order to check verify(q′, (Env jk)jk), we first compute solve
′
P ′
0
,Init (event(p, i)). By
matching, we check V2.1 and obtain the values of σjr , ρjrk, and ijr for all j, r, and k.
We add (ρjrk, ijr) to Env jk. We compute σjrp′j and σjrq′jk for each j, r, and k, and
check V2.2 and V2.3.
After checking verify(q′, (Env jk)jk), we finally check Hypothesis H2 for each jk.
We start with a set that contains the whole domain of ρ for some (ρ, i) ∈ Env jk. For
each (ρ, i) and (ρ′, i′) in Env jk , we remove from this set the variables x such that
ρ(x){λ/i} unifies with ρ′(x){λ′/i′} for λ 6= λ′. When the obtained set is non-empty,
Hypothesis H2 is satisfied by taking for xjk any element of the obtained set. Otherwise,
Hypothesis H2 is not satisfied.
Example 13 For the example P of Section 2.3, the previous theorem does not enable
us to prove the correspondence event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4)) (inj event(e3(x1, x2, x3,
x4)) (inj event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4)) inj event(e1(x1, x2, x3)))) directly. Indeed,
Theorem 5 would require that we show a correspondence of the form event(σe2(x1,
x2, x3, x4))  inj event(σe1(x1, x2, x3)). However, such a correspondence does
not hold, because after executing a single event e1, the adversary can replay the first
message of the protocol, so that B executes several events e2.
It is still possible to prove this correspondence by combining the automatic
proof of the slightly weaker correspondence q = event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))  
(inj event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4))  (inj event(e1(x1, x2, x3)) ∧ inj event(e2(x1, x2,
x3, x4)))), which does not order the events e1 and e2, with a simple manual argument.
(This technique applies to many other examples.) Let us first prove the latter corre-
spondence.
Let P ′ = instr′(P ) and Init = {c}. We have
solve
′
P ′,Init (event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4), i)) =
{H ∧m-event(e3(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]), ρ111)
⇒ event(eB(pkA, pkB , a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]), iB0)}
solve
′
P ′,Init (event(e3(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]), i)) =
{m-event(e1(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0]), ρ111111)
∧m-event(e2(pkA, pkB , a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]), ρ111112)
⇒ event(e3(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]), iA0)}
where pkA = pk (skA[ ]), pkB = pk(skB[ ])
p1 = pencryptp((a[pkB, iA0], pkA), pkB, r1[pkB , iA0])
p2 = pencryptp((a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0], pkB), pkA, r2[p1, iB0])
ρ111 = ρ111111 = {iA 7→ iA0, x pkB 7→ pkB,m 7→ p2}
ρ111112 = {iB 7→ iB0,m
′ 7→ p1}
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Intuitively, as in Example 12, the value of solve′P ′,Init (event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4), i))
guarantees that each event eB(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]), executed in the ses-
sion of index iB = iB0 is preceded by an event e3(pkA, pkB, a[pkB , iA0], b[p1, iB0])
executed in the session of index iA = iA0 with x pkB = pkB and m = p2.
Since iB0 occurs in this event (or in its environment), we have injectivity. The value
of solve′P ′,Init (event(e3(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]), i)) guarantees that each
event e3(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]) executed in the session of index iA = iA0
is preceded by events e1(pkA, pkB , a[pkB, iA0]) executed in the session of index iA =
iA0 with x pkB = pkB and m = p2, and e2(pkA, pkB , a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]) exe-
cuted in the session of index iB = iB0 with m′ = p1. Since iA0 occurs in these events
(or in their environments), we have injectivity. So we obtain the desired correspondence
event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))  (inj event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4))  (inj event(e1(x1, x2,
x3)) ∧ inj event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4)))).
More formally, let us show that we can apply Theorem 5. We have p = p′1 =
eB(x1, x2, x3, x4), p11 = e3(x1, x2, x3, x4), p1111 = e1(x1, x2, x3), p1112 = e2(x1,
x2, x3, x4). We show verify(q, (Env jk)jk). Given the first value of solve
′
P ′,Init
shown above, we satisfy V2.1 by letting σ11 = {x1 7→ pkA, x2 7→ pkB, x3 7→
a[pkB, iA0], x4 7→ b[p1, iB0]} and i11 = iB0, with (ρ111, i11) ∈ Env11. The common
variables between σ11q11 = event(e3(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]))  (inj
event(e1(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0]))∧inj event(e2(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0])))
and σ11p′1 = eB(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]) are iA0 and iB0, and they occur in
σ11p11 = e3(pkA, pkB, a[pkB, iA0], b[p1, iB0]). So we have V2.2. Recursively, in
order to obtain V2.3, we have to show verify(σ11q11, (Env11jk)jk). Given the sec-
ond value of solve′P ′,Init shown above, we satisfy V2.1 by letting σ11111 = Id and
i11111 = iA0, with (ρ111111, i11111) ∈ Env1111 and (ρ111112, i11111) ∈ Env1112.
(We prefix the indices with 111 in order to represent that these values concern the
recursive call with j = 1, r = 1, and k = 1.) V2.2 holds trivially, because
σ11111σ11q111k0 = σ11111σ11event(p111k0), since the considered correspondence
has one nesting level only. V2.3 holds because q1111 reduces to event(p1111), so
verify(σ11111σ11q1111, (Env1111jk)jk) holds by V1, and the situation is similar for
q1112. Therefore, we obtain H1. In order to show H2, we have to find x11 such
that ρ111(x11){λ/i11} does not unify with ρ111(x11){λ′/i11} when λ 6= λ′. This
property holds with x11 = m, because i11 = iB0 occurs in ρ111(m) = p2. Simi-
larly, ρ111111(x1111){λ/i11111} does not unify with ρ111111(x1111){λ′/i11111} when
λ 6= λ′, for x1111 = iA, since i11111 = iA0 occurs in ρ111111(iA). Finally,
ρ111112(x1112){λ/i11111} does not unify with ρ111112(x1112){λ′/i11111}when λ 6= λ′
for x1112 = m′, since i11111 = iA0 occurs in ρ111112(m′) = p1. So, by Theorem 5,
the process P ′ satisfies the recent correspondence event(eB(x1, x2, x3, x4))  (inj
event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4))  (inj event(e1(x1, x2, x3)) ∧ inj event(e2(x1, x2, x3,
x4)))) against Init-adversaries.
We can then show that P ′ satisfies the recent correspondence event(eB(x1, x2,
x3, x4))  (inj event(e3(x1, x2, x3, x4))  (inj event(e2(x1, x2, x3, x4))  inj
event(e1(x1, x2, x3)))). We just have to show that the event e2(x1, x2, x3, x4) is ex-
ecuted after e1(x1, x2, x3). The nonce a is created just before executing e1(x1, x2,
x3) = e1(pkA, x pkB , a), and the event e2(x1, x2, x3, x4) = e2(x pkA, pkB, x a, b)
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contains a in the variable x3 = x a. So e2 has been executed after receiving a message
that contains a, so after a has been sent in some message, so after executing event e1.
8 Termination
In this section, we study termination properties of our algorithm. We first show that it
terminates on a restricted class of protocols, named tagged protocols. Then, we study
how to improve the choice of the selection function in order to obtain termination in
other cases.
8.1 Termination for Tagged Protocols
Intuitively, a tagged protocol is a protocol in which each application of a constructor
can be immediately distinguished from others in the protocol, for example by a tag: for
instance, when we want to encryptm under k, we add the constant tag ct0 to m, so that
the encryption becomes sencrypt((ct0,m), k) where the tag ct0 is a different constant
for each encryption in the protocol. The tags are checked when destructors are applied.
This condition is easy to realize by adding tags, and it is also a good protocol design:
the participants use the tags to identify the messages unambiguously, thus avoiding
type flaw attacks [50].
In [20], in collaboration with Andreas Podelski, we have given conditions on the
clauses that intuitively correspond to tagged protocols, and we have shown that, for
tagged protocols using only public channels, public-key cryptography with atomic
keys, shared-key cryptography and hash functions, and for secrecy properties, the solv-
ing algorithm using the selection function sel0 terminates.
Here, we extend this result by giving a definition of tagged protocols for processes
and showing that the clause generation algorithm yields clauses that satisfy the con-
ditions of [20], so that the solving algorithm terminates. (A similar result has been
proved for strong secrecy in the technical report [16].)
Definition 15 (Tagged protocol) A tagged protocol is a process P0 together with a
signature of constructors and destructors such that:
C1. The only constructors and destructors are those of Figure 2, plus equal .
C2. In every occurrence of M(x) and M〈N〉 in P0, M is a name free in P0.
C3. In every occurrence of f(. . .) with f ∈ {sencrypt , sencryptp , pencryptp , sign ,
nmrsign , h,mac} in P0, the first argument of f is a tuple (ct ,M1, . . . ,Mn),
where the tag ct is a constant. Different occurrences of f have different values
of the tag ct .
C4. In every occurrence of let x = g(. . .) in P else Q, for g ∈ {sdecrypt ,
sdecryptp , pdecryptp , checksignature, getmessage} in P0, P = let y =
1thn(x) in if y = ct then P
′ for some ct and P ′.
In every occurrence of nmrchecksign in P0, its third argument is (ct ,M1, . . . ,
Mn) for some ct ,M1, . . . ,Mn.
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C5. The destructor applications (including equality tests) have no else branches.
There exists a trace of P0 (without adversary) in which all program points are
executed exactly once.
C6. The second argument of pencryptp in the trace of Condition C5 is of the form
pk (M) for some M .
C7. The arguments of pk and host in the trace of Condition C5 are atomic constants
(free names or names created by restrictions not under inputs, non-deterministic
destructor applications, or replications) and they are not tags.
Condition C1 limits the set of allowed constructors and destructors. We could give
conditions on the form of allowed destructor rules, but these conditions are complex,
so it is simpler and more intuitive to give an explicit list. Condition C2 states that all
channels must be public. This condition avoids the need for the predicate message.
Condition C3 guarantees that tags are added in all messages, and Condition C4 guar-
antees that tags are always checked.
In most cases, the trace of Condition C5 is simply the intended execution of the
protocol. All terms that occur in the trace of Condition C5 have pairwise distinct
tags (since each program point is executed at most once, and tags at different program
points are different by Condition C3). We can prove that it also guarantees that the
terms of all clauses generated for the process P0 have instances in the set of terms that
occur in the trace of Condition C5 (using the fact that all program points are executed
at least once). These properties are key in the termination proof. More concretely,
Condition C5 means that, after removing replications of P0, the resulting process has
a trace that executes each program point (at least) once. In this trace, all destructor
applications succeed and the process reduces to a configuration with an empty set of
processes. Since, after removing replications, the number of traces of a process is
always finite, Condition C5 is decidable.
Condition C6 means that, in its intended execution, the protocol uses public-key
encryption only with public keys, and Condition C7 means that long-term secret (sym-
metric and asymmetric) keys are atomic constants.
Example 14 A tagged protocol can easily be obtained by tagging the Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe protocol. The tagged protocol consists of the following messages:
Message 1. A→ B : {ct0, a, pkA}pkB
Message 2. B → A : {ct1, a, b, pkB}pkA
Message 3. A→ B : {ct2, b}pkB
Each encryption is tagged with a different tag ct0, ct1, and ct2. This protocol can be
represented in our calculus by the following process P :
PA(skA, pkA, pkB) = !c(x pkB).(νa)event(e1(pkA, x pkB, a)).
(νr1)c〈pencryptp((ct0, a, pkA), x pkB, r1)〉.
c(m).let (= ct1,= a, x b,= x pkB) = pdecryptp(m, skA) in
event(e3(pkA, x pkB, a, x b)).(νr3)c〈pencryptp((ct2, x b), x pkB, r3)〉
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if x pkB = pkB then event(eA(pkA, x pkB, a, x b)).
c〈sencrypt((ct3, sAa), a)〉.c〈sencrypt((ct4, sAb), x b)〉
PB(skB, pkB, pkA) = !c(m
′).let (= ct1, x a, x pkA) = pdecryptp(m, skB) in
(νb)event(e2(x pkA, pkB , x a, b)).
(νr2)c〈pencryptp((ct2, x a, b, pkB), x pkA, r2)〉.
c(m′′).let (= ct3,= b) = pdecryptp(m
′′, skB) in
if x pkA = pkA then event(eB(x pkA, pkB, x a, b)).
c〈sencrypt((ct5, sBa), x a)〉.c〈sencrypt((ct6, sBb), b)〉
PT = !c(x1).c(x2).c〈x2〉.(c(x3).c(x4) | c(x5).c(x6))
P = (νskA)(νskB)let pkA = pk(skA) in let pkB = pk (skB) in
c〈pkA〉c〈pkB〉.(PA(skA, pkA, pkB) | PB(skB, pkB, pkA) | PT )
The encryptions that are used for testing the secrecy of nonces are also tagged, with
tags ct3 to ct6. Furthermore, a process PT is added in order to satisfy Condition C5,
because, without PT , in the absence of adversary, the process would block when it tries
to send the public keys pkA and pkB . The execution of Condition C5 is the intended
execution of the protocol. In this execution, the process PT receives the public keys
pkA and pkB; it forwards pkB on channel c to PA, so that a session between A and B
starts. Then A and B run this session normally, and finally output the encryptions of
sAa, sAb, sBa , and sBb; these encryptions are received by PT . The other conditions
of Definition 15 are easy to check, so P is tagged.
Proposition 3 below applies to P , and also to the process without PT , because the
addition of PT in fact does not change the clauses. (The only clause generated from
PT is a tautology, immediately removed by elimtaut .)
We prove the following termination result in Appendix D:
Proposition 3 For sel = sel0, the algorithm terminates on tagged protocols for queries
of the form α false when α is closed and all facts in Fnot are closed.
The proof first considers the particular case in which pk and host have a single argu-
ment in the execution of Condition C5, and then generalizes by mapping all arguments
of pk and host (which are atomic constants by Condition C7) to a single constant. The
proof of the particular case proceeds in two steps. The first step shows that the clauses
generated from a tagged protocol satisfy the conditions of [20]. Basically, these condi-
tions require that the clauses for the protocol satisfy the following properties:
T1. The patterns in the clauses are tagged, that is, the first argument of all occur-
rences of constructors except tuples, pk , and host is of the form (ct ,M1, . . . ,
Mn). The proof of this property relies on Conditions C3 and C4.
T2. Let S1 be the set of subterms of patterns that correspond to the terms that occur in
the execution of Condition C5. Every clause has an instance in which all patterns
are in S1. The proof of this property relies on Condition C5.
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T3. Each non-variable, non-data tagged pattern has at most one instance in S1. (A
pattern is said to be non-data when it is not of the form f(. . .) with f a data
constructor, that is, here, a tuple.) This property comes from Condition C3 which
guarantees that the tags at distinct occurrences are distinct and, for pk(p) and
host(p), from the hypothesis that pk and host have a single argument in the
execution of Condition C5.
Note that the patterns in the clauses (Rf) and (Rg) that come from constructors and
destructors are not tagged, so we need to handle them specially; Conditions C1 and C6
are useful for that.
The second step of the proof uses the result of [20] in order to conclude termination.
Basically, this result shows that Properties T1 and T2 are preserved by resolution. The
proof of this result relies on the fact that, if two non-variable non-data tagged patterns
unify and have instances in S1, then their instances in S1 are equal (by T3). So, when
unifying two such patterns, their unification still has an instance in S1. Furthermore,
we show that the size of the instance in S1 of a clause obtained by resolution is not
greater than the size of the instance in S1 of one of the initial clauses. Hence, we can
bound the size of the instance in S1 of generated clauses, which shows that only finitely
many clauses are generated.
The hypothesis that all facts in Fnot are closed is not really a restriction, since we
can always remove facts fromFnot without changing the result. (It may just slow down
the resolution.) The restriction to queries α false allows us to remove m-event facts
from clauses (by Remark 3). For more general queries, m-event facts may occur in
clauses, and one can find examples on which the algorithm does not terminate. Here is
such an example:
PS = c
′
1(y); let z = sencrypt((ct0, y), kSB) in
c′2〈sencrypt((ct2, sencrypt((ct1, z), kSA)), kSB)〉; event(h((ct3, y))); c
′
3〈z〉
PB = c
′
2(z
′); c′3(z); let (= ct0, y) = sdecrypt(z, kSB) in
let (= ct2, y
′) = sdecrypt(z′, kSB) in event(h((ct4, y, y
′))); c′4〈y
′〉
P0 = (νkSB); (c′1〈C0〉 | !PS | !PB | c
′
4(y
′))
This example has been built on purpose for exhibiting non-termination, since we did
not meet such non-termination cases in our experiments with real protocols. One can
interpret this example as follows. The participant A shares a key kSA with a server
S. Similarly, B shares a key kSB with S. The code of S is represented by PS , the
code of B by PB , and A is assumed to be dishonest, so it is represented by the adver-
sary. The process PS builds two tickets sencrypt((ct0, y), kSB) and sencrypt((ct2,
sencrypt((ct1, sencrypt((ct0, y), kSB)), kSA)), kSB). The first ticket is for B, the
second ticket should first be decrypted by B, then sent to A, which is going to decrypt
it again and sent it back to B. In the example, PB just decrypts the two tickets and
forwards the second one to A. It is easy to check that this process is a tagged protocol.
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This process generates the following clauses:
attacker(y) ⇒
attacker(sencrypt((ct2, sencrypt((ct1, sencrypt((ct0, y), kSB)), kSA)), kSB))
(19)
attacker(y) ∧m-event(h((ct3, y))) ⇒ attacker(sencrypt((ct0, y), kSB)) (20)
attacker(sencrypt((ct0, y), kSB)) ∧ attacker(sencrypt((ct2, y
′), kSB))
∧m-event(h((ct4, y, y
′))) ⇒ attacker(y′)
(21)
attacker(C0) (22)
The first two clauses come from PS , the third one from PB , and the last one from
the output in P0. Obviously, clauses (Init) (in particular attacker(kSA) since kSA ∈
fn(P0)), (Rf) for sencrypt and h, and (Rg) for sdecrypt are also generated. Assuming
the first hypothesis is selected in (21), the solving algorithm performs a resolution step
between (20) and (21), which yields:
attacker(y) ∧ attacker(sencrypt((ct2, y
′), kSB)) ∧
m-event(h((ct3, y))) ∧m-event(h((ct4, y, y
′))) ⇒ attacker(y′)
The second hypothesis is selected in this clause. By resolving with (19), we obtain
attacker(y) ∧ attacker(y′) ∧m-event(h((ct3, y))) ∧
m-event(h((ct4, y, sencrypt((ct1, sencrypt((ct0, y
′), kSB)), kSA))))
⇒ attacker(sencrypt((ct1, sencrypt((ct0, y
′), kSB)), kSA))
By applying (Rg) for sdecrypt and resolving with attacker(ct1) and attacker(kSA),
we obtain:
attacker(y) ∧ attacker(y′) ∧m-event(h((ct3, y))) ∧
m-event(h((ct4, y, sencrypt((ct1, sencrypt((ct0, y
′), kSB)), kSA))))
⇒ attacker(sencrypt((ct0, y
′), kSB))
This clause is similar to (20), so we can repeat this resolution process, resolving with
(21), (19), and decrypting the conclusion. Hence we obtain
n∧
j=1
attacker(yj) ∧m-event(h((ct3, y1))) ∧
n−1∧
j=1
m-event(h((ct4, yj, sencrypt((ct1, sencrypt((ct0, yj+1), kSB)), kSA))))
⇒ attacker(sencrypt((ct0, yn), kSB))
for all n > 0, so the algorithm does not terminate.
As noticed in [20], termination could be obtained in the presence of m-event facts
with an additional simplification:
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Elimination of useless m-event facts: elim-m-event eliminates m-event
facts in which a variable x occurs, and x only occurs in m-event facts and
in attacker(x) hypotheses.
This simplification is always sound, because it creates a stronger clause. It does not
lead to a loss of precision when all variables of events after also occur in the event
before . (This happens in particular for non-injective agreement.) Indeed, assume
that m-event(p) contains a variable which does not occur in the conclusion. This is
preserved by resolution, so when we obtain a clause m-event(p′) ∧H ⇒ event(p′′),
where m-event(p′) comes from m-event(p), p′ contains a variable that does not occur
in p′′, so this occurrence of m-event(p′) cannot be used to prove the desired correspon-
dence. However, in the general case, this simplification leads to a loss of precision. (It
may miss some m-event facts.) That is why this optimization was present in early im-
plementations which verified only authentication, and was later abandoned. We could
reintroduce it when all variables of events after also occur in the event before , if
we had termination problems coming from m-event facts for practical examples. No
such problems have occurred up to now.
8.2 Choice of the Selection Function
Unfortunately, not all protocols are tagged. In particular, protocols using a Diffie-
Hellman key agreement (see Section 9.1) are not tagged in the sense of Definition 15.
The algorithm still terminates for some of them (Skeme [52] for secrecy, SSH) with
the previous selection function sel0. However, it does not terminate with the selec-
tion function sel0 for some other examples (Skeme [52] for one authentication prop-
erty, the Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocol [60], some versions of the Woo-Lam
shared-key protocol [70] and [5, Example 6.2].) In this section, we present heuristics
to improve the choice of the selection function, in order to avoid most simple non-
termination cases. As reported in more detail in Section 10, these heuristics provide
termination for Skeme [52] and the Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocol [60].
Let us determine which constraints the selection function should satisfy to avoid
loops in the algorithm. First, assume that there is a clause H ∧ F ⇒ σF , where σ is a
substitution such that all σnF are distinct for n ∈ N.
• Assume that F is selected in this clause, and there is a clause H ′ ⇒ F ′, where
F ′ unifies with F , and the conclusion is selected in H ′ ⇒ F ′. Let σ′ be the most
general unifier of F and F ′. So the algorithm generates:
σ′H ′ ∧ σ′H ⇒ σ′σF . . . σ′H ′ ∧
n−1∧
i=0
σ′σiH ⇒ σ′σnF
assuming that the conclusion is selected in all these clauses, and that no clause is
removed because it is subsumed by another clause. So the algorithm would not
terminate. Therefore, in order to avoid this situation, we should avoid selecting
F in the clause H ∧ F ⇒ σF .
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• Assume that the conclusion is selected in the clause H ∧ F ⇒ σF , and there is
a clause H ′ ∧ σ′F ⇒ C (up to renaming of variables), where σ′ commutes with
σ (in particular, when σ and σ′ have disjoint supports), and that σ′F is selected
in this clause. So the algorithm generates:
σ′H ∧ σH ′ ∧ σ′F ⇒ σC . . .
n−1∧
i=0
σ′σiH ∧ σnH ′ ∧ σ′F ⇒ σnC
assuming that σ′F is selected in all these clauses, and that no clause is removed
because it is subsumed by another clause. So the algorithm would not terminate.
Therefore, in order to avoid this situation, if the conclusion is selected in the
clause H ∧F ⇒ σF , we should avoid selecting facts of the form σ′F , where σ′
and σ have disjoint supports, in other clauses.
In particular, since there are clauses of the form attacker(x1)∧ . . .∧ attacker(xn) ⇒
attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)), by the first remark, the facts attacker(xi) should not be se-
lected in this clause. So the conclusion will be selected in this clause and, by the second
remark, facts of the form attacker(x) with x variable should not be selected in other
clauses. We find again the constraint used in the definition of sel0.
We also have the following similar remarks after swapping conclusion and hypoth-
esis. Assume that there is a clause H ∧ σF ⇒ F , where σ is a substitution such that
all σnF are distinct for n ∈ N. We should avoid selecting the conclusion in this clause
and, if we select σF in this clause, we should avoid selecting conclusions of the form
σ′F , where σ′ and σ have disjoint supports, in other clauses.
We define a selection function that takes into account all these remarks. For a clause
H ⇒ C, we define the weight whyp(F ) of a fact F ∈ H by:
whyp(F ) =


−∞ if F is an unselectable fact
−2 if ∃σ, σF = C
−1 otherwise, if F ∈ Shyp
0 otherwise.
The set Shyp is defined as follows: at the beginning, Shyp = ∅; if we generate a clause
H ∧ F ⇒ σF where σ is a substitution that maps variables of F to terms that are not
all variables and, in this clause, we select the conclusion, then we add to Shyp all facts
σ′F with σ and σ′ of disjoint support (and renamings of these facts). For simplicity, we
have replaced the condition “all σnF are distinct for n ∈ N” with “σ maps variables
of F to terms that are not all variables”. (The former implies the latter but the converse
is wrong.) Our aim is only to obtain good heuristics, since there exists no perfect
selection function that would provide termination in all cases. The set Shyp can easily
be represented finitely: just store the facts F with, for each variable, a flag indicating
whether this variable can be substituted by any term by σ′, or only by a variable.
Similarly, we define the weight of the conclusion:
wconcl =


−2 if ∃σ, ∃F ∈ H,σC = F
−1 otherwise, if C ∈ Sconcl
0 otherwise.
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The set Sconcl is defined as follows: at the beginning, Sconcl = ∅; if we generate a
clause H ∧ σF ⇒ F where σ is a substitution that maps variables of F to terms that
are not all variables and, in this clause, we select σF , then we add to Sconcl all facts
σ′F with σ and σ′ of disjoint support (and renamings of these facts).
Finally, we define
sel1(H ⇒ C) =
{
∅ if ∀F ∈ H,whyp(F ) < wconcl,
{F0} where F0 ∈ H of maximum weight, otherwise.
Therefore, we avoid unifying facts of smallest weight when that is possible. The se-
lected fact F0 can be any element of H of maximum weight. In the implementation,
the hypotheses are represented by a list, and the selected fact is the first element of the
list of hypotheses of maximum weight.
We can also notice that the bigger the fact is, the stronger are constraints to unify
it with another fact. So selecting a bigger fact should reduce the possible unifications.
Therefore, we consider sel2, defined as sel1 except that whyp(F ) = size(F ) instead of
0 in the last case.
When selecting a fact that has a negative weight, we are in one of the cases when
termination will probably not be achieved. We therefore emit a warning in this case, so
that the user can stop the program.
9 Extensions
In this section, we briefly sketch a few extensions to the framework presented previ-
ously. The extensions of Sections 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3 were presented in [18] for the proof
of process equivalences. We sketch here how to adapt them to the proof of correspon-
dences.
9.1 Equational Theories and Diffie-Hellman Key Agreements
Up to now, we have defined cryptographic primitives by associating rewrite rules to
destructors. Another way of defining primitives is by equational theories, as in the
applied pi calculus [4]. This allows us to model, for instance, variants of encryption for
which the failure of decryption cannot be detected or more complex primitives such as
Diffie-Hellman key agreements. The Diffie-Hellman key agreement [38] enables two
principals to build a shared secret. It is used as an elementary step in more complex
protocols, such as Skeme [52], SSH, SSL, and IPsec.
As shown in [18], our verifier can be extended to handle some equational theories.
Basically, one shows that each trace in a model with an equational theory corresponds
to a trace in a model in which function symbols are equipped with additional rewrite
rules, and conversely. (We could adapt [18, Lemma 1] to show that this result also
applies to correspondences.) Therefore, we can show that a correspondence proved
in the model with rewrite rules implies the same correspondence in the model with
an equational theory. Moreover, we have implemented algorithms that compute the
rewrite rules from an equational theory.
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In the experiments reported in this paper, we use equational theories only for the
Diffie-Hellman key agreement, which can be modeled by using two functions f and f ′
that satisfy the equation
f(y, f ′(x)) = f(x, f ′(y)). (23)
In practice, the functions are f(x, y) = yx mod p and f ′(x) = bx mod p, where
p is prime and b is a generator of Z∗p. The equation f(y, f ′(x)) = (bx)y mod p =
(by)x mod p = f(x, f ′(y)) is satisfied. In our verifier, following the ideas used in
the applied pi calculus [4], we do not consider the underlying number theory; we work
abstractly with the equation (23). The Diffie-Hellman key agreement involves two
principals A and B. A chooses a random name x0, and sends f ′(x0) to B. Similarly,
B chooses a random name x1, and sends f ′(x1) to A. Then A computes f(x0, f ′(x1))
and B computes f(x1, f ′(x0)). Both values are equal by (23), and they are secret:
assuming that the attacker cannot have x0 or x1, it can compute neither f(x0, f ′(x1))
nor f(x1, f
′(x0)).
In our verifier, the equation (23) is translated into the rewrite rules
f(y, f ′(x)) → f(x, f ′(y)) f(x, y) → f(x, y).
Notice that this definition of f is non-deterministic: a term such as f(a, f ′(b)) can
be reduced to f(b, f ′(a)) and f(a, f ′(b)), so that f(a, f ′(b)) reduces to its two forms
modulo the equational theory. The fact that these rewrite rules model the equation (23)
correctly follows from [18, Section 5].
When using this model, we have to adapt the verification of correspondences. In-
deed, the conditions on the clauses must be checked modulo the equational theory.
(Using the rewrite rules, we can implement unification modulo the equational the-
ory, basically by rewriting the terms by the rewrite rules before performing syntactic
unification.) For example, in the case of non-injective agreement, even if the pro-
cess P0 satisfies non-injective agreement against Init -adversaries, it may happen that
a clause m-event(e′(p1, . . . , pn){f(p2, f ′(p1))/z}) ⇒ event(e(p1, . . . , pn){f(p1,
f ′(p2))/z}) is in solveP ′
0
,Init (event(e(x1, . . . , xn))). The specification is still satisfied
in this case, because (p1, . . . , pn){f(p1, f ′(p2))/z} = (p1, . . . , pn){f(p2, f ′(p1))/z}
modulo the equational theory. So we have to test that, if H ⇒ event(e(p1, . . . , pn)) is
in solveP ′
0
,Init (event(e(x1, . . . , xn))), then there exist p′1, . . . , p′n equal to p1, . . . , pn
modulo the equational theory such that m-event(e′(p′1, . . . , p′n)) ∈ H . More gener-
ally, the equality R = H ∧m-event(σ′pj1)∧ . . .∧m-event(σ′pjlj ) ⇒ event(σ′p′j) in
the hypothesis of Theorem 3 is checked modulo the equational theory (using matching
modulo the equational theory to find σ′). Point V2.1 of the definition of verify and Hy-
pothesis H2 of Theorem 5 are also checked modulo the equational theory. Furthermore,
the following condition is added to Point V2.2 of the definition of verify:
For all j, r, and k, we let qc = σjrqjk and pc = σjrpjk, and we
require that, for all substitutions σ and σ′, if σpc = σ′pc and for all
x ∈ fv(qc) \ fv(pc), σx = σ′x, then σqc = σ′qc (where equalities are
considered modulo the equational theory).
This property is useful in the proof of Theorem 5 (see Appendix E). It always holds
when the equational theory is empty, because σpc = σ′pc implies that for all x ∈
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fv(pc), σx = σ
′x, so for all x ∈ fv(qc), σx = σ′x. However, it does not hold in
general for any equational theory, so we need to check it explicitly when the equational
theory is non-empty. In the implementation, this condition is checked as follows. Let
θ be a renaming of variables of pc to fresh variables. We check that, for every σu most
general unifier of pc and θpc modulo the equational theory, σuqc = σuθqc modulo
the equational theory. When this check succeeds, we can prove the condition above as
follows. Let σ0 be defined by, for all x ∈ fv(qc), σ0x = σx and, for all x ∈ fv (θpc),
σ0x = σ
′θ−1x. If σpc = σ′pc, then σ0pc = σpc = σ′pc = σ0θpc, so σ0 unifies pc and
θpc, hence there exist σ1 and a most general unifier σu of pc and θpc such that σ0 =
σ1σu. We have σuqc = σuθqc, so σqc = σ0qc = σ1σuqc = σ1σuθqc = σ0θqc = σ′qc.
This treatment of equations has the advantage that resolution can still use syntactic
unification, so it remains efficient. However, it also has limitations; for example, it
cannot handle associative functions, such as XOR, because it would generate an in-
finite number of rewrite rules for the destructors. We refer to [28, 31] for treatments
of XOR and to [27, 48, 56, 58] for treatments of Diffie-Hellman key agreements with
more detailed algebraic relations. The NRL protocol analyzer handles a limited version
of associativity for strings of bounded length [43], which we could handle.
9.2 Precise Treatment of else Branches
In the generation of clauses described in Section 5.2, we consider that the else branch
of destructor applications may always be executed. Our implementation takes into
account these else branches more precisely. In order to do that, it uses a set of special
variables GVar and a predicate nounif, also used in [18], such that, for all closed
patterns p and p′, nounif(p, p′) holds if and only if there is no closed substitution σ
with domain GVar such that σp = σp′. The fact nounif(p, p′) means that p 6= p′ for
all values of the special variables in GVar .
One can then check the failure of an equality test M = M ′ by
nounif(ρ(M), ρ(M ′)) and the failure of a destructor application g(M1, . . . ,Mn)
by
∧
g(p1,...,pn)→p∈def(g)
nounif((ρ(M1), . . . , ρ(Mn)),GVar (p1, . . . , pn)), where
GVar(p) is the pattern p after renaming all its variables to elements of GVar and
ρ is the environment that maps variables to their corresponding patterns. Intuitively,
the rewrite rule g(p1, . . . , pn) → p can be applied if and only if (ρ(M1), . . . , ρ(Mn))
is an instance of (p1, . . . , pn). So the rewrite rule g(p1, . . . , pn) → p cannot be applied
if and only if nounif((ρ(M1), . . . , ρ(Mn)),GVar(p1, . . . , pn)).
The predicate nounif is handled by specific simplification steps in the solver, de-
scribed and proved correct in [18].
9.3 Scenarios with Several Stages
Some protocols can be broken into several parts, or stages, numbered 0, 1, . . . , such that
when the protocol starts, stage 0 is executed; at some point in time, stage 0 stops and
stage 1 starts; later, stage 1 stops and stage 2 starts, and so on. Therefore, stages allow
us to model a global clock. Our verifier can be extended to such scenarios with several
stages, as summarized in [18]. We add a construct t : P to the syntax of processes,
which means that process P runs only in stage t, where t is an integer.
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The generation of clauses can easily be extended to processes with stages. We
use predicates attackert and messaget for each stage t, generate the clauses for the
attacker for each stage, and the clauses for the protocol with predicates attackert and
messaget for each process that runs in stage t. Furthermore, we add clauses
attackert(x) ⇒ attackert+1(x) (Rt)
in order to transmit attacker knowledge from each stage t to the next stage t + 1.
Scenarios with several stages allow us to model properties related to the compro-
mise of keys. For example, we can model forward secrecy properties as follows. Con-
sider a public-key protocol P (without stage prefix) and the process P ′ = 0 : P | 1 :
c〈skA〉; c〈skB〉, which runs P in stage 0 and later outputs the secret keys of A and B
on the public channel c in stage 1. If we prove that P ′ preserves the secrecy of the
session keys of P , then the attacker cannot obtain these session keys even if it later
compromises the private keys of A and B, which is forward secrecy.
9.4 Compromise of Session Keys
We consider the situation in which the attacker compromises some session keys of the
protocol. Our goal is then to show that the other session keys of the protocol are still
safe. For example, this property does not hold for the Needham-Schroeder shared-key
protocol [60]: in this protocol, when an attacker manages to get some session keys,
then it can also get the secrets of other sessions.
If we assume that the compromised sessions are all run before the standard sessions
(to model that the adversary needs time to break the session keys before being able to
use the obtained information against standard sessions), then this can be modeled as
a scenario with two stages: in stage 0, the process runs a modified version of the
protocol that outputs its session keys; in stage 1, the standard sessions runs; we prove
the security of the sessions of stage 1.
However, we can also consider a stronger model, in which the compromised ses-
sions may run in parallel with the non-compromised ones. In this case, we have a single
stage.
Let P0 be the process representing the whole protocol. We consider that the part of
P0 not under replications corresponds to the creation of long-term secrets, and the part
of P0 under at least one replication corresponds to the sessions. We say that the names
generated under at least one replication in P0 are session names. We add one argument
ic to the function symbols a[. . .] that encode session names in the instrumented process
P ′0; this additional argument is named compromise identifier and can take two values,
s0 or s1. We consider that, during the execution of the protocol, each replicated subpro-
cess !QX of P0 generates two sets of copies of QX , one with compromise identifier s0,
one with s1. The attacker compromises sessions that involve only copies of processes
QX with the compromise identifier s0. It does not compromise sessions that involve at
least one copy of some process QX with compromise identifier s1.
The clauses for the process P0 are generated as in Section 5.2 (except for the addi-
tion of a variable compromise identifier as argument of session names). The following
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clauses are added:
For each constructor f , comp(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ comp(xk) ⇒ comp(f(x1, . . . , xk))
For each (νa : a[. . .]) under n replications and k inputs and non-deterministic
destructor applications in P ′0,
comp(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ comp(xk) ⇒ comp(a[x1, . . . , xk]) if n = 0
comp(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ comp(xk) ⇒ comp(a[x1, . . . , xk, i1, . . . , in, s0]) if n > 0
comp(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ comp(xk) ⇒ attacker(a[x1, . . . , xk, i1, . . . , in, s0]) if n > 0
The predicate comp is such that comp(p) is true when all session names in p have
compromise identifier s0. These clauses express that the attacker has the session names
that contain only the compromise identifier s0.
In order to prove the secrecy of a session name s, we query the fact attacker(s[x1,
. . . , xk, i1, . . . , in, s1]). If this fact is underivable, then the protocol does not have
the weakness of the Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocol mentioned above: the
attacker cannot have the secret s of a session that it has not compromised. In con-
trast, attacker(s[x1, . . . , xk, i1, . . . , in, s0]) is always derivable, since the attacker has
compromised the sessions with identifier s0.
We can also prove correspondences in the presence of key compromise. We want
to prove that the non-compromised sessions are secure, so we prove that, if an event
event(M) has been executed in a copy of some QX with compromise identifier s1,
then the required events event(Mjk) have been executed in any process. (A copy of
QX with compromise identifier s1 may interact with a copy of QY with compromise
identifier s0 and, in this case, the events event(Mjk) may be executed in the copy of
QY with compromise identifier s0.) We obtain this result by adding the compromise
identifier ic as argument of the predicates m-event and event in clauses, and corre-
spondingly adding s1 as argument of event(M) and event(Mj), and a fresh variable
as argument of the other events event(Mjk) in queries. We can then prove the cor-
respondence in the same way as in the absence of key compromise. The treatment of
correspondences attacker(M)  . . . and message(M,M ′)  . . . in which M and
M ′ do not contain bound names remains unchanged.
10 Experimental Results
We have implemented our verifier in Ocaml and have performed tests on various pro-
tocols of the literature. The tests reported here concern secrecy and authentication
properties for simple examples of protocols. More complex examples have been stud-
ied, using our technique for proving correspondences. We do not detail them in this
paper, because they have been the subject of specific papers [2, 3, 19].
Our results are summarized in Figure 6, with references to the papers that describe
the protocols and the attacks. In these tests, the protocols are fully modeled, includ-
ing interaction with the server for all versions of the Needham-Schroeder, Woo-Lam
shared key, Denning-Sacco, Otway-Rees, and Yahalom protocols. The first column in-
dicates the name of the protocol; we use the following abbreviations: NS for Needham-
Schroeder, PK for public-key, SK for shared-key, corr. for corrected, tag. for tagged,
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unid. for unidirectional, and bid. for bidirectional. We have tested the Needham-
Schroeder shared key protocol with the modeling of key compromise mentioned in
Section 9.4, in which the compromised sessions can be executed in parallel with the
non-compromised ones (version marked “comp.” in Figure 6). The second column
indicates the number of Horn clauses that represent the protocol. The third column
indicates the total number of resolution steps performed for analyzing the protocol.
The fourth column gives the execution time of our analyzer, in ms, on a Pentium M
1.8 GHz. Several secrecy and agreement specifications are checked for each protocol.
The time given is the total time needed to check all specifications. The following
factors influence the speed of the system:
• We use secrecy assumptions to speed up the search. These assumptions say that
the secret keys of the principals, and the random values of the Diffie-Hellman
key agreement in the Skeme protocol, remain secret. On average, the verifier is
two times slower without secrecy assumptions, in our tests.
• We mentioned several selection functions, and the speed of the system can vary
substantially depending on the selection function. In the tests of Figure 6, we
used the selection function sel2. With sel1, the system is two times slower on
average on Needham-Schroeder shared-key, Otway-Rees, the variant of [63]
of Otway-Rees, and Skeme but faster on the bidirectional simplified Yahalom
(59 ms instead of 91 ms). The speed is almost unchanged for our other tests. On
average, the verifier is 1.8 times slower with sel1 than with sel2, in our tests.
The selection function sel0 gives approximately the same speed as sel1, except
for Skeme, for which the analysis does not terminate with sel0. (We comment
further on termination below.)
• The tests of Figure 6 have been performed without elimination of redundant hy-
potheses. With elimination of redundant hypotheses that contain m-event facts,
we obtain approximately the same speed. With elimination of all redundant hy-
potheses, the verifier is 1.3 times slower on average in these tests, because of the
time spent testing whether hypotheses are redundant.
When our tool successfully proves that a protocol satisfies a certain specification,
we are sure that this specification indeed holds, by our soundness theorems. When
our tool does not manage to prove that a protocol satisfies a certain specification, it
finds at least one clause and a derivation of this clause that contradicts the specifica-
tion. The existence of such a clause does not prove that there is an attack: it may
correspond to a false attack, due to the approximations introduced by the Horn clause
model. However, using an extension of the technique of [6] to events, in most cases,
our tool reconstructs a trace of the protocol, and thus proves that there is actually an
attack against the considered specification. In the tests of Figure 6, this reconstruction
succeeds in all cases for secrecy and non-injective correspondences, in the absence of
key compromise. The trace reconstruction is not implemented yet in the presence of
key compromise (Section 9.4) or for injective correspondences. (It presents additional
difficulties in the latter case, since the trace should execute some event twice and others
once in order to contradict injectivity, while the derivation corresponds to the execution
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Protocol # # res. Time Cases with attacks
cl. steps (ms) Secrecy A B Ref.
NS PK [60] 32 1988 95 Nonces B None All [53]
NS PK corr. [53] 36 1481 51 None None None
Woo-Lam PK [70] 23 104 7 All [40]
Woo-Lam PK corr. [72] 27 156 6 None
Woo-Lam SK [46] 25 184 8 All [8]
Woo-Lam SK corr. [46] 21 244 4 None
Denning-Sacco [37] 30 440 18 Key B All [5]
Denning-Sacco corr. [5] 30 438 16 None Inj
NS SK [60], tag. 31 2721 41 None None None
NS SK corr. [61], tag. 32 2102 57 None None None
NS SK [60], tag., comp. 50 25241 167 Key B None Inj [37]
NS SK corr. [61], tag., comp. 53 23956 225 None None None
Yahalom [26] 26 1515 34 None Key None
Simpler Yahalom [26], unid. 21 1479 30 None Key None
Simpler Yahalom [26], bid. 24 3685 91 None All None [67]
Otway-Rees [62] 34 1878 59 None Key Inj,Key [26]
Simpler Otway-Rees [5] 28 1934 31 None All All [63]
Otway-Rees, variant of [63] 35 3349 87 Key B All All [63]
Main mode of Skeme [52] 39 4139 154 None None None
Figure 6: Experimental results
of events once, with badly related session identifiers.) In the cases in which trace re-
construction is not implemented, we have checked manually that the protocol is indeed
subject to an attack, so our tool found no false attack in the tests of Figure 6: for all
specifications that hold, it has proved them.
The last four columns give the results of the analysis. The column “Se-
crecy” concerns secrecy properties, the column A concerns agreement specifica-
tions event(e(x1, . . . , xn))  [inj] event(e′(x1, . . . , xn)) in which A executes the
event event(e(M1, . . . ,Mn)), the column B agreement specifications event(e(x1,
. . . , xn))  [inj] event(e
′(x1, . . . , xn)) in which B executes the event event(e(M1,
. . . ,Mn)). The last column gives the reference of the attacks when attacks are found.
The first six protocols of Figure 6 (Needham-Schroeder public key and Woo-Lam one-
way authentication protocols) are authentication protocols. For them, we have tested
non-injective and recent injective agreement on the name of the participants, and non-
injective and injective full agreement (agreement on all atomic data). For the Needham-
Schroeder public key protocol, we have also tested the secrecy of nonces. “Nonces B”
means that the nonces Na and Nb manipulated by B may not be secret, “None” means
all tested specifications are satisfied (there is no attack), “All” that our tool finds an
attack against all tested specifications. The Woo and Lam protocols are one-way au-
thentication protocols: they are intended to authenticate A to B, but not B to A, so we
have only tested them with B containing event(e(M1, . . . ,Mn)).
Numerous versions of the Woo and Lam shared-key protocol have been published
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in the literature [70], [8], [5, end of Example 3.2], [5, Example 6.2], [72], [46] (flawed
and corrected versions). Our tool terminates and proves the correctness of the corrected
versions of [8] and of [46]; it terminates and finds an attack on the flawed version
of [46]. (The messages received or sent by A do not depend on the host A wants to
talk to, so A may start a session with the adversary C, and the adversary can reuse the
messages of this session to talk to B in A’s name.) We can easily see that the versions
of [70] and [5, Example 6.2] are also subject to this attack, even if our tool does not
terminate on them. The only difference between the protocol of [46] and that of [70] is
that [46] adds tags to distinguish different encryption sites. As shown in Section 8.1,
adding tags enforces termination. Our tool finds the attack of [29, bottom of page 52]
on the versions of [5, end of Example 3.2] and [72]. For example, the version of [72]
is
Message 1. A→ B: A
Message 2. B → A: NB
Message 3. A→ B: {A,B,NB}KAS
Message 4. B → S: {A,B, {A,B,NB}KAS}KBS
Message 5. S → B: {A,B,NB}KBS
and the attack is
Message 1. I(A) → B: A
Message 2. B → I(A): NB
Message 3. I(A) → B: NB
Message 4. B → I(A): {A,B,NB}KBS
Message 5. I(A) → B: {A,B,NB}KBS
In message 3, the adversary sends NB instead of {A,B,NB}KAS . B cannot see the
difference and, acting as defined in the protocol, B unfortunately sends exactly the
message needed by the adversary as message 5. So B thinks he talks to A, while A and
S can perfectly be dead. The attack found against the version of [5, end of Example
3.2] is very similar.
The last five protocols exchange a session key, so we have tested agreement on
the names of the participants, and agreement on both the participants and the session
key (instead of full agreement, since agreement on the session key is more important
than agreement on other values). In Figure 6, “Key B” means that the key obtained by
B may not be secret, “Key” means that agreement on the session key is wrong, “Inj”
means that injective agreement is wrong, “All” and “None” are as before.
In the Needham-Schroeder shared key protocol [60], the last messages are
Message 4. B → A: {NB}K
Message 5. A→ B: {NB − 1}K
whereNB is a nonce. RepresentingNB−1 with a function minusone(x) = x−1, with
associated destructor plusone defined by plusone(minusone(x)) → x, the algorithm
does not terminate with the selection function sel0. The selection functions sel1 or sel2
given in Section 8.2 however yield termination. We can also notice that the purpose of
the subtraction is to distinguish the reply of A from B’s message. As mentioned in [5],
it would be clearer to have:
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Message 4. B → A: {Message 4 : NB}K
Message 5. A→ B: {Message 5 : NB}K
We have used this encoding in the tests shown in Figure 6. Our tool then terminates
with selection functions sel0, sel1, and sel2. [20] explains in more detail why these two
messages encoded with minusone prevent termination with sel0, and why the addition
of tags “Message 4”, “Message 5” yields termination. Adding the tags may strengthen
the protocol (for instance, in the Needham-Schroeder shared key protocol, it prevents
replaying Message 5 as a Message 4), so the security of the tagged version does not
imply the security of the original version. As mentioned in [5], using the tagged ver-
sion is a better design choice because it prevents confusing different messages, so this
version should be implemented. Our tool also does not terminate on Skeme with selec-
tion function sel0, for an authentication query, but terminates with selection functions
sel1 or sel2. All other examples of Figure 6 terminate with the three selection functions
sel0, sel1, and sel2.
Among the examples of Figure 6, only the Woo-Lam shared key protocol, flawed
and corrected versions of [46] and the Needham-Schroeder shared key protocol have
explicit tags. Our tool terminates on all other protocols, even if they are not tagged. The
termination can partly be explained by the notion of “implicitly tagged” protocols [20]:
the various messages are not distinguished by explicit tags, but by other properties
of their structure, such as the arity of the tuples that they contain. In Figure 6, the
Denning-Sacco protocol and the Woo-Lam public key protocol are implicitly tagged.
Still, the tool terminates on many examples that are not even implicitly tagged.
For the Yahalom protocol, we show that, if B thinks that k is a key to talk with
A, then A also thinks that k is a key to talk with B. The converse is clearly wrong,
because the session key is sent from A to B in the last message, so the adversary can
intercept this message, so that A has the key but not B.
For the Otway-Rees protocol, we do not have agreement on the session key, since
the adversary can intercept messages in such a way that one participant has the key and
the other one has no key. There is also an attack in which both participants get a key,
but not the same one [44]. The latter attack is not found by our tool, since it stops with
the former attacks.
For the simplified version of the Otway-Rees protocol given in [5], B can ex-
ecute its event event(e(M1, . . . ,Mn)) with A dead, and A can execute its event
event(e(M1, . . . ,Mn)) withB dead. As Burrows, Abadi, and Needham already noted
in [26], even the original protocol does not guarantee to B thatA is alive (attack against
injective agreement that we also find). [46] said that the protocol satisfied its authenti-
cation specifications, because they showed that neither A nor B can conclude that k is
a key for talking between A and B without the server first saying so. (Of course, this
property is also important, and could also be checked with our verifier.)
11 Conclusion
We have extended previous work on the verification of security protocols by logic pro-
gramming techniques, from secrecy to a very general class of correspondences, includ-
ing not only authentication but also, for instance, correspondences that express that the
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messages of the protocol have been sent and received in the expected order. This tech-
nique enables us to check correspondences in a fully automatic way, without bounding
the number of sessions of the protocols. This technique also yields an efficient verifier,
as the experimental results demonstrate.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Martı´n Abadi, Je´roˆme Feret, Ce´dric Fournet, and Andrew Gor-
don for helpful discussions on this paper. This work was partly done at Max-Planck-
Institut fu¨r Informatik, Saarbru¨cken, Germany.
References
[1] M. Abadi and B. Blanchet. Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and
logic programs. Journal of the ACM, 52(1):102–146, Jan. 2005.
[2] M. Abadi and B. Blanchet. Computer-assisted verification of a protocol for certi-
fied email. Science of Computer Programming, 58(1–2):3–27, Oct. 2005. Special
issue SAS’03.
[3] M. Abadi, B. Blanchet, and C. Fournet. Just fast keying in the pi calculus.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 10(3):1–59,
July 2007.
[4] M. Abadi and C. Fournet. Mobile values, new names, and secure communi-
cation. In 28th Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of
Programming Languages (POPL’01), pages 104–115, London, United Kingdom,
Jan. 2001. ACM Press.
[5] M. Abadi and R. Needham. Prudent engineering practice for cryptographic pro-
tocols. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 22(1):6–15, Jan. 1996.
[6] X. Allamigeon and B. Blanchet. Reconstruction of attacks against cryptographic
protocols. In 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-18),
pages 140–154, Aix-en-Provence, France, June 2005. IEEE.
[7] R. Amadio and S. Prasad. The game of the name in cryptographic tables. In P. S.
Thiagarajan and R. Yap, editors, Advances in Computing Science - ASIAN’99,
volume 1742 of Lecture Notes on Computer Science, pages 15–27, Phuket, Thai-
land, Dec. 1999. Springer.
[8] R. Anderson and R. Needham. Programming Satan’s computer. In J. van Leeu-
ven, editor, Computer Science Today: Recent Trends and Developments, volume
1000 of Lecture Notes on Computer Science, pages 426–440. Springer, 1995.
[9] L. Bachmair and H. Ganzinger. Resolution theorem proving. In A. Robinson and
A. Voronkov, editors, Handbook of Automated Reasoning, volume 1, chapter 2,
pages 19–100. North Holland, 2001.
62
[10] M. Backes, A. Cortesi, and M. Maffei. Causality-based abstraction of multiplicity
in security protocols. In 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
(CSF’07), pages 355–369, Venice, Italy, July 2007. IEEE.
[11] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Entity authentication and key distribution. In D. R.
Stinson, editor, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 1993, volume 773 of Lec-
ture Notes on Computer Science, pages 232–249, Santa Barbara, California, Aug.
1993. Springer.
[12] K. Bhargavan, C. Fournet, A. D. Gordon, and R. Pucella. TulaFale: A secu-
rity tool for web services. In Formal Methods for Components and Objects
(FMCO 2003), volume 3188 of Lecture Notes on Computer Science, pages 197–
222, Leiden, The Netherlands, Nov. 2003. Springer. Paper and tool available at
http://securing.ws/.
[13] B. Blanchet. An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on Prolog rules. In
14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-14), pages 82–96,
Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, June 2001. IEEE Computer Society.
[14] B. Blanchet. From secrecy to authenticity in security protocols. In
M. Hermenegildo and G. Puebla, editors, 9th International Static Analysis Sym-
posium (SAS’02), volume 2477 of Lecture Notes on Computer Science, pages
342–359, Madrid, Spain, Sept. 2002. Springer.
[15] B. Blanchet. Automatic proof of strong secrecy for security protocols. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 86–100, Oakland, California, May
2004.
[16] B. Blanchet. Automatic proof of strong secrecy for security protocols.
Technical Report MPI-I-2004-NWG1-001, Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Informatik,
Saarbru¨cken, Germany, July 2004.
[17] B. Blanchet. Security protocols: From linear to classical logic by abstract inter-
pretation. Information Processing Letters, 95(5):473–479, Sept. 2005.
[18] B. Blanchet, M. Abadi, and C. Fournet. Automated verification of selected equiv-
alences for security protocols. Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming,
75(1):3–51, Feb.–Mar. 2008.
[19] B. Blanchet and A. Chaudhuri. Automated formal analysis of a protocol for se-
cure file sharing on untrusted storage. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Pri-
vacy, Oakland, CA, May 2008. IEEE. To appear.
[20] B. Blanchet and A. Podelski. Verification of cryptographic protocols: Tagging
enforces termination. Theoretical Computer Science, 333(1-2):67–90, Mar. 2005.
Special issue FoSSaCS’03.
[21] C. Bodei, M. Buchholtz, P. Degano, F. Nielson, and H. R. Nielson. Static valida-
tion of security protocols. Journal of Computer Security, 13(3):347–390, 2005.
63
[22] P. Broadfoot, G. Lowe, and B. Roscoe. Automating data independence. In 6th Eu-
ropean Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2000), volume
1895 of Lecture Notes on Computer Science, pages 175–190, Toulouse, France,
Oct. 2000. Springer.
[23] P. J. Broadfoot and A. W. Roscoe. Embedding agents within the intruder to detect
parallel attacks. Journal of Computer Security, 12(3/4):379–408, 2004.
[24] M. Bugliesi, R. Focardi, and M. Maffei. Analysis of typed analyses of authenti-
cation protocols. In Proc. 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop
(CSFW’05), pages 112–125, Aix-en-Provence, France, June 2005. IEEE Comp.
Soc. Press.
[25] M. Bugliesi, R. Focardi, and M. Maffei. Dynamic types for authentication. Jour-
nal of Computer Security, 15(6):563–617, 2007.
[26] M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. Needham. A logic of authentication. Proceedings
of the Royal Society of London A, 426:233–271, 1989. A preliminary version
appeared as Digital Equipment Corporation Systems Research Center report No.
39, February 1989.
[27] Y. Chevalier, R. Ku¨sters, M. Rusinowitch, and M. Turuani. Deciding the security
of protocols with Diffie-Hellman exponentiation and products in exponents. In
P. K. Pandya and J. Radhakrishnan, editors, FST TCS 2003: Foundations of Soft-
ware Technology and Theoretical Computer Science, 23rd Conference, volume
2914 of Lecture Notes on Computer Science, pages 124–135, Mumbai, India,
Dec. 2003. Springer.
[28] Y. Chevalier, R. Ku¨sters, M. Rusinowitch, and M. Turuani. An NP decision pro-
cedure for protocol insecurity with XOR. Theoretical Computer Science, 338(1–
3):247–274, June 2005.
[29] J. Clark and J. Jacob. A survey of authentication protocol literature: Version1.0.
Technical report, University of York, Department of Computer Science, Nov.
1997.
[30] E. Cohen. First-order verification of cryptographic protocols. Journal of Com-
puter Security, 11(2):189–216, 2003.
[31] H. Comon-Lundh and V. Shmatikov. Intruder deductions, constraint solving and
insecurity decision in presence of exclusive or. In Symposium on Logic in Com-
puter Science (LICS’03), pages 271–280, Ottawa, Canada, June 2003. IEEE Com-
puter Society.
[32] V. Cortier, J. Millen, and H. Rueß. Proving secrecy is easy enough. In 14th
IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-14), pages 97–108, Cape
Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, June 2001. IEEE Computer Society.
[33] C. J. F. Cremers. Scyther - Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols. Ph.D.
dissertation, Eindhoven University of Technology, Nov. 2006.
64
[34] A. Datta, A. Derek, J. C. Mitchell, and D. Pavlovic. A derivation system and com-
positional logic for security protocols. Journal of Computer Security, 13(3):423–
482, 2005.
[35] H. de Nivelle. Ordering Refinements of Resolution. PhD thesis, Technische Uni-
versiteit Delft, Oct. 1995.
[36] M. Debbabi, M. Mejri, N. Tawbi, and I. Yahmadi. A new algorithm for the au-
tomatic verification of authentication protocols: From specifications to flaws and
attack scenarios. In DIMACS Workshop on Design and Formal Verification of
Security Protocols, Rutgers University, New Jersey, Sept. 1997.
[37] D. E. Denning and G. M. Sacco. Timestamps in key distribution protocols. Com-
mun. ACM, 24(8):533–536, Aug. 1981.
[38] W. Diffie and M. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, IT-22(6):644–654, Nov. 1976.
[39] D. Dolev and A. C. Yao. On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Theory, IT-29(12):198–208, Mar. 1983.
[40] A. Durante, R. Focardi, and R. Gorrieri. CVS at work: A report on new failures
upon some cryptographic protocols. In V. Gorodetski, V. Skormin, and L. Popy-
ack, editors, Mathematical Methods, Models and Architectures for Computer Net-
works Security (MMM-ACNS’01), volume 2052 of Lecture Notes on Computer
Science, pages 287–299, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 2001. Springer.
[41] N. Durgin, P. Lincoln, J. C. Mitchell, and A. Scedrov. Multiset rewriting and
the complexity of bounded security protocols. Journal of Computer Security,
12(2):247–311, 2004.
[42] S. Escobar, C. Meadows, and J. Meseguer. A rewriting-based inference system for
the NRL protocol analyzer and its meta-logical properties. Theoretical Computer
Science, 367(1-2):162–202, 2006.
[43] S. Escobar, C. Meadows, and J. Meseguer. Equational cryptographic reasoning
in the Maude-NRL protocol analyzer. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer
Science, 171(4):23–36, July 2007.
[44] F. J. T. Fa´brega, J. C. Herzog, and J. D. Guttman. Strand spaces: Proving security
protocols correct. Journal of Computer Security, 7(2/3):191–230, 1999.
[45] A. Gordon and A. Jeffrey. Typing one-to-one and one-to-many correspondences
in security protocols. In M. Okada, B. Pierce, A. Scedriv, H. Tokuda, and
A. Yonezawa, editors, Software Security – Theories and Systems, Mext-NSF-JSPS
International Symposium, ISSS 2002, volume 2609 of Lecture Notes on Computer
Science, pages 263–282, Tokyo, Japan, Nov. 2002. Springer.
[46] A. Gordon and A. Jeffrey. Authenticity by typing for security protocols. Journal
of Computer Security, 11(4):451–521, 2003.
65
[47] A. Gordon and A. Jeffrey. Types and effects for asymmetric cryptographic proto-
cols. Journal of Computer Security, 12(3/4):435–484, 2004.
[48] J. Goubault-Larrecq, M. Roger, and K. N. Verma. Abstraction and resolution
modulo AC: How to verify Diffie-Hellman-like protocols automatically. Journal
of Logic and Algebraic Programming, 64(2):219–251, Aug. 2005.
[49] J. D. Guttman and F. J. T. Fa´brega. Authentication tests and the structure of
bundles. Theoretical Computer Science, 283(2):333–380, 2002.
[50] J. Heather, G. Lowe, and S. Schneider. How to prevent type flaw attacks on secu-
rity protocols. In 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-
13), pages 255–268, Cambridge, England, July 2000.
[51] J. Heather and S. Schneider. A decision procedure for the existence of a rank
function. Journal of Computer Security, 13(2):317–344, 2005.
[52] H. Krawczyk. SKEME: A versatile secure key exchange mechanism for internet.
In Internet Society Symposium on Network and Distributed Systems Security, Feb.
1996. Available at http://bilbo.isu.edu/sndss/sndss96.html.
[53] G. Lowe. Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using
FDR. In Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems,
volume 1055 of Lecture Notes on Computer Science, pages 147–166. Springer,
1996.
[54] G. Lowe. A hierarchy of authentication specifications. In 10th Computer Security
Foundations Workshop (CSFW ’97), pages 31–43, Rockport, Massachusetts, June
1997. IEEE Computer Society.
[55] C. Lynch. Oriented equational logic programming is complete. Journal of Sym-
bolic Computation, 21(1):23–45, 1997.
[56] C. Meadows and P. Narendran. A unification algorithm for the group Diffie-
Hellman protocol. In Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS’02),
Portland, Oregon, Jan. 2002.
[57] C. A. Meadows. The NRL protocol analyzer: An overview. Journal of Logic
Programming, 26(2):113–131, 1996.
[58] J. Millen and V. Shmatikov. Symbolic protocol analysis with an abelian group
operator or Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. Journal of Computer Security,
13(3):515–564, 2005.
[59] J. C. Mitchell, M. Mitchell, and U. Stern. Automated analysis of cryptographic
protocols using Murϕ. In 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages
141–151, 1997.
[60] R. M. Needham and M. D. Schroeder. Using encryption for authentication in
large networks of computers. Commun. ACM, 21(12):993–999, Dec. 1978.
66
[61] R. M. Needham and M. D. Schroeder. Authentication revisited. Operating Sys-
tems Review, 21(1):7, 1987.
[62] D. Otway and O. Rees. Efficient and timely mutual authentication. Operating
Systems Review, 21(1):8–10, 1987.
[63] L. C. Paulson. The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols. Jour-
nal of Computer Security, 6(1–2):85–128, 1998.
[64] A. W. Roscoe and P. J. Broadfoot. Proving security protocols with model checkers
by data independence techniques. Journal of Computer Security, 7(2, 3):147–190,
1999.
[65] M. Rusinowitch and M. Turuani. Protocol insecurity with finite number of ses-
sions is NP-complete. Theoretical Computer Science, 299(1–3):451–475, Apr.
2003.
[66] D. X. Song, S. Berezin, and A. Perrig. Athena: a novel approach to efficient
automatic security protocol analysis. Journal of Computer Security, 9(1/2):47–
74, 2001.
[67] P. Syverson. A taxonomy of replay attacks. In 7th IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Workshop (CSFW-94), pages 131–136, Franconia, New Hampshire,
June 1994. IEEE Computer Society.
[68] P. Syverson and C. Meadows. A formal language for cryptographic protocol
requirements. Designs, Codes, and Cryptography, 7(1/2):27–59, 1996.
[69] C. Weidenbach. Towards an automatic analysis of security protocols in first-
order logic. In H. Ganzinger, editor, 16th International Conference on Automated
Deduction (CADE-16), volume 1632 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence,
pages 314–328, Trento, Italy, July 1999. Springer.
[70] T. Y. C. Woo and S. S. Lam. Authentication for distributed systems. Computer,
25(1):39–52, Jan. 1992.
[71] T. Y. C. Woo and S. S. Lam. A semantic model for authentication protocols. In
Proceedings IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pages 178–
194, Oakland, California, May 1993.
[72] T. Y. C. Woo and S. S. Lam. Authentication for distributed systems. In D. Denning
and P. Denning, editors, Internet Besieged: Countering Cyberspace Scofflaws,
pages 319–355. ACM Press and Addison-Wesley, Oct. 1997.
Appendices
A Instrumented Processes
Let last(s) be the last element of the sequence of session identifiers s, or ∅ when
s = ∅. Let label(ℓ) be defined by label(a[t, s]) = (a, last(s)) and label(b0[a[s]]) =
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(a, last(s)). We define the multiset Label (P ) as follows: Label((νa : ℓ)P ) =
{label(ℓ))} ∪ Label (P ), Label(!iP ) = ∅, and in all other cases, Label(P ) is the
union of the Label (P ′) for all immediate subprocesses P ′ of P . Let Label(E) =
{label(E(a)) | a ∈ dom(E)} and Label(S) = {(a, λ) | λ ∈ S, a any name function
symbol}.
Definition 16 An instrumented semantic configuration is a triple S,E,P such that S
is a countable set of constant session identifiers, the environment E is a mapping from
names to closed patterns, and P is a multiset of closed processes. The instrumented se-
mantic configuration is S,E,P well-labeled when the multiset Label (S)∪Label(E)∪⋃
P∈P Label(P ) contains no duplicates.
Lemma 5 Let P0 be a closed process and P ′0 = instr(P0). Let Q be an Init-adversary
and Q′ = instrAdv(Q). Let E0 such that fn(P ′0) ∪ Init ⊆ dom(E0) and, for all
a ∈ dom(E0), E0(a) = a[ ]. The configuration S0, E0, {P ′0, Q′} is a well-labeled
instrumented semantic configuration.
Proof We have Label(E0) = {(a, ∅) | a ∈ dom(E0)}, Label(P ′0) = {(a, ∅) | (νa :
a[. . .]) occurs in P ′0 not under a replication}, and Label(Q′) = {(a, ∅) | (νa : b0[a[ ]])
occurs in Q′ not under a replication}. These multisets contain no duplicates since the
bound names of P ′0 and Q′ are pairwise distinct and distinct from names in dom(E0).
So the multiset Label(S0)∪Label (E0)∪Label(P ′0)∪Label(Q′) contains no duplicates.
2
Lemma 6 If S,E,P is a well-labeled instrumented semantic configuration and
S,E,P → S′, E′,P ′ then S′, E′,P ′ is a well-labeled instrumented semantic con-
figuration.
Proof We proceed by cases on the reduction S,E,P → S′, E′,P ′. The rule (Red
Repl) removes the labels (a, λ) for a certain λ from Label(S) and adds some of them to
Label(P). The rule (Red Res) removes a label from Label(P) and adds it to Label (E).
Other rules can remove labels when they remove a subprocess, but they do not add
labels. 2
Lemma 7 Let S,E,P be an instrumented semantic configuration. Let σ be a substitu-
tion and σ′ be defined by σ′x = E(σx) for all x. For all terms M , E(σM) = σ′E(M)
and, for all atoms α, E(σα) = σ′E(α).
Proof We prove the result for terms M by induction on M .
• If M = x, E(σx) = σ′x = σ′E(x) by definition of σ′.
• If M = a, E(σa) = E(a) = σ′E(a), since E(a) is closed.
• If M is a composite term M = f(M1, . . . ,Mn), E(σM) = f(E(σM1), . . . ,
E(σMn)) = f(σ
′E(M1), . . . , σ
′E(Mn)) = σ
′E(M), by induction hypothesis.
The extension to atoms is similar to the case of composite terms. 2
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Lemma 8 If S,E,P is a well-labeled instrumented semantic configuration, M and
M ′ are closed terms, and E(M) = E(M ′), then M = M ′.
Proof The multiset Label (E) does not contain duplicates, hence different names in
E have different associated patterns, therefore different terms have different associated
patterns. 2
Lemma 9 If S,E,P is a well-labeled instrumented semantic configuration, M ′ is a
closed term, and E(M ′) = σE(M), then there exists a substitution σ′ such that M ′ =
σ′M and, for all variables x of M , E(σ′x) = σx. We have a similar result for atoms
and for tuples containing terms and atoms.
Proof We prove the result for terms by induction on M .
• If M = x, E(M ′) = σE(M) = σx. We define σ′ by σ′x = M ′.
• If M is a name, E(M) is closed, so E(M ′) = σE(M) = E(M). By Lemma 8,
M ′ = M = σ′M for any substitution σ′.
• If M is a composite term M = f(M1, . . . ,Mn), E(M ′) = f(σE(M1), . . . ,
σE(Mn)). Therefore, M ′ = f(M ′1, . . . ,M ′n) with E(M ′i) = σE(Mi) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By induction hypothesis, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists
σ′i such that M ′i = σ′iMi and, for all variables x of Mi, E(σ′ix) = σx. For
all i, j, if x occurs in Mi and Mj , E(σ′ix) = σx = E(σ′jx), so by Lemma 8,
σ′ix = σ
′
jx. Thus we can merge all substitutions σ′i into a substitution σ′ defined
by σ′x = σ′ixwhen x occurs inMi. So we haveM ′ = σ′M and, for all variables
x of M , E(σ′x) = σx.
The extension to atoms and to tuples of terms and atoms is similar to the case of com-
posite terms. 2
Proof (of Lemma 1) Let Q be an Init -adversary and Q′ = instrAdv(Q). Let E0
containing fn(P0) ∪ Init ∪ fn(α) ∪
⋃
j fn(αj) ∪
⋃
j,k fn(Mjk). Consider a trace
T = E0, {P0, Q} → E1,P1. Let σ such that T satisfies σα. By Proposition 1, letting
E′0 = {a 7→ a[ ] | a ∈ E0}, there is a trace T ′ = S0, E′0, {P ′0, Q′} →∗ S′, E′1,P ′1,
unInstr(P ′1) = P1, and both traces satisfy the same atoms, so T ′ also satisfies σα.
Since E′0 contains the names of α, αj , and Mjk, and E′1 is an extension of E′0,
E′1(α) = E
′
0(α) = F , E
′
1(αj) = E
′
0(αj) = Fj , and E′1(Mjk) = E′0(Mjk) = pjk.
Let σ′′ be defined by σ′′x = E1(σx) for all x. By Lemma 7, E′1(σα) = σ′′E′1(α), so
E′1(σα) = σ
′′F . Hence T ′ satisfies σ′′F . Since P ′0 satisfies the given correspondence,
there exist σ′′0 and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that σ′′0Fj = σ′′F and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , lj},
T ′ satisfies event(σ′′0 pjk), so there exists M ′′k such that E′1(M ′′k ) = σ′′0 pjk and
T ′ satisfies event(M ′′k ). Hence E′1(M ′′k ) = σ′′0E′1(Mjk) and E′1(σα) = σ′′F =
σ′′0Fj = σ
′′
0E
′
1(αj), that is, E′1((M ′′1 , . . . ,M ′′lj , σα)) = σ
′′
0E
′
1(Mj1, . . . ,Mjlj , αj).
By Lemma 9, there exists σ0 such that (M ′′1 , . . . ,M ′′lj , σα) = σ0(Mj1, . . . ,Mjlj , αj).
So σα = σ0αj and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , lj}, T ′ satisfies event(σ0Mjk), so T also
satisfies event(σ0Mjk). 2
69
message(E(M), E(N)) ∈ FP ′
0
,Init E ⊢ P
E ⊢M〈N〉.P
(Output)
∀T ′ such that message(E(M), T ′) ∈ FP ′
0
,Init , E[x 7→ T
′] ⊢ P
E ⊢M(x).P
(Input)
E ⊢ 0
(Nil)
E ⊢ P E ⊢ Q
E ⊢ P | Q
(Parallel)
∀λ,E[i 7→ λ] ⊢ P
E ⊢ !iP
(Replication)
E[a 7→ E(ℓ)] ⊢ P
E ⊢ (νa : ℓ)P
(Restriction)
∀T such that g(E(M1), . . . , E(Mn)) → T,E[x 7→ T ] ⊢ P E ⊢ Q
E ⊢ let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q
(Destructor application)
event(E(M)) ∈ FP ′
0
,Init if m-event(E(M)) ∈ FP ′
0
,Init then E ⊢ P
E ⊢ event(M).P
(Event)
Figure 7: Type rules
B Proof of Theorem 1
The correctness proof uses a type system as a convenient way of expressing invariants
of processes. This type system can be seen as a modified version of the type system
of [1, Section 7], which was used to prove the correctness of our protocol verifier for
secrecy properties. In this type system, the types are closed patterns:
T ::= types
a[T1, . . . , Tn, λ1, . . . , λk] name
f(T1, . . . , Tn) constructor application
The symbols λ1, . . . , λk are constant session identifiers, in a set S0. Let FP ′
0
,Init be
the set of closed facts derivable from RP ′
0
,Init ∪ Fme.
The type rules are defined in Figure 7. The environment E is a function from
names and variables in Vo to types and from variables in Vs to constant session
identifiers. The mapping E is extended to all terms as a substitution by E(f(M1,
. . . ,Mn)) = f(E(M1), . . . , E(Mn)) and to restriction labels by E(a[M1, . . . ,Mn,
i1, . . . , in′ ]) = a[E(M1), . . . , E(Mn), E(i1), . . . , E(in′)] andE(b0[a[i1, . . . , in′ ]]) =
b0[a[E(i1), . . . , E(in′)]], so that it maps closed terms and restriction labels to types.
The rules define the judgment E ⊢ P , which means that the process P is well-typed
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in the environment E. We do not consider the case of conditionals here, since it is a
particular case of destructor applications.
We say that an instrumented semantic configuration S,E,P is well-typed, and we
write ⊢ S,E,P , when it is well-labeled and E ⊢ P for all P ∈ P .
Proof sketch (of Theorem 1) Let P0 be the considered process and P ′0 = instr(P0).
Let Q be an Init -adversary and Q′ = instrAdv(Q). Let E0 such that fn(P ′0)∪ Init ⊆
dom(E0) and for all a ∈ dom(E0), E0(a) = a[ ].
1. Typability of the adversary: Let P ′ be a subprocess of Q′. Let E be an envi-
ronment such that ∀a ∈ fn(P ′), attacker(E(a)) ∈ FP ′
0
,Init and ∀x ∈ fv (P ′),
attacker(E(x)) ∈ FP ′
0
,Init . (In particular, E is defined for all free names and
free variables of P ′.) We show that E ⊢ P ′, by induction on P ′. This result is
similar to [1, Lemma 5.1.4]. In particular, we obtain E0 ⊢ Q′.
2. Typability of P ′0: We prove by induction on the process P , subprocess of P ′0,
that, if (a) ρ binds all free names and variables of P , (b) RP ′
0
,Init ⊇ [[P ]]ρH , (c)
σ is a closed substitution, and (d) σH can be derived from RP ′
0
,Init ∪ Fme, then
σρ ⊢ P . This result is similar to [1, Lemma 7.2.2].
In particular, RP ′
0
,Init ⊇ [[P
′
0]]ρ∅, where ρ = {a 7→ a[ ] | a ∈ fn(P ′0)}. So, with
E = σρ = {a 7→ a[ ] | a ∈ fn(P ′0)}, E ⊢ P
′
0. A fortiori, E0 ⊢ P ′0.
3. Properties of P ′0, Q′: By Lemma 5, S0, E0, {P ′0, Q′} is well-labeled. So, using
the first two points, ⊢ S0, E0, {P ′0, Q′}.
4. Substitution lemma: Let E′ = E[x 7→ E(M)]. We show by induction on M ′
that E(M ′{M/x}) = E′(M ′). We show by induction on P that, if E′ ⊢ P ,
then E ⊢ P{M/x}. This result is similar to [1, Lemma 5.1.1].
5. Subject reduction: Assume that ⊢ S,E,P and S,E,P → S′, E′,P ′. Further-
more, assume that, if the reduction S,E,P → S′, E′,P ′ executes event(M),
then m-event(E(M)) ∈ Fme. Then ⊢ S′, E′,P ′. This is proved by cases on the
derivation of S,E, P → S′, E′, P ′. This result is similar to [1, Lemma 5.1.3].
6. Consider the trace T = S0, E0, {P ′0, Q′} →∗ S′, E′,P ′. By the hypoth-
esis of the theorem, if event(M) has been executed in T , then T satisfies
event(E′(M)), so m-event(E′(M)) ∈ Fme. If the reduction that executes
event(M) is S,E,P → S,E,P ′′, we have E(M) = E′(M), since E′ is an
extension of E, and E already contains the names of M . Hence we obtain the
hypothesis of subject reduction. So, by Items 3 and 5, we infer that all configu-
rations in the trace are well-typed.
When F = event(p), since T satisfies event(p), there exists M such that T
satisfies event(M) and E′(M) = p. So T contains a reduction S1, E1,P1 ∪
{event(M).P} → S1, E1,P1 ∪ {P}. Therefore E1 ⊢ event(M).P , so
event(E1(M)) ∈ FP ′
0
,Init . Moreover, E1(M) = E′(M) since E′ is an ex-
tension of E1, therefore event(E′(M)) = event(p) = F is derivable from
RP ′
0
,Init ∪ Fme.
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When F = message(p, p′), since T satisfies message(p, p′), there exist M and
M ′ such that T satisfies message(M,M ′), E′(M) = p, and E′(M ′) = p′.
So T contains a reduction S1, E1,P1 ∪ {M〈M ′〉.P,M(x).Q} → S1, E1,P1 ∪
{P,Q{M/x}}. Therefore E1 ⊢ M〈M ′〉.P . This judgment must have been
derived by (Output), so message(E1(M), E1(M ′)) ∈ FP ′
0
,Init . Moreover,
E1(M) = E
′(M) and E1(M ′) = E′(M ′) since E′ is an extension of
E1, so message(E
′(M), E′(M ′)) = message(p, p′) = F is derivable from
RP ′
0
,Init ∪ Fme.
When F = attacker(p′), T also satisfies message(c[ ], p′) for some c ∈ Init .
Therefore, by the previous case, message(c[ ], p′) is derivable from RP ′
0
,Init ∪
Fme. Since c ∈ Init , attacker(c[ ]) is in RP ′
0
,Init . So, by Clause (Rl),
attacker(p′) = F is derivable from RP ′
0
,Init ∪ Fme. 2
C Correctness of the Solving Algorithm
In terms of security, the soundness of our analysis means that, if a protocol is found
secure by the analysis, then it is actually secure. Showing soundness in this sense
essentially amounts to showing that no derivable fact is missed by the resolution al-
gorithm, which, in terms of logic programming, is the completeness of the resolution
algorithm. Accordingly, in terms of security, the completeness of our analysis would
mean that all secure protocols can be proved secure by our analysis. Completeness in
terms of security corresponds, in terms of logic programming, to the correctness of the
resolution algorithm, which means that the resolution algorithm does not derive false
facts.
The completeness of “binary resolution with free selection”, which is our basic al-
gorithm, was proved in [9, 35, 55]. We extend these proofs by showing that complete-
ness still holds with our simplifications of clauses. (These simplifications are often
specific to security protocols.)
As a preliminary, we define a sort system, with three sorts: session identifiers, or-
dinary patterns, and environments. Name function symbols expect session identifiers
as their last k arguments where k is the number of replications above the restriction
that defines the considered name function symbol, and ordinary patterns as other ar-
guments. The pattern a[p1, . . . , pn, i1, . . . , ik] is an ordinary pattern. Constructors f
expect ordinary patterns as arguments and f(p1, . . . , pn) is an ordinary pattern. The
predicates attacker and message expect ordinary patterns as arguments. The predi-
cate event expects an ordinary pattern and, for injective events, a session identifier.
The predicate m-event expects an ordinary pattern and, for injective events, an envi-
ronment. We say that a pattern, fact, clause, set of clauses is well-sorted when these
constraints are satisfied.
Lemma 10 All clauses manipulated by the algorithm are well-sorted, and if a variable
occurs in the conclusion of a clause and is not a session identifier, then it also occurs
in non-m-event facts in its hypothesis.
72
Proof It is easy to check that all patterns and facts are well-sorted in the clause gener-
ation algorithm. One only unifies patterns of the same sort. The environment ρ and the
substitutions always map a variable to a pattern of the same sort. During the building
of clauses, the variables in the image of ρ that are not session identifiers also occur in
non-m-event facts in H , and the variables in the conclusion of generated clauses are in
the image of ρ. Hence, the clauses in RP ′
0
,Init satisfy Lemma 10.
Furthermore, this property is preserved by resolution. Resolution generates a clause
R′′ = σuH ∧ σuH ′ ⇒ σuC′ from clauses R = H ⇒ C and R′ = H ′ ∧F0 ⇒ C′ that
satisfy Lemma 10, where σu is the most general unifier of C and F0. The substitution
σu unifies elements of the same sort, so σu maps each variable to an element of the
same sort, so R′′ is well-sorted. If a non-session identifier variable x occurs in σuC′,
then there is a non-session identifier variable y in C′ such that x occurs in σuy. Then
y occurs in non-m-event facts in the hypothesis of R′, H ′ ∧ F0. First case: y occurs
in non-m-event facts in H ′, so x occurs in σuH ′, so x occurs in non-m-event facts
in the hypothesis of R′′. Second case: y occurs in F0, so x occurs in σuF0 = σuC,
so there is a non-session identifier variable z such that z occurs in C and x occurs in
σuz, so z occurs in non-m-event facts in H , so x occurs in non-m-event facts in σuH ,
so x occurs in non-m-event facts in the hypothesis of R′′. In both cases, x occurs in
non-m-event facts in the hypothesis of R′′. Therefore, R′′ satisfies Lemma 10.
This property is also preserved by the simplification functions. 2
Definition 17 (Derivation) Let F be a closed fact. Let R be a set of clauses. A
derivation of F from R is a finite tree defined as follows:
1. Its nodes (except the root) are labeled by clauses R ∈ R.
2. Its edges are labeled by closed facts. (Edges go from a node to each of its sons.)
3. If the tree contains a node labeled by R with one incoming edge labeled by F0
and n outgoing edges labeled by F1, . . . , Fn, then R ⊒ {F1, . . . , Fn} ⇒ F0.
4. The root has one outgoing edge, labeled by F . The unique son of the root is
named the subroot.
In a derivation, if there is a node labeled by R with one incoming edge labeled by
F0 and n outgoing edges labeled by F1, . . . , Fn, then the clause R can be used to infer
F0 from F1, . . . , Fn. Therefore, there exists a derivation of F from R if and only if F
can be inferred from clauses in R (in classical logic).
The key idea of the proof of Lemma 2 is the following. Assume that F is derivable
fromR0∪Fme and consider a derivation of F fromR0∪Fme. Assume that the clauses
R and R′ are applied one after the other in the derivation of F . Also assume that these
clauses have been combined by R ◦F0 R′, yielding clause R′′. In this case, we replace
R and R′ with R′′ in the derivation of F . When no more replacement can be done, we
show that all remaining clauses have no selected hypothesis. So all these clauses are in
R1 = saturate(R0), and we have built a derivation of F from R1.
To show that this replacement process terminates, we remark that the total number
of nodes of the derivation strictly decreases.
73
Next, we introduce the notion of data-decomposed derivation. This notion is useful
for proving the correctness of the decomposition of data constructors. (In the absence
of data constructors, all derivations are data-decomposed.)
Definition 18 A derivation D is data-decomposed if and only if, for all edges η′ → η
in D labeled by attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)) for some data constructor f , the node η′ is
labeled by a clause attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) ⇒ attacker(xi) for some i or the node
η is labeled by the clause attacker(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(xn) ⇒ attacker(f(x1, . . . ,
xn)).
Intuitively, a derivation is data-decomposed when all intermediate facts proved
in that derivation are decomposed as much as possible using data-destructor clauses
attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) ⇒ attacker(xi) before being used to prove other facts. We
are going to transform the initial derivation into a data-decomposed derivation. Further
transformations of the derivation will keep it data-decomposed.
The next lemma shows that two nodes in a derivation can be replaced by one when
combining their clauses by resolution.
Lemma 11 Consider a data-decomposed derivation containing a node η′, labeled R′.
Let F0 be a hypothesis of R′. Then there exists a son η of η′, labeled R, such that the
edge η′ → η is labeled by an instance of F0, R◦F0R′ is defined, and, if sel(R) = ∅ and
F0 ∈ sel(R′), one obtains a data-decomposed derivation of the same fact by replacing
the nodes η and η′ with a node η′′ labeled R′′ = R ◦F0 R′.
Proof This proof is illustrated in Figure 8. Let R′ = H ′ ⇒ C′, H ′1 be the multiset of
the labels of the outgoing edges of η′, and C′1 the label of its incoming edge. We have
R′ ⊒ (H ′1 ⇒ C
′
1), so there exists σ such that σH ′ ⊆ H ′1 and σC′ = C′1. Hence there
is an outgoing edge of η′ labeled σF0, since σF0 ∈ H ′1. Let η be the node at the end of
this edge, let R = H ⇒ C be the label of η. We rename the variables of R such that
they are distinct from the variables of R′. Let H1 be the multiset of the labels of the
outgoing edges of η. So R ⊒ (H1 ⇒ σF0). By the above choice of distinct variables,
we can then extend σ such that σH ⊆ H1 and σC = σF0.
The edge η′ → η is labeled σF0, instance of F0. Since σC = σF0, the facts C and
F0 are unifiable, so R ◦F0 R′ is defined. Let σ′ be the most general unifier of C and
F0, and σ′′ such that σ = σ′′σ′. We have R ◦F0 R′ = σ′(H ∪ (H ′ \ {F0})) ⇒ σ′C′.
Moreover, σ′′σ′(H ∪ (H ′ \ {F0})) ⊆ H1 ∪ (H ′1 \ {σF0}) and σ′′σ′C′ = σC′ = C′1.
Hence R′′ = R ◦F0 R′ ⊒ (H1 ∪ (H ′1 \ {σF0})) ⇒ C′1. The multiset of labels of
outgoing edges of η′′ is precisely H1 ∪ (H ′1 \ {σF0}) and the label of its incoming
edge is C′1, therefore we have obtained a correct derivation by replacing η and η′ with
η′′.
Let us show that the obtained derivation is data-decomposed. Consider an edge
η′1 → η1 in this derivation, labeled by F = attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)), where f is a data
constructor.
• If η′1 and η1 are different from η′′, then the same edge exists in the initial deriva-
tion, so it is of the desired form.
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Figure 8: Merging of nodes of Lemma 11
• If η′1 = η′′, then there is an edge η → η1 labeled by F in the initial
derivation. Since the initial derivation is data-decomposed, η is labeled by
R = attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) ⇒ attacker(xi) or η1 is labeled by R1 =
attacker(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(xn) ⇒ attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)). The former
case is impossible because sel(R) = ∅. In the latter case, η1 is labeled by R1, so
we have the desired form in the obtained derivation.
• If η1 = η′′, then there is an edge η′1 → η′ labeled by F in the initial
derivation. Since the initial derivation is data-decomposed, η′1 is labeled by
R′1 = attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) ⇒ attacker(xi) or η
′ is labeled by R′ =
attacker(x1) ∧ . . .∧ attacker(xn) ⇒ attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)). The latter case
is impossible because sel(R) 6= ∅. In the former case, η′1 is labeled by R′1, so we
have the desired form in the obtained derivation.
Hence the obtained derivation is data-decomposed. 2
Lemma 12 If a node η of a data-decomposed derivation D is labeled by R, then one
obtains a data-decomposed derivation D′ of the same fact as D by relabeling η with a
clause R′ such that R′ ⊒ R.
Proof Let H be the multiset of labels of outgoing edges of the considered node η,
and C be the label of its incoming edge. We have R ⊒ H ⇒ C. By transitivity of ⊒,
R′ ⊒ H ⇒ C. So we can relabel η with R′.
Let us show that the obtained derivation D′ is data-decomposed. Consider an edge
η′1 → η1 in D′, labeled byF = attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)), where f is a data constructor.
• If η′1 and η1 are different from η, then the same edge exists in the initial derivation
D, so it is of the desired form.
• If η′1 = η, then there is an edge η′1 → η1 in D, labeled by F . Since D
is data-decomposed, η′1 = η is labeled by R = attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) ⇒
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attacker(xi) or η1 is labeled by R1 = attacker(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(xn) ⇒
attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) in D. In the latter case, we have the desired form in
D′. In the former case, let R′ = H ′ ⇒ C′. We have R′ ⊒ R, so there ex-
ists σ such that σH ′ ⊆ {attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn))} and σC′ = attacker(xi).
Hence C′ = attacker(y) where σy = xi, and H ′ = ∅ or H ′ = attacker(z)
with σz = f(x1, . . . , xn) or H ′ = attacker(f(y1, . . . , yn)) with σyj = xj
for all j ≤ n. By Lemma 10, y occurs in H ′, so H ′ 6= ∅. If we had
H ′ = attacker(z), σz 6= σy, so z 6= y, so this case is impossible. Hence
H ′ = attacker(f(y1, . . . , yn)). Moreover, σyj 6= σy for all j 6= i, so yj 6= y
for all j 6= i. Since y occurs in H ′, y = yi. Hence R′ = R up to renaming, and
we have the desired form in D′.
• If η1 = η, then there is an edge η′1 → η1 in D, labeled by F . Since
D is data-decomposed, η′1 is labeled by R′1 = attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) ⇒
attacker(xi) or η1 = η is labeled by R = attacker(x1)∧ . . .∧attacker(xn) ⇒
attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) in D. In the former case, we have the desired form in
D′. In the latter case, letR′ = H ′ ⇒ C′. We haveR′ ⊒ R, so there exists σ such
that σH ′ ⊆ {attacker(x1), . . . , attacker(xn)} and σC′ = attacker(f(x1, . . . ,
xn)). Hence H ′ =
∧
j∈J attacker(yj) where J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and σyj = xj
for all j ∈ J , and C′ = attacker(y) with σy = f(x1, . . . , xn) or C′ =
attacker(f(y′1, . . . , y
′
n)) with σy′j = xj for all j ≤ n. By Lemma 10, if
C′ = attacker(y), y occurs in H ′, but this is impossible because σyj 6= σy
for all j ∈ J . So C′ = attacker(f(y′1, . . . , y′n)). By Lemma 10, y′j occurs in H ′
for all j ≤ n, so J = {1, . . . , n} and y′j = yj for all j ≤ n. Hence R′ = R up
to renaming, and we have the desired form in D′.
Hence the obtained derivation D′ is data-decomposed. 2
Definition 19 We say that R ⊒Set R′ if, for all clauses R in R′, R is subsumed by a
clause of R.
Lemma 13 If R ⊒Set R′ and D is a data-decomposed derivation containing a node
η labeled by R ∈ R′, then one can build a data-decomposed derivation D′ of the same
fact as D by relabeling η with a clause in R.
Proof Obvious by Lemma 12. 2
Lemma 14 If R ⊒Set R′, then elim(R) ⊒Set R′.
Proof This is an immediate consequence of the transitivity of ⊒. 2
Lemma 15 At the end of saturate, R satisfies the following properties:
1. For all R ∈ R0, R ⊒Set simplify(R);
2. Let R ∈ R and R′ ∈ R. Assume that sel(R) = ∅ and there exists F0 ∈ sel(R′)
such that R ◦F0 R′ is defined. In this case, R ⊒Set simplify(R ◦F0 R′).
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Proof To prove the first property, let R ∈ R0. We show that, after the addition of R
to R, R ⊒Set simplify(R).
In the first step of saturate, we execute the instruction R ← elim(simplify(R) ∪
R). We have simplify(R) ∪ R ⊒Set simplify(R), so, by Lemma 14, after execution
of this instruction, R ⊒Set simplify(R).
Assume that we execute R← elim(simplify(R′′) ∪R), and before this execution
R ⊒Set simplify(R). Hence simplify(R′′) ∪R ⊒Set simplify(R), so, by Lemma 14,
after the execution of this instruction, R ⊒Set simplify(R).
The second property simply means that the fixpoint is reached at the end of
saturate, so R = elim(simplify(R ◦F0 R
′)∪R). Since simplify(R ◦F0 R′)∪R ⊒Set
simplify(R◦F0R
′), by Lemma 14, elim(simplify(R◦F0R′)∪R) ⊒Set simplify(R◦F0
R′), so R ⊒Set simplify(R ◦F0 R
′). 2
Lemma 16 Let f ∈ {elimattx , elimtaut , elimnot , elimredundanthyp , elimdup,
decomp, decomphyp , simplify , simplify ′}.
If the data-decomposed derivationD contains a node η labeledR, then one obtains
a data-decomposed derivation D′ of the same fact as D or of an instance of a fact in
Fnot by relabeling η with some R′ ∈ f(R) or removing η, and possibly deleting nodes.
Furthermore, if D′ is not a derivation of the same fact as D, then η is removed.
If D′ contains a node labeled R′ ∈ f(R), then there exists a derivation D using R,
the clauses of D′ except R′, and the clauses of R0 that derives the same fact as D′.
When R is unchanged by f , that is, f(R) = {R}, this lemma is obvious. So, in the
proofs below, we consider only the cases in which R is modified by f .
Proof (for elimattx ) The direct part is obvious: R′ is built fromR by removing some
hypotheses, so we just remove the subtrees corresponding to removed hypotheses of R.
Conversely, let p be a closed pattern such that attacker(p) is derivable from R0.
(There exists an infinite number of such p.) We build a derivation D by replacing R′
with R in D and adding a derivation of attacker(p) as a subtree of the nodes labeled
by R′ in D. 2
Proof (for elimtaut ) Assume that R is a tautology. For the direct part, we remove η
and replace it with one of its subtrees. The converse is obvious since elimtaut(R) = ∅.
2
Proof (for elimnot ) Assume that R contains as hypothesis an instance F of a fact
in Fnot. Then elimnot(R) = ∅. Since D is a derivation, a son η′ of η infers an
instance of F . We let D′ be the sub-derivation with subroot η′. D′ is a derivation of an
instance of a fact in Fnot, so we obtain the direct part. The converse is obvious since
elimnot(R) = ∅. 2
Proof (for elimredundanthyp) We have R = H ∧H ′ ⇒ C, σH ⊆ H ′, σ does not
change the variables of H ′ and C, and R′ = H ′ ⇒ C.
For the direct part, R′ is built from R by removing some hypotheses, so we just
remove the subtrees corresponding to removed hypotheses of R.
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For the converse, we obtain a derivation D by duplicating the subtrees proving
instances of elements of H ′ that are also in σH and replacing R′ with R. 2
Proof (for elimdup) For the direct part, R′ is built from R by removing some hy-
potheses, so we just remove the subtrees corresponding to removed hypotheses of R.
Conversely, we can form a derivation using R instead of R′ by duplicating the
subtrees that derive the duplicate hypotheses of R. 2
Proof (for decomp and decomphyp) If R is modified by decomp or decomphyp ,
then R is of one of the following forms:
• R = attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn))∧H ⇒ C, where f is a data constructor (for both
decomp and decomphyp).
For the direct part, let η′ be the son of η corresponding to the hypothesis
attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)). The edge η → η′ is labeled by an instance of
attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)), so, since D is data-decomposed, η′ is labeled by
attacker(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(xn) ⇒ attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)). (The clause
R that labels η cannot be attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) ⇒ attacker(xi), since this
clause would be unmodified by decomp and decomphyp .) Then we build D′ by
relabeling η with R′ = attacker(p1)∧. . .∧attacker(pn)∧H ⇒ C and deleting
η′.
For the converse, we replace R′ = attacker(p1)∧ . . .∧ attacker(pn)∧H ⇒ C
in D′ with attacker(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(xn) ⇒ attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) and
R = attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)) ∧H ⇒ C in D.
• R = H ⇒ attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)), where f is a data constructor (for decomp
only).
For the direct part, let η′ be the father of η. The edge η′ → η is labeled by an in-
stance of attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)), so, since D is data-decomposed, η′ is labeled
by attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) ⇒ attacker(xi) for some i. (The clause R that la-
bels η cannot be attacker(x1)∧ . . .∧attacker(xn) ⇒ attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn))
since this clause would be unmodified by decomp.) Then we build D′ by rela-
beling η with R′ = H ⇒ attacker(pi) and deleting η′.
For the converse, we replace R′ = H ⇒ attacker(pi) in D′ with R = H ⇒
attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)) and attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) ⇒ attacker(xi) in D. 2
Proof (for simplify and simplify ′) For simplify and simplify ′, the result is obtained
by applying Lemma 16 for the functions that compose simplify and simplify ′. 2
Proof of Lemma 2 Let F be a closed fact. If, for all F ′ ∈ Fnot, no instance of F ′
is derivable from saturate(R0) ∪Fme, then F is derivable from R0 ∪Fme if and only
if F is derivable from saturate(R0) ∪ Fme.
Proof Assume that F is derivable from R0 ∪ Fme and consider a derivation of F
from R0 ∪ Fme. We show that F or an instance of a fact in Fnot is derivable from
saturate(R0) ∪ Fme.
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Figure 9: Construction of a data-decomposed derivation
We first transform the derivation of F into a data-decomposed derivation. We say
that an edge η′ → η is offending when it is labeled by Ff = attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn))
for some data constructor f , η′ is not labeled by Rf,i = attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) ⇒
attacker(xi) for some i, and η is not labeled by Rf = attacker(x1) ∧ . . . ∧
attacker(xn) ⇒ attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)). We consider an offending edge η′ → η
such that the subtree D of root η contains no offending edge. We copy the subtree D,
which concludes Ff , n times and add the clauses Rf,i for i = 1, . . . n, to conclude
Ff,i = attacker(pi), then use the clause Rf to conclude Ff again, as in Figure 9. This
transformation decreases the total number of data constructors at the root of labels of
offending edges. Indeed, since there are no offending edges in D, the only edges that
may be offending in the new subtree of root η′ are those labeled by F1, . . . , Fn. The
total number of data constructors at the root of their labels is the total number of data
constructors at the root of p1, . . . , pn, which is one less than the total number of data
constructors at the root of f(p1, . . . , pn). Hence, this transformation terminates and,
upon termination, the obtained derivation contains no offending edge, so it is data-
decomposed.
We consider the value of the set of clauses R at the end of saturate. For each
clause R in R0, R ⊒Set simplify(R) (Lemma 15, Property 1). Assume that there
exists a node labeled by R ∈ R0 \ R in this derivation. By Lemma 16, we can replace
R with someR′′ ∈ simplify(R) or removeR. (After this replacement, we may obtain a
derivation of an instance of a fact in Fnot instead of a derivation of F .) If R is replaced
with R′′, by Lemma 13, we can replace R′′ with a clause in R. This transformation
decreases the number of nodes labeled by clauses not in R. So this transformation
terminates and, upon termination, no node of the obtained derivation is labeled by a
clause in R0 \ R. Therefore, we obtain a data-decomposed derivation D of F or of an
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instance of a fact in Fnot from R∪ Fme.
Next, we build a data-decomposed derivation ofF or of an instance of a fact inFnot
from R1 ∪ Fme, where R1 = saturate(R0). If D contains a node labeled by a clause
not in R1 ∪Fme, we can transform D as follows. Let η′ be a lowest node of D labeled
by a clause not inR1∪Fme. So all sons of η′ are labeled by elements ofR1∪Fme. Let
R′ be the clause labeling η′. Since R′ /∈ R1 ∪ Fme, sel(R′) 6= ∅. Take F0 ∈ sel(R′).
By Lemma 11, there exists a son of η of η′ labeled by R, such that R ◦F0 R′ is defined.
Since all sons of η′ are labeled by elements ofR1∪Fme, R ∈ R1∪Fme. By definition
of the selection function, F0 is not a m-event fact, so R /∈ Fme, so R ∈ R1. Hence
sel(R) = ∅. So, by Lemma 15, Property 2, R ⊒Set simplify(R ◦F0 R′). So, by
Lemma 11, we can replace η and η′ with η′′ labeled by R ◦F0 R′. By Lemma 16, we
can replace R ◦F0 R′ with some R′′′ ∈ simplify(R ◦F0 R′) or remove R ◦F0 R′.
• If R ◦F0 R′ is replaced with R′′′, then by Lemma 13, we can replace R′′′ with
a clause in R. The total number of nodes strictly decreases since η and η′ are
replaced with a single node.
• If R ◦F0 R′ is removed, then the total number of nodes strictly decreases since η
and η′ are removed.
So in all cases, we obtain a derivation D′ of F or of an instance of a fact in Fnot
from R ∪ Fme, such that the total number of nodes strictly decreases. Hence, this
replacement process terminates. Upon termination, all clauses are in R1 ∪ Fme. So
we obtain a data-decomposed derivation of F or of an instance of a fact in Fnot from
R1 ∪ Fme, which is the expected result.
For the converse implication, notice that if a fact is derivable from R1 then it is
derivable from R, and that all clauses added to R do not create new derivable facts:
when composing two clauses R and R′, the created clause can derive facts that could
also by derived by R and R′. 2
Proof of Lemma 3 Let F ′ be a closed instance of F . If, for all F ′′ ∈ Fnot,
derivable(F ′′,R1) = ∅, then F ′ is derivable from R1 ∪ Fme if and only if there exist
a clause H ⇒ C in derivable(F,R1) and a substitution σ such that σC = F ′ and all
elements of σH are derivable from R1 ∪ Fme.
Proof Let us prove the direct implication. Let F = {(F, F ′)} ∪ {(F ′′, σF ′′) | F ′′ ∈
Fnot, σ any substitution}. We show that, if F ′ is derivable from R1 ∪ Fme, then there
exist a clause H ⇒ C in derivable(Fg,R1) and a substitution σ such that (Fg, σC) ∈
F and all elements of σH are derivable from R1 ∪ Fme. (This property proves the
desired result. If, for all F ′′ ∈ Fnot, derivable(F ′′,R1) = ∅ and F ′ is derivable from
R1 ∪ Fme, then there exist a clause H ⇒ C in derivable(Fg,R1) and a substitution σ
such that (Fg, σC) ∈ F and all elements of σH are derivable from R1 ∪ Fme. Since,
for all F ′′ ∈ Fnot, derivable(F ′′,R1) = ∅, we have Fg = F and F /∈ Fnot. Since
(F, σC) ∈ F , we have then σC = F ′.)
Let D be the set of derivations D′ of a fact Fi such that, for some Fg and
R, (Fg, Fi) ∈ F , the clause R′ at the subroot of D′ satisfies deriv(R′,R,R1) ⊆
derivable(Fg,R1) and ∀R′′ ∈ R, R′′ 6⊒ R′, and the other clauses of D′ are in
R1 ∪ Fme.
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Let attacker′ be a new predicate symbol. Let D be a derivation. If D is a deriva-
tion of attacker(p), we let D′ be the derivation obtained by replacing the clause
H ⇒ attacker(p1) with H ⇒ attacker′(p1) and the fact attacker(p) derived by
D with attacker′(p). If D is not a derivation of attacker(p), we let D′ be D. We
say that the derivation D is almost-data-decomposed when D′ is data-decomposed.
We first show that all derivations D in D are almost-data-decomposed. Let D′ be the
transformed derivation as defined above. Let η′ → η be an edge of D′ labeled by
F = attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)), where f is a data constructor. This edge is not the out-
going edge of the root of D′, because D′ does not conclude attacker(p) for any p. So
the clause that labels η is of the form R = H ⇒ attacker(p) and it is in R1. In order
to obtain a contradiction, assume that p is a variable x. Since sel(R) = ∅, H contains
only unselectable facts. By Lemma 10, x occurs in non-m-event facts in H , so H
contains attacker(x). So R is a tautology. This is impossible because R would have
been removed from R1 by elimtaut . So p is not a variable. Hence p = f(p′1, . . . , p′n).
If R was different from attacker(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(xn) ⇒ attacker(f(x1, . . . ,
xn)), R would have been transformed by decomp, so R would not be in R1. Hence
R = attacker(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(xn) ⇒ attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)). Therefore,
D′ is data-decomposed, so D is almost-data-decomposed. Below, when we apply
Lemma 11, 16, or 12, we first transform the considered derivation D into D′, apply
the lemma to the data-decomposed derivation D′, and transform it back by replacing
attacker′ with attacker. We obtain the same result as by transforming D directly, be-
cause the simplifications of simplify ′ apply in the same way when the conclusion is
attacker(p) or attacker′(p), since simplify ′ uses decomphyp instead of decomp and
does not use elimtaut .
Let D0 be a derivation of F ′ from R1 ∪ Fme. Let D′0 be obtained from D0 by
adding a node labeled by {F} ⇒ F at the subroot of D0. By definition of derivable,
deriv(R′, ∅,R1) ⊆ derivable(F,R1), and ∀R′′ ∈ ∅, R′′ 6⊒ R′. Hence D′0 is a deriva-
tion of F ′ in D, so D is non-empty.
Now consider a derivation D1 in D with the smallest number of nodes. The
clause R′ labeling the subroot η′ of D1 satisfies (Fg, Fi) ∈ F , deriv(R′,R,R1) ⊆
derivable(Fg,R1), and ∀R′′ ∈ R, R′′ 6⊒ R′. In order to obtain a contradiction, we
assume that sel(R′) 6= ∅. Let F0 ∈ sel(R′). By Lemma 11, there exists a son η of
η′, labeled by R, such that R ◦F0 R′ is defined. By hypothesis on the derivation D1,
R ∈ R1 ∪ Fme. By the choice of the selection function, F0 is not a m-event fact, so
R /∈ Fme, so R ∈ R1. Let R0 = R ◦F0 R′. So, by Lemma 11, we can replace R′ with
R0, obtaining a derivation D2 of Fi with fewer nodes than D1.
By Lemma 16, we can either replace R0 with some R′0 ∈ simplify
′(R0) or remove
R0, yielding a derivation D3.
• In the latter case, D3 is a derivation of a fact F ′i which is either Fi or an instance
of a fact F ′g in Fnot. If F ′i = Fi, we let F ′g = Fg. So (F ′g, F ′i ) ∈ F .
We replace R0 with R′0 = F ′g ⇒ F ′g in D2. Hence we obtain a derivation with
fewer nodes than D1 and such that deriv(R′0, ∅,R1) ⊆ derivable(F ′g,R1) and
∀R1 ∈ ∅, R1 6⊒ R′0. So we have a derivation in D with fewer nodes than D1,
which is a contradiction.
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• In the former case, D3 is a derivation of Fi, and deriv(R′0, {R′} ∪ R,R1) ⊆
deriv(R′,R,R1) ⊆ derivable(Fg,R1) (third case of the definition of deriv(R′,
R,R1)).
– If ∀R1 ∈ {R′} ∪ R, R1 6⊒ R′0, D3 is a derivation of Fi in D, with fewer
nodes than D1, which is a contradiction.
– Otherwise, ∃R1 ∈ {R′} ∪ R, R1 ⊒ R′0. Therefore, by Lemma 12, we can
build a derivation D4 by replacing R′0 with R1 in D3. There is an older
call to deriv, of the form deriv(R1,R′,R1), such that deriv(R1,R′,R1) ⊆
derivable(Fg,R1). Moreover, R1 has been added to R′ in this call,
since R1 appears in {R′} ∪ R. Therefore the third case of the defini-
tion of deriv(R1,R′,R1) has been applied, and not the first case. So
∀R2 ∈ R′, R2 6⊒ R1, so the derivation D4 is in D and has fewer nodes
than D1, which is a contradiction.
In all cases, we could find a derivation in D that has fewer nodes than D1. This is a
contradiction, so sel(R′) = ∅, hence R′ ∈ derivable(Fg,R1). The other clauses of this
derivation are in R1 ∪ Fme. By definition of a derivation, R′ ⊒ H ′ ⇒ Fi where H ′
is the multiset of labels of the outgoing edges of the subroot of the derivation. Taking
R′ = H ⇒ C, there exists σ such that σC = Fi and σH ⊆ H ′, so all elements of σH
are derivable from R1 ∪ Fme. We have the result, since (Fg, Fi) ∈ F .
The proof of the converse implication is left to the reader. (Basically, the clause
R ◦F0 R
′ does not generate facts that cannot be generated by applying R and R′.) 2
D Termination Proof
In this section, we give the proof of Proposition 3 stated in Section 8.1. We denote by
P0 a tagged protocol and let P ′0 = instr(P0). We have the following properties:
• By Condition C2, the input and output constructs in the protocol always use a
public channel c. So the facts message(c, p) are replaced with attacker(p) in all
clauses. The only remaining clauses containing message are (Rl) and (Rs). Since
message(x, y) is selected in these clauses, the only inference with these clauses
is to combine (Rs) with (Rl), and it yields a tautology which is immediately
removed. Therefore, we can ignore these clauses in our termination proof.
• By hypothesis on the queries and Remark 3, the clauses do not contain m-event
facts.
In this section, we use the sort system defined at the beginning of Appendix C
(Lemma 10).
The patterns of a fact pred(p1, . . . , pn) are p1, . . . , pn. The patterns of a clause R
are the patterns of all facts in R, and we denote the set of patterns of R by patterns(R).
A pattern is said to be non-data when it is not of the form f(. . .) with f a data con-
structor. The set sub(S) contains the subterms of patterns in the set S. Below, we use
the word “program” for a set of clauses (that is, a logic program).
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Definition 20 (Weakly tagged programs) Let S0 be a finite set of closed patterns and
tagGen be a set of patterns.
A pattern is top-tagged when it is an instance of a pattern in tagGen .
A pattern is fully tagged when all its non-variable non-data subterms are top-tagged.
Let RProtAdv be the set of clauses R that satisfy Lemma 10 and are of one of the
following three forms:
1. RProtocol contains clauses R of the form F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn ⇒ F where for all i, Fi
is of the form attacker(p) for some p, F is of the form attacker(p) or event(p)
for some p, there exists a substitution σ such that patterns(σR) ⊆ sub(S0), and
the patterns of R are fully-tagged.
2. RConstr contains clauses of the form attacker(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(xn) ⇒
attacker(f(x1, . . . , xn)) where f is a constructor.
3. RDestr contains clauses of the form attacker(f(p1, . . . , pn)) ∧ attacker(x1) ∧
. . .∧ attacker(xk) ⇒ attacker(x) where f is a constructor, p1, . . . , pn are fully
tagged, x is one of p1, . . . , pn, and f(p1, . . . , pn) is more general than every
pattern of the form f(. . .) in sub(S0).
A programR0 is weakly tagged if there exist a finite set of closed patterns S0 and a set
of patterns tagGen such that
W1. R0 is included in RProtAdv.
W2. If two patterns p1 and p2 in tagGen unify, p′1 is an instance of p1 in sub(S0),
and p′2 is an instance of p2 in sub(S0), then p′1 = p′2.
Intuitively, a pattern is top-tagged when its root function symbol is tagged (that
is, it is of the form f((ct ,M1, . . . ,Mn), . . .)). A pattern is fully tagged when all its
function symbols are tagged.
We are going to show that all clauses generated by the resolution algorithm are
in RProtAdv. Basically, the clauses in RProtocol satisfy two conditions: they can be
instantiated into clauses whose patterns are in sub(S0) and they are tagged. Then, all
patterns in clauses of RProtocol are instances of tagGen and have instance in sub(S0).
Property W2 allows us to show that this property is preserved by resolution: when
unifying two patterns that satisfy the invariant, the result of the unification also satisfies
the invariant, because the instances in sub(S0) of those two patterns are in fact equal.
Thanks to this property, we can show that clauses obtained by resolution from clauses
in RProtocol are still in RProtocol. To prove termination, we show that the size of
generated clauses decreases, for a suitable notion of size defined below. The clauses of
RConstr and RDestr are needed for constructors and destructors. Although they do not
satisfy exactly the conditions for being in RProtocol, their resolution with a clause in
RProtocol yields a clause in RProtocol.
Let Paramspk and Paramshost be the sets of arguments of pk resp. host in the
terms that occur in the trace of Condition C5. Let condense(R0) be the set of clausesR
obtained byR ← ∅; for each R ∈ R0,R← elim(simplify(R)∪R). We first consider
the case in which a single long-term key is used, that is, Paramspk and Paramshost
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E,P ∪ { 0 },M→ E,P ,M (Red Nil’)
E,P ∪ { !iP },M→ E[i 7→ Id0],P ∪ {P{Id0/i} },M∪ {Id0} (Red Repl’)
E,P ∪ {P | Q },M→ E,P ∪ {P,Q },M (Red Par’)
E,P ∪ { (νa : ℓ)P } → E[a 7→ E(ℓ)],P ∪ {P },M∪{M1, . . . ,Mn, a}
(Red Res’)
E,P ∪ { c〈M〉.Q },M→ E,P ∪ {Q },M∪ {M} (Red Out’)
E,P ∪ { c(x).P },M→ E[x 7→ E(M)],P ∪ {P{M/x} },M if M ∈M
(Red In’)
E,P ∪ { let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else 0 },M→
E[x 7→ E(M ′)],P ∪ {P{M ′/x} },M∪{M1, . . . ,Mn,M
′}
if g(M1, . . . ,Mn) →M ′
(Red Destr 1’)
E,P ∪ { event(M).Q },M→ E,P ∪ {Q },M∪ {M} (Red Event’)
Figure 10: Special semantics for instrumented processes
have at most one element. The results will be generalized to any number of keys at
the end of this section. The next proposition shows that the initial clauses given to the
resolution algorithm form a weakly tagged program.
Proposition 4 If P0 is a tagged protocol such that Paramspk and Paramshost have
at most one element and P ′0 = instr(P0), then condense(RP ′0,Init ) is a weakly tagged
program.
Proof sketch The fully detailed proof is very long (about 8 pages) so we give only
a sketch here. A similar proof (for strong secrecy instead of secrecy and reachability)
with more details can be found in the technical report [16, Appendix C].
We assume that different occurrences of restrictions and variables have different
identifiers and identifiers different from free names and variables. In Figure 10, we
define a special semantics for instrumented processes, which is only used as a tool in
the proof. A semantic configuration consists of three components: an environment
E mapping names and variables to patterns, a multiset of instrumented processes P ,
and a set of terms M. The semantics is defined as a reduction relation on semantic
configurations. In this semantics, (νa) creates the name a, instead of a fresh name a′.
Indeed, creating fresh names is useless, since the replication does not copy processes
in this semantics, and the names are initially pairwise distinct.
LetE0 = {a 7→ a[ ] | a ∈ fn(P0)}. We show thatE0, {P ′0}, fn(P0) →∗ E′, ∅,M′,
for some E′ andM′, such that the second argument of pencryptp inM′ is of the form
pk(M) and the arguments of pk and host in M′ are atomic constants in Paramspk
and Paramshost respectively. This result is obtained by simulating in the semantics of
Figure 10 the trace of Condition C5. Moreover, the second argument of pencryptp in
M′ is of the form pk (M) by Condition C6 and the arguments of pk and host in M′
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are atomic constants in Paramspk and Paramshost respectively, by Condition C7 and
definition of Paramspk and Paramshost .
Let us define S0 = E′(M′) ∪ {b0[Id0]}. If Paramspk is empty, we add some
key k to it, so that Paramspk = {k}. Let c, c′, c′′, c′′′ be constants. If S0 contains
no instance of sencrypt(x, y), we add sencrypt((c, c′), c′′) to S0. If S0 contains no
instance of sencryptp(x, y, z), we add sencryptp((c, c′), c′′, c′′′) to S0. If S0 contains
no instance of pencryptp(x, y, z), we add pencryptp((c, c′), pk (k), c′′) to S0. If S0
contains no instance of sign(x, y), we add sign((c, c′), k) to S0. If S0 contains no
instance of nmrsign(x, y), we add nmrsign((c, c′), k) to S0. So S0 is a finite set of
closed patterns. Intuitively, S0 is the set of patterns corresponding to closed terms that
occur in the trace of Condition C5.
Let Et be E in which all patterns a[. . .] are replaced with their corresponding term
a. In all reductions E0, {P ′0}, fn(P0) →∗ E,P ,M, all patterns of the form a[. . .] in
the image of E are equal to E(a), so E ◦ Et = E. We show the following result by
induction on P :
Let P be an instrumented process, subprocess of P ′0. Assume that E0,
{P ′0}, fn(P0) →
∗ E,P ∪ {Et(P )},M →∗ E′, ∅,M′, and that there
exists σ′ such that E′|dom(ρ) = σ
′◦ρ and patterns(σ′H) ⊆ sub(S0). Then
for all R ∈ [[P ]]ρH , there exists σ′′ such that patterns(σ′′R) ⊆ sub(S0).
Let ρ0 = {a 7→ a[ ] | a ∈ fn(P0)}. By applying this result to P = P ′0, we obtain that
for all clauses R in [[P ′0]]ρ0∅, there exists a substitution σ such that patterns(σR) ⊆
sub(S0).
Let
tagGen = {f((ct i, x1, . . . , xn), x
′
2, . . . , x
′
n′) |
f ∈ {sencrypt , sencryptp , pencryptp , sign,nmrsign, h,mac}}
∪ {a[x1, . . . , xn] | a name function symbol}
∪ {pk(x), host (x)} ∪ {c | c atomic constant}
We show the following result by induction on P :
Assume that the patterns of the image of ρ and of H are fully tagged.
Assume that P is an instrumented process, subprocess of P ′0. For all R ∈
[[P ]]ρH , patterns(R) are fully tagged.
This result relies on Condition C3 to show that the created terms are tagged, and on
Condition C4 to show that the tags are checked. By applying this result to P = P ′0, we
obtain that for all R ∈ [[P ′0]]ρ0∅, the patterns of R are fully tagged.
By the previous results, [[P ′0]]ρ0∅ ⊆ RProtocol.
The clauses (Rf) are in RConstr. The clauses (Init) and (Rn) are in RProtocol given
the value of S0. The clauses (Rg) for nthi, sdecrypt , sdecryptp , pdecryptp , and
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getmessage are:
attacker((x1, . . . , xn)) ⇒ attacker(xi) (nthi)
attacker(sencrypt(x, y)) ∧ attacker(y) ⇒ attacker(x) (sdecrypt )
attacker(sencryptp(x, y, z)) ∧ attacker(y) ⇒ attacker(x) (sdecryptp)
attacker(pencryptp(x, pk (y), z)) ∧ attacker(y) ⇒ attacker(x) (pdecryptp)
attacker(sign(x, y)) ⇒ attacker(x) (getmessage)
and they are in RDestr provided that all public-key encryptions in S0 are of the form
pencryptp(p1, pk (p2), p3) (that is, Condition C6). The clauses for checksignature and
nmrchecksign are
attacker(sign(x, y)) ∧ attacker(pk (y)) ⇒ attacker(x) (checksignature)
attacker(nmrsign(x, y)) ∧ attacker(pk (y)) ∧ attacker(x) ⇒ attacker(true)
(nmrchecksign)
These two clauses are subsumed respectively by the clauses for getmessage (given
above) and true (which is simply attacker(true) since true is a zero-ary construc-
tor), so they are eliminated by condense , i.e., they are not in condense(RP ′
0
,Init ).
(This is important, because they are not in RDestr.) Therefore all clauses in
condense(RP ′
0
,Init ) are in RProtAdv, since the set of clauses RProtAdv is preserved
by simplification, so we have Condition W1.
Different patterns in tagGen do not unify. Moreover, each pattern in tagGen has at
most one instance in sub(S0). For pk(x) and host(x), this comes from the hypothesis
that Paramspk and Paramshost have at most one element. For atomic constants, this
is obvious. (Their only instance is themselves.) For other patterns, this comes from
the fact that the trace of Condition C5 executes each program point at most once, and
that patterns created at different programs points are associated with different symbols
(f, c) for f((c, . . .), . . .) and a for a[. . .]. (For f((c, . . .), . . .), this comes from Condi-
tion C3. For a[. . .], this is because different restrictions use a different function symbol
by construction of the clauses.) So we have Condition W2. 2
The next proposition shows that saturation terminates for weakly tagged programs.
Proposition 5 Let R0 be a set of clauses. If condense(R0) is a weakly tagged pro-
gram (Definition 20), then the computation of saturate(R0) terminates.
Proof This result is very similar to [20, Proposition 8], so we give only a brief sketch
and refer the reader to that paper for details.
We show by induction that all clauses R generated from R0 are in RProtocol ∪
RConstr ∪RDestr and the patterns of attacker facts in clauses R in RProtocol are non-
data.
First, by hypothesis, all clauses in condense(R0) satisfy this property, by definition
of weakly tagged programs and because of the decomposition of data constructors by
decomp.
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If we combine by resolution two clauses in RConstr ∪ RDestr, we in fact combine
a clause of RConstr with a clause of RDestr. The resulting clause is a tautology by
definition of RConstr and RDestr, so it is eliminated by elimtaut .
Otherwise, we combine by resolution a clause R in RProtocol with a clause R′
such that R′ ∈ RProtocol, sel(R′) = ∅, and sel(R) 6= ∅, or R′ ∈ RConstr, or R′ ∈
RDestr. Let R′′ be the clause obtained by resolution of R and R′. We show that the
patterns of R′′ are fully tagged, and for each σ such that patterns(σR) ⊆ sub(S0),
there exists σ′′ such that patterns(σ′′R′′) ⊆ sub(S0) and size(σ′′R′′) < size(σR),
where the size is defined as follows. The size of a pattern size(p) is defined as usual,
size(attacker(p)) = size(event(p)) = size(p), and size(F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn ⇒ F ) =
size(F1) + . . . + size(Fn) + size(F ).
Let Rs ∈ simplify(R′′). The patterns of Rs are non-data fully tagged,
patterns(σ′′Rs) ⊆ sub(S0), and size(σ′′Rs) ≤ size(σ′′R′′) < size(σR). So
Rs ∈ RProtocol and its patterns are non-data.
Moreover, for all generated clauses R, there exists σ such that size(σR) is smaller
than the maximum initial value of size(σR) for a clause of the protocol. There is a fi-
nite number of such clauses (since size(R) ≤ size(σR)). So saturate(R0) terminates.
2
Next, we show that derivable terminates when it is called on the result of the satu-
ration of a weakly tagged program.
Proposition 6 If F is a closed fact and R1 is a weakly tagged program simplified by
simplify such that, for all R ∈ R1, sel0(R) = ∅, then derivable(F,R1) terminates.
Proof We show the following property:
For all calls deriv(R,R,R1), R = F ⇒ F or R = attacker(p1) ∧ . . . ∧
attacker(pn) ⇒ F where p1, . . . , pn are closed patterns.
This property is proved by induction. It is obviously true for the initial call to deriv,
deriv(F ⇒ F, ∅,R1). For recursive calls to deriv, deriv(R′′,R,R1), the clause R′′ is
in simplify ′(R′ ◦F0 R), where R′ = attacker(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(xk) ⇒ F ′ since
R′ ∈ R1 and R = F ⇒ F or R = attacker(p1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(pn) ⇒ F where
p1, . . . , pn are closed patterns, by induction hypothesis. After unification of F ′ and F0,
xi is substituted by a closed pattern p′i (subpattern of F0, and F0 is closed since F0 is
a hypothesis of R), since xi appears in F ′. (If xi did not appear in F ′, attacker(xi)
would have been removed by elimattx .)
If R = F ⇒ F , R′ ◦F0 R = attacker(p′1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(p′k) ⇒ F has only
closed patterns in its hypotheses, and so has the clause R′′ in simplify ′(R′ ◦F0 R).
Otherwise, R = attacker(p1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(pn) ⇒ F , F0 = attacker(pi),
and pi is a closed pattern. We have R′ ◦F0 R = attacker(p′1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(p′k) ∧
attacker(p1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(pi−1) ∧ attacker(pi+1) ∧ . . . ∧ attacker(pn) ⇒ F ,
which has only closed patterns in its hypotheses, and so has the clause R′′ in
simplify ′(R′ ◦F0 R). Moreover, p′1, . . . , p′k are disjoint subterms of pi, therefore the
total size of p′1, . . . , p′k is strictly smaller than the size of pi. (If we had equality,
F ′ would be a variable; this variable would occur in the hypothesis by definition of
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RProtAdv, so R′ would have been removed by elimtaut .) Therefore the total size of
the patterns in the hypotheses strictly decreases. (The simplification function simplify ′
cannot increase this size.) This decrease proves termination. 2
From the previous results, we infer the termination of the algorithm for tagged pro-
tocols, when Paramspk and Paramshost have at most one element. The general case
can then be obtained as in [20]: we define a function OneKey which maps all ele-
ments of Paramspk and Paramshost to a single atomic constant. When P0 is a tagged
protocol, OneKey(P0) is a tagged protocol in which Paramspk and Paramshost are
singletons. We consider a “less optimized algorithm” in which elimination of duplicate
hypotheses and of tautologies are performed only for facts of the form attacker(x),
elimination of redundant hypotheses is not performed, and elimination of subsumed
clauses is performed only for eliminating the destructor clauses for checksignature
and nmrchecksign . We observe that the previous results still hold for the less opti-
mized algorithm, with the same proof, so this algorithm terminates on OneKey(P0).
All resolution steps possible for the less optimized algorithm applied to P0 are possi-
ble for the less optimized algorithm applied to OneKey(P0) as well (more patterns are
unifiable, and the remaining simplifications of the less optimized algorithm commute
with applications of OneKey). Hence, the derivations from RP ′
0
,Init are mapped by
OneKey to derivations from ROneKey(P ′
0
),Init , which are finite, so derivations from
RP ′
0
,Init are also finite, so the less optimized algorithm terminates on P0. We can then
show that the original, fully optimized algorithm also terminates on P0. So we finally
obtain Proposition 3.
E General Correspondences
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 5. For simplicity, we assume that the function
applications at the root of events are unary.
Lemma 17 Let P0 be a closed process and P ′0 = instr′(P0). Let Q be an Init-
adversary and Q′ = instrAdv(Q). Assume that, in P0, the arguments of events are
function applications. Let f be a function symbol. Assume that there is a single oc-
currence of event(f( )) in P0 and this occurrence is under a replication. Consider
any trace T = S0, E0, {P ′0, Q′} →∗ S′, E′,P ′. The multiset of session identifiers λ of
events event(f( ), λ) executed in T contains no duplicates.
Proof Let us define the multiset SId(P ) by SId(event(f(M), λ).P ) = {λ} ∪
SId(P ) (for the given function symbol f ), SId(!iP ) = ∅, and in all other cases,
SId(P ) is the union of the SId(P ′) for all immediate subprocesses P ′ of P . For a
trace T , let SId(T ) be the set of session identifiers λ of events event(f( ), λ) exe-
cuted in the trace T .
We show that, for each trace T = S0, E0, {P ′0, Q′} →∗ S′, E′,P ′, SId(T ) ∪⋃
P∈P′ SId(P )∪ S
′ contains no duplicates. The proof is by induction on the length of
the trace.
For the empty trace T = S0, E0, {P ′0, Q′} →∗ S0, E0, {P ′0, Q′}, SId(T ) = ∅ and
SId(P ′0) ∪ SId(Q) = ∅ by definition.
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The reduction (Red Repl) moves at most one session identifier from S′ to⋃
P∈P′ SId(P ) (without introducing duplicates since there is one occurrence of
event(f( ), )). The reduction (Red Event) moves at most one session identifier from⋃
P∈P′ SId(P ) to SId(T ). The other reductions can only remove session identifiers
from
⋃
P∈P′ SId(P ) (by removing subprocesses). 2
Lemma 18 Let P0 = C[event(f(M)).D[event(fm−event(M,x).P ]], where no
replication occurs in D[ ] above the hole [ ], and the variables and names bound in
P0 are all pairwise distinct and distinct from free names. Assume that, in P0, the ar-
guments of events are function applications, and that there is a single occurrence of
event(f( )) and of event(fm−event( , )) in P0.
Let Q be an Init -adversary and Q′ = instrAdv(Q). Let P ′0 = instr′(P0). Con-
sider a trace of P ′0: T = S0, E0,P0 = {P ′0, Q′} →∗ Sτf , Eτf ,Pτf .
Then there exists a function φi such that a) if event(fm−event(p, p′), λ) is executed
at step τ in T for some λ, p, p′, τ , then event(f(p), λ) is executed at step φi(τ) in T ,
b) φi is injective, and c) if φi(τ) is defined, then φi(τ) < τ .
Proof We denote by Sτ , Eτ ,Pτ the configuration at the step τ in the trace T . Let
S1(τ) = {(λ, p) | event(f(p), λ) is executed in the first τ steps of T },
S2(τ) = {(λ, p) | event(fm−event(p, p′), λ) is executed in the first τ steps of T }
S3(τ) = {(λ, p) | event(fm−event(M,M ′), λ) occurs not under event(f(M), λ) in
Pτ for Eτ (M) = p}
For each τ , we show that S2(τ) ∪ S3(τ) ⊆ S1(τ).
• For τ = 0, the sets S1(τ), S2(τ), and S3(τ) are empty.
• If Sτ , Eτ ,Pτ → Sτ+1, Eτ+1,Pτ+1 using (Red Event) to execute event(f(M),
λ), then the same (λ,Eτ+1(M)) is added to S3(τ + 1) and to S1(τ + 1).
Similarly, for (Red Event) executing event(fm−event(M,M ′), λ), a pair (λ,
Eτ+1(M)) is moved from S3(τ) to S2(τ + 1). These changes preserve the
desired inclusion.
• Otherwise, if Sτ , Eτ ,Pτ → Sτ+1, Eτ+1,Pτ+1, then S1(τ + 1) = S1(τ),
S2(τ + 1) = S2(τ), and S3(τ + 1) ⊆ S3(τ) (because some subprocesses may
be removed by the reduction).
In particular, S2(τf) ⊆ S1(τf). By Lemma 17, there is a bijection φ1 from the session
labels λ of executed event(f( ), λ) events in T to the steps at which these events are
executed in T , and similarly φ2 for event(fm−event( , ), ) events. Let φi = φ1◦φ−12 .
• If event(fm−event(p, p′), λ) is executed at step τ , (λ, p) ∈ S2(τf) ⊆ S1(τf), so
event(f(p), λ) is executed at a certain step τ ′. So φ2(λ) = τ and φ1(λ) = τ ′,
so φi(τ) is defined and τ ′ = φi(τ).
• Since φ1 and φ−12 are injective, φi is injective.
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• If φi(τ) is defined, the event event(fm−event(σy, σx), λ) is executed at step τ
by (Red Event). So (λ, σy) ∈ S3(τ), where Pτ corresponds to the state just be-
fore the event event(fm−event(σy, σx), λ) is executed. Hence (λ, σy) ∈ S1(τ)
since S2(τ) ∪ S3(τ) ⊆ S1(τ). So event(f(σy), λ) is executed at step τ ′ < τ .
We have φ2(λ) = τ and φ1(λ) = τ ′, so φi(τ) = τ ′ < τ . 2
Proof (of Theorem 5) For each non-empty jk, when [inj]jk = inj, let fjk be the
root function symbol of pjk . We consider a modified process P1 built from P0 as
follows. For each jk such that [inj]jk = inj and event(fjk(M)) occurs in P0, we
add another event event(fm−event
jk
(M,xjk)) just under the definition of variable xjk
if xjk is defined under event(fjk(M)) and just under event(fjk(M)) otherwise.
Let P ′1 = instr
′(P1). The process P ′1 is built from P ′0 as follows. For each jk
such that [inj]jk = inj and event(fjk(M), i) occurs in P ′0, we add another event
event(fm−event
jk
(M,xjk), i) just under the definition of variable xjk if xjk is de-
fined under event(fjk(M), i) and just under event(fjk(M), i) otherwise. (When
[inj]jk = inj, xjk ∈ dom(ρjrk) where ρjrk is the environment added as argument of
m-event facts in the clauses, so xjk is defined either above event(fjk(M), i) or under
event(fjk(M), i) without any replication between the event and the definition of xjk ,
since the domain of the environment given as argument to m-event is set at replications
by substituting  and not modified later.) We will show that P ′1 satisfies the desired
correspondence. It is then clear that P ′0 also satisfies it.
The clauses RP ′
1
,Init can be obtained from R′P ′
0
,Init by replacing all facts
m-event(p, ρ) with
m-event(p, i) ∧
∧
jk such that p=fjk(p′) and xjk∈dom(ρ)
m-event(fm−event
jk
(p′, ρ(xjk)), i)
for some i, and adding clauses that conclude event(fm−event
jk
(. . .), . . .).
The clauses in solveP ′
1
,Init can be obtained in the same way from solve′P ′
0
,Init . So
we can define a function verify′ like verify with an additional argument (xjkj′k′ )jkj′k′
by adding (xjkjkj′k′)jkj′k′ in the arguments of recursive call of Point V2.3 and replac-
ing Point V2.1 with solveP ′
1
,Init (event(p, i)) ⊆ {H ∧
∧lj
k=1 m-event(argjrk, ijrk) ⇒
event(σjrp
′
j , ijr) for some H , j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, r, ijrk, and (ρjrk, ijr) ∈ Env jk for all
k} where argjrk = σjrpjk if [inj]jk 6= inj, and argjrk = fm−eventjk (σjrp′, ρjrk(xjk))
if [inj]jk = inj and pjk = fjk(p′). When verify(q, (Env jk)jk) is true, verify
′(q,
(Env jk)jk, (xjk)jk) is also true.
Let Q be an Init -adversary and Q′ = instrAdv(Q). Let E0 such that E0(a) = a[ ]
for all a ∈ dom(E0) and fn(P ′1) ∪ Init ⊆ dom(E0). Let us now consider a trace of
P ′1, T = S0, E0, {P
′
1, Q
′} →∗ S′, E′,P ′.
By Lemma 18, for each non-empty jk such that [inj]jk = inj, there exists a func-
tion φi
jk
such that a) if event(fm−event
jk
(p, p′), λ) is executed at step τ in T for some
λ, p, p′, τ , then event(fjk(p), λ) is executed at step φijk(τ) in T , b) φijk is injective,
and c) if φi
jk
(τ) is defined, then φi
jk
(τ) < τ .
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When ψjk is a family of functions from steps to steps in a trace, we define ψ◦jk as
follows:
• ψ◦ǫ (τ) = τ for all τ ;
• for all jk, for all j and k, ψ◦
jkjk
= φi
jkjk
◦ ψjkjk ◦ ψ
◦
jk
when [inj]jkjk = inj and
ψ◦
jkjk
= ψjkjk ◦ ψ
◦
jk
otherwise.
We show that, if verify′(q′, (Env jk)jk, (xjk)jk) is true for
q′ = event(p) ⇒
m∨
j=1

event(p′j) 
lj∧
k=1
[inj]jkq
′
jk


q′
jk
= event(pjk) 
mjk∨
j=1
ljkj∧
k=1
[inj]jkjkq
′
jkjk
then there exists a function ψjk for each jk such that
P1. For all τ , if the event event(σp, λǫ) is executed at step τ in T , then there exist σ′′
and J = (jk)k such that σ′′p′jǫ = σp and, for all non-empty k, ψ
◦
makejk(k,J)
(τ)
is defined and event(σ′′pmakejk(k,J), λk) is executed at step ψ◦makejk(k,J)(τ) in
T .
P2. For all non-empty jk, if [inj]jk = inj and ψjk(τ) is defined, then event(p′′1 , λ′1)
is executed at step τ in T , event(fm−event
jk
(p′′2 , θρ(xjk)), λ
′
2) is executed at step
ψjk(τ) in T , and θi = λ′1 for some p′′1 , p′′2 , λ′1, λ′2, θ, and (ρ, i) ∈ Env jk,
where fjk is the root function symbol of pjk. (This property is used for proving
injectivity and recentness.)
P3. For all non-empty jk, if ψjk(τ) is defined, then ψjk(τ) ≤ τ .
The proof is by induction on q′.
• If q′ = event(p) (that is, m = 1, l1 = 0, and p1 = p), we define jǫ = 1 and
σ′′ = σ, so that σ′′p′jǫ = σp. All other conditions hold trivially, since there is no
non-empty k.
• Otherwise, we define ψjk as follows.
Using Point V2.1, by Theorem 3, P ′1 satisfies the correspondence
event(p, i) ⇒
∨
j=1..m,r

event(σjrp′j , ijr) 
lj∧
k=1
event(argjrk, ijrk)

 (24)
against Init-adversaries.
Assume that event(σp, λ) is executed at step τ in T for some substitution σ.
Let us consider the trace T cut just after step τ . By Correspondence (24), there
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exist σ′, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and r such that σ′σjrp′j = σp, σ′ijr = σλ = λ, and
for k ∈ {1, . . . , lj}, there exists λk such that event(σ′ argjrk, λk) is executed
in the trace T cut after step τ . So the event event(σ′ argjrk, λk) is executed at
step τk ≤ τ in T . In this case, we define ψjk(τ) = τk and r(τ) = r.
If [inj]jk = inj, then event(σ′σjrpjk, λk) is executed as step φijk(ψjk(τ)) =
ψ◦jk(τ).
If [inj]jk 6= inj, then argjrk = σjrpjk, so event(σ′σjrpjk, λk) is executed as
step ψjk(τ) = ψ◦jk(τ).
By construction, if ψjk(τ) is defined, then ψjk(τ) ≤ τ .
When [inj]jk = inj, we let fjk be the root function symbol of pjk .
By Point V2.3, for all j, r, k, verify′(σjrq′jk, (Env jkjk)jk, (xjkjk)jk) is true. So,
by induction hypothesis, there exist functions ψjrk,jk such that
– For all τk, if the event event(σ′σjrpjk, λk) is executed at step
τk in T , then there exist σ′′jrk and J = (jjrk,k)k such that
σ′′jrkσjrpjk = σ
′σjrpjk and, for all non-empty k, ψ◦jrk,makejk(k,J)(τk)
is defined and event(σ′′jrkσjrpjkmakejk(k,J), λkk) is executed at step
ψ◦
jrk,makejk(k,J)
(τk) in T .
– For all non-empty jk, if [inj]jkjk = inj and ψjrk,jk(τ) is defined, then
event(p′′1 , λ
′
1) is executed at step τ in T , event(fm−eventjkjk (p
′′
2 , θρ(xjkjk)),
λ′2) is executed at step ψjrk,jk(τ) in T and θi = λ′1 for some p′′1 , p′′2 , λ′1,
λ′2, θ, and (ρ, i) ∈ Env jkjk .
– For all non-empty jk, if ψjrk,jk(τ) is defined, then ψjrk,jk(τ) ≤ τ .
We define ψjkjk(τ) = ψjrk,jk(τ) for r = r(τ). Then we have ψ◦jkjk(τ) =
ψ◦
jrk,jk
(ψ◦jk(τ)) for r = r(τ).
Therefore, for all τ , if event(σp, λ) is executed at step τ in T , then
– there exist σ′, Jǫ = (jk)k , and r such that jǫ = j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, jk is unde-
fined for all k 6= ǫ, σ′σjrp′j = σp, and, for all k, ψ◦makejk(k,Jǫ)(τ) is defined
and event(σ′σjrpmakejk(k,Jǫ), λk) is executed as step ψ◦makejk(k,Jǫ)(τ);
– for all k, there exist σ′′jrk and Jk = (jkk)kk such that σ′′jrkσjrpjk =
σ′σjrpjk and, for all non-empty k, ψ◦makejk(kk,Jk)(τ) is defined and
event(σ′′jrkσjrpmakejk(kk,Jk), λkk) is executed at step ψ
◦
makejk(kk,Jk)
(τ)
in T .
We define a family of indices J by merging Jǫ and Jk for all k, that is, J = (jk)k.
Therefore, in order to obtain P1, it is enough to find a substitution σ′′ such that
σ′′p′j = σ
′σjrp
′
j , σ
′′pjk = σ
′σjrpjk, and σ′′pjkjk = σ′′jrkσjrpjkjk for all non-
empty jk. Let us define σu as follows:
– For all x ∈ fv (σjrp′j) ∪
⋃
k fv(σjrpjk), σux = σ
′x.
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– For all k, for all x ∈ fv (σjrq′jk) \ fv (σjrpjk), σux = σ′′jrkx.
By Point V2.2, these sets of variables are disjoint, so σu is well defined. Let
σ′′ = σuσjr .
We have σ′′p′j = σuσjrp′j = σ′σjrp′j and σ′′pjk = σuσjrpjk = σ′σjrpjk.
Since σ′′q′jk = σuσjrq′jk , we just have to show that σuσjrq′jk = σ′′jrkσjrq′jk .
We have σuσjrpjk = σ′σjrpjk = σ′′jrkσjrpjk. Therefore, if x ∈ fv(σjrpjk),
then σux = σ′′jrkx.5 Hence, for all x ∈ fv (σjrq′jk), σux = σ′′jrkx, which proves
that σuσjrq′jk = σ′′jrkσjrq′jk. Hence we obtain P1.
If [inj]jk = inj and ψjk(τ) is defined, then event(p′′1 , λ′1) = event(σp, λ) is
executed at step τ in T , event(fm−eventjk (p′′2 , θρ(xjk)), λ′2) = event(σ′ argjrk,
λk) is executed at step ψjk(τ) in T , and θi = λ′1 for some p′′1 = σp, p′′2 , λ′1 = λ,
λ′2 = λk, θ = σ
′
, and (ρ, i) = (ρjrk, ijr) ∈ Env jk. For all non-empty jk, if
[inj]jkjk = inj and ψjkjk(τ) is defined, then event(p′′1 , λ′1) is executed at step
τ in T , event(fm−event
jkjk
(p′′2 , θρ(xjkjk)), λ
′
2) is executed at step ψjkjk(τ) in T ,
and θi = λ′1 for some p′′1 , p′′2 , λ′1, λ′2, θ, and (ρ, i) ∈ Env jkjk . So we obtain P2.
If ψjk(τ) is defined, then ψjk(τ) ≤ τ . For all non-empty jk, if ψjkjk(τ) is
defined, then ψjkjk(τ) ≤ τ . Therefore, we have P3.
Let q = event(p) ⇒
∨m
j=1
(
event(p′j) 
∧lj
k=1[inj]jkqjk
)
, and qjk = event(pjk) ∨mjk
j=1
∧ljkj
k=1[inj]jkjkqjkjk. By Hypothesis H1, verify
′(q, (Env jk)jk, (xjk)jk) is true,
so there exists a function ψjk for each jk such that P1, P2, and P3 are satisfied. Let
φjk = ψ
◦
jk
.
• By P1, for all τ , if the event event(σp, λǫ) is executed at step τ in T , then
there exist σ′ and J = (jk)k such that σ′p′jǫ = σp and, for all non-empty
k, φmakejk(k,J)(τ) is defined and event(σ′pmakejk(k,J), λk) is executed at step
φmakejk(k,J)(τ) in T .
Let us show recentness. Suppose that [inj]makejk(k,J) = inj. We show that the
runtimes of session(λk⌈) and session(λk) overlap. We have φmakejk(k,J)(τ) =
φi
makejk(k,J)
(ψmakejk(k,J)(φmakejk(k⌈,J)(τ))). Let τ1 = φmakejk(k⌈,J)(τ). Then
ψmakejk(k,J)(τ1) is defined. Hence, by P2, e1 = event(p′′1 , λ′1) is executed
at step τ1 in T , e2 = event(fm−eventmakejk(k,J)(p
′′
2 , θρ(xmakejk(k,J))), λ
′
2) is exe-
cuted at step τ2 = ψmakejk(k,J)(τ1) in T by a reduction Sτ2 , Eτ2 ,Pτ2 →
Sτ2+1, Eτ2+1,Pτ2+1, and θi = λ′1 for some p′′1 , p′′2 , λ′1, λ′2, θ, and
(ρ, i) ∈ Envmakejk(k,J). Since the event event(σ′pmakejk(k⌈,J), λk⌈) is
also executed at step τ1 = φmakejk(k⌈,J)(τ), we have λ′1 = λk⌈. By
the properties of φi
makejk(k,J)
, event(fmakejk(k,J)(p
′′
2 ), λ
′
2) is executed at step
5This property does not hold in the presence of an equational theory (see Section 9.1). In that case, we
conclude by the additional hypothesis mentioned in Section 9.1.
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φi
makejk(k,J)
(τ2) = φmakejk(k,J)(τ). Moreover, event(σ
′pmakejk(k,J), λk) is
also executed at step φmakejk(k,J)(τ), so λ′2 = λk.
By Hypothesis H2, ρ(xmakejk(k,J)){λ/i} does not unify with
ρ(xmakejk(k,J)){λ
′/i} when λ 6= λ′, so i occurs in ρ(xmakejk(k,J)), so
λk⌈ = λ
′
1 = θi occurs in θρ(xmakejk(k,J)), so λk⌈ occurs in e2.
So e2 is executed after the rule S,E,P ∪ {!i
′
P ′} → S \ {λk⌈}, E,P ∪
{P ′{λk⌈/i
′}, !i
′
P ′} in T . Indeed, since λk⌈ occurs in the event e2 executed
at step τ2, λk⌈ ∈ SId
′(Eτ2) ∪ SId
′(Pτ2) where SId
′(P) (resp. SId ′(E)) is the
set of session identifiers λ that occur in P (resp. E). Moreover, SId ′(E0) ∪
SId ′({P ′1, Q
′}) = ∅, and the only rule that increases SId ′(E) ∪ SId ′(P)
is S,E,P ∪ {!iP ′} → S \ {λ}, E,P ∪ {P ′{λ/i}, !iP ′}, which adds λ to
SId ′(E) ∪ SId ′(P). Therefore, e2 is executed after the beginning of the run-
time of session(λk⌈).
Moreover, e2 is executed at step τ2 = ψmakejk(k,J)(τ1) and e1 is executed
at step τ1 in T , with ψmakejk(k,J)(τ1) ≤ τ1, so e2 is executed before e1 =
event(p′′1 , λk⌈).
So e2 = event(fm−eventmakejk(k,J)(p
′′
2 , θρ(xmakejk(k,J))), λk) is executed during the
runtime of session(λk⌈), therefore the runtimes of session(λk⌈) and session(λk)
overlap.
• Let us show that, for all non-empty jk, if [inj]jk = inj, then ψjk is injective. Let
τ1 and τ2 such that ψjk(τ1) = ψjk(τ2). By P2, event(p′′1 , λ′1) is executed at step
τ1 in T , event(fm−event
jk
(p′′3 , θ1ρ1(xjk)), λ
′
3) is executed at step ψjk(τ1) in T ,
and θ1i1 = λ′1 for some p′′1 , p′′3 , λ′1, λ′3, θ1, and (ρ1, i1) ∈ Env jk. Also by P2,
event(p′′2 , λ
′
2) is executed at step τ2 in T , event(fm−eventjk (p
′′
4 , θ2ρ2(xjk)), λ
′
4)
is executed at step ψjk(τ2) in T , and θ2i2 = λ′2 for some p′′1 , p′′4 , λ′2, λ′4, θ2,
and (ρ2, i2) ∈ Env jk . Since ψjk(τ1) = ψjk(τ2), θ1ρ1(xjk) = θ2ρ2(xjk). By
Hypothesis H2, this implies that θ1i1 = θ2i2, so λ′1 = λ′2. By Lemma 17,
τ1 = τ2, which proves the injectivity of ψjk .
• Let us show that, for all non-empty jk, if [inj]jk = inj, then φjk is injective, by
induction on the length of the sequence of indices jk.
For all j and k, if [inj]jk = inj, then φjk is injective since φijk , ψjk , and φǫ are
injective.
For all non-empty jk, for all j and k, if [inj]jkjk = inj, then, by hypothesis,
[inj]jk = inj, so, by induction hypothesis, φjk is injective. The functions φijkjk
and ψjkjk are injective, so φjkjk is also injective.
• For all jk, for all j and k, if φjkjk(τ) is defined, then φjk(τ) is defined, and
φjkjk(τ) ≤ φjk(τ), since φijkjk(τ
′′) ≤ τ ′′ and ψjkjk(τ ′) ≤ τ ′ by P3, when
they are defined.
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In particular, for all j and k, if φjk(τ) is defined, then φjk(τ) ≤ φǫ(τ) = τ .
This concludes the proof of the desired recent correspondence. 2
Proof (of Proposition 2) We have verify(q, (Env jk)jk) with Env jk = {(ρjrk, ijr) |
r ∈ {1, . . . , nj}}, because the first item implies V2.1, V2.2 holds trivially since
qjk reduces to event(pjk), and V2.3 also holds since qjk reduces to event(pjk), so
verify(σjrqjk, (Env jkjk)jk) holds by V1. The second item implies H2. So we have
the result by Theorem 5. 2
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